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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the role of the United Kingdom Parliament in the law 
making procedures of the European Union. 
Part one considers the constitutional position of Parliament in the European Union and 
examines the formal and informal relationship between Parliament and the European 
Institutions and their effect upon the legislative process. 
Part two focuses on the House of Commons scrutiny of European Community 
legislative proposals. It examines the work of the Select Committee on European 
Legislation, the two European Standing Committees and the Departmental Select 
Committees. A particular point of focus is their primary task, of influencing the minister 
before he gives final agreement to a legislative proposal in the Council of Ministers. 
Part two concludes with an analysis of how developments post Maastricht have affected 
the scrutiny process. Particular attention is paid to the co-decision legislative procedure 
and its impact on scrutiny. 
Part three focuses on the arrangements in the House of Lords for scrutiny of European 
decision making. The two core chapters examine and evaluate the Select Committee on 
the European Communities and the five subject related Sub-Committees. Where 
relevant, comparative analysis with procedures in the Commons is drawn. 
Developments post Maastricht are also considered by inquiring into the scrutiny 
arrangements for legislation proposed under the Inter-Governmental Pillars - the 
political cooperation forum within the European Union. Part three concludes by an 
appraisal of current proposals for reforming the Lords and their potential impact on 
scrutiny. 
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Part four. the conclusion. evaluates the evidence presented and proposes detailed 
reforms to the scrutiny process. The final paragraphs focus specifically on the outcome 
of the 1996-97 Inter-Governmental Conference whose agenda includes the role of 
national parliaments in the European Union. Within this context, the prospects for. and 
future likely developments to, the scrutiny process are considered. 
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PREFACE 
The thesis aims to provide an analysis of the developments that have taken place 
since 1973 which provide for the scrutiny of secondary European legislative proposals 
(i. e. regulations and directives) within the United Kingdom Parliament. Over this 
period, Parliament has sought to hold the minister accountable for decisions taken in the 
Council of Ministers by influencing him prior to the legislative proposal being 
confirmed. This is the central element of the scrutiny process. 
Law making by the institutions of the European Union has undoubtedly become 
more significant in terms of volume and its impact on domestic policy. However, unlike 
domestic legislation where Parliament is the Sovereign law-maker, in the European 
sphere Parliament cannot amend the legislation once agreed in Council. Thus the 
scrutiny process is the only opportunity for Parliament to influence the minister. For the 
UK, with its long tradition of Parliamentary democracy and accountability of the 
executive, it is vital that the effectiveness of this process is maximised. In particular, this 
means ensuring the effectiveness of the internal arrangements within both Houses of 
Parliament. 
I have therefore endeavoured to investigate and explain the importance of this law- 
making process, which has so far not been the object of any extensive academic research 
study. Whilst certain aspects of this process have been the subject of academic research 
and examination, for example, Professor St J. N. Bates 1991 analysis of the introduction 
of the two European Standing Committees published in the Statute Law Review (Vol. 
12 No. 2 p. 109), the legislative process as a whole, and in particular how developments 
post Maastricht have affected ministerial accountability, have not been the subject of 
any comprehensive research such as that undertaken for this thesis. 
The research has required detailed analysis of Parliamentary papers, principally 
Select Committee reports from both Houses of Parliament, dating back to the 1960s. It 
has also necessitated my attendance at numerous Select and Standing Committee 
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meetings where practical experience of the functioning of the scrutiny process was 
obtained. In addition, the investigation greatly benefited from oral evidence of, and 
correspondence with Parliamentary Clerks and Officials who provided invaluable 
information relating to the procedures in the various Committees. Finally, a complete 
picture of the process was obtained through discussions with MPs involved regularly in 
the scrutiny process or those having a particular interest in the relationship between 
Parliament and the European Union. 
I would like to thank all those many persons (see Appendix 1) who freely gave up 
their valuable time to discuss at length the subject matter of this thesis. Some such as 
Lord Slynn did this despite their other (more important) commitments. His comments 
relating to the work of Sub-Committee E in the House of Lords, the scrutiny body of 
greatest interest to me as a lawyer, provided a unique insight which contributed 
substantially to my understanding the importance of the work carried out by this Sub- 
Committee. Without the undoubted generosity of all these persons the thesis could not 
have been possible. I also wish to thank Dr Robert Blackburn without whose continual 
help, advice and encouragement the thesis would not have been completed. However, 
any errors in this work remain my own. 
The thesis describes the law and procedure as at 1 September 1996, with a few later 
developments which are of particular importance. 
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PART I- THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Introduction 
The process of law making within the European Community bears no resemblance 
to legislative procedures familiar to the UK Parliament. There are two essential 
differences. The first is the wide and lengthy consultative process embarked on by the 
Commission. This includes consultation not only with each Member State, but also with 
a variety of specific interest groups. This is a small part of an extremely wide and well 
developed lobbying process which has become an integral part of the EC legislative 
procedure. 
The second and most criticised difference is the fact that the final agreement on a 
legislative proposal is taken not by an elected Parliament but by the Council of 
Ministers behind closed doors. For this reason it is often contended that the legislation is 
devoid of any democratic legitimacy. No national parliament has any involvement in the 
final legislative stage. In fact it can be argued that the UK Parliament is itself only a 
small part of the lobbying process. 
The role of the UK Parliament is limited to an attempt to influence the minister prior 
to him casting his vote in the Council of Ministers. Thus, any influence Parliament may 
have comes solely through the existing scrutiny arrangements within Parliament. A 
similar point was made by the House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure in its 
Fourth Report of 1989: -1 
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"... the scrutiny procedures keep Members well informed on Community 
legislative proposals.... and together with the vigilance of pressure groups 
and other affected organisations, should make it highly unlikely that the 
House will be caught unawares as regards the existence of a particular item 
of Community legislation once it has been formally adopted by the 
Commission. " 
What the Procedure Committee is in fact saying is that Parliament should not isolate 
itself in this legislative process. There is an acceptance by the Procedure Committee 
that Parliament has neither the time nor the expertise to be involved in every aspect of 
Community legislation. Thus, it advocates a consensual approach, such as a partnership 
with other interested groups and a pooling of resources to ensure that the UK plays its 
full part in the Community legislative process. 
The lobbying of government by interest and pressure groups at the pre-legislative 
stage is an integral part of the legislative process in the United Kingdom. Thus, when 
the government publishes its consultative Green Paper this is an opportunity for 
interested parties to inform the government of their views on a particular policy or 
proposed Bill. This procedure works well within our Parliamentary democracy. The 
government, though under no legal or constitutional obligation to take on board the 
views presented to it, will nevertheless not ignore powerful groups such as The British 
Medical Association or The National Farmers Union. Even those groups that may be 
considered as naturally hostile, for example the TUC to the present government, will all 
make an informed and reasoned contribution to the debate. 
Lobbying in a European context, is not too dissimilar from the procedures used in the 
national context. However, the main difference is that the lobbyists can participate at 
two levels. Influence can be brought both on the national government and on the 
European Commission. the key institution in the development of EC legislative 
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proposals. At a national le%ýel, pressure groups must have good relations with the 
government of the day. If the government can be persuaded to adopt the line taken by 
the pressure group, then there is greater potential to influence. In the final anak, sis., the 
government may decide to use its veto and block a proposal. However, this is remote in 
todays political arrangements. The growth of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) means 
a Member State's ability to veto has been removed in many important areas. 2 
The most effective form of influence is where a pressure group and the government 
working together in a partnership forge a strong negotiating position which the minister 
may then take into the Council of Ministers meeting. This reflects the views held by the 
Procedure Committee who felt that such a partnership was the most productive way 
forward. 3 
At the European level, 4 by far the most important institution to influence is the 
Commission. As already stated this organisation acts as a civil service and develops 
legislative proposals. Therefore, it is essential for all pressure groups who have interests 
in European affairs to have direct access to the Commission. Since 1986, the Single 
European Act (SEA) has increased the powers of the Commission to initiate legislation 
in a number of key areas and most importantly for the completion of the Single Market. 
This introduced a welter of new legislation in areas such as free movement of goods and 
persons, the majority of which was proposed by the Commission. 
There are twenty Commissioners who are appointed by the Member States (Article 
158 EC). Each Commissioner is responsible for a particular area of policy. Most 
importantly, this includes proposing legislation. For example, the UK's two 
Commissioners Neil Kinnock and Sir Leon Brittan. are responsible for Transport for 
Trade policy respectively. Developing strong links with the office of each 
Commissioner is vital for an}, interested party. 
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Thus the SEA 1986, shifted much of the regulation in these areas from the national to 
the European level, and as a consequence a need to influence a supra-national 
organisation. This changed fundamentally the lobbying process within the EC. The 
emphasis now shifted from the national to the European level. Organisations developed 
close and direct links with the Commission, a relationship that does not exist between 
Westminster and the Commission. 
According to figures published by Mazey and Richardson5 in 1993, there were 525 
interest groups who had developed strong official links with the Commission. They 
ranged from organisations such as European Trade Unions, to consumer groups, to 
individual companies such as Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and British Aerospace. 
This development is evidence that the European Community is now accepted as being 
as important as national institutions in the legislative process. 6 
One final point to note in this area is that lobbying at the European level is not 
limited exclusively to the European Commission. Though it does not initiate legislation, 
the European Parliament has, since the Maastricht Treaty, a greater ability to propose 
amendments. Most importantly, the Parliament is active in areas of social policy and 
environmental protection. Even though the Council may reject their amendments, the 
Parliament may slow up the process which can lead to compromise. It has not yet been 
fully appreciated by many in the UK that the Parliament is now an integral part of the 
legislative process with a positive input. Thus, closer links with the Parliament are 
essential and should be developed. 
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The Legislative process 
Treaty provisions 
Legislation in the European Community is made either by the Council of Ministers, 
on a proposal from the Commission, under powers conferred by the TreatieS7 or by the 
Commission itself under powers given to it directly by certain Treaty Articles, 8 or under 
authority delegated to it by the Council. In addition, the Single European Act placed a 
further obligation on the Council of Ministers to extend the powers of the Commission 
to enable it to implement the rules which the Council lays down, subject to certain 
exceptions. 
It remains here to describe the basic nature of each form of Community act. As far as 
this secondary legislation is concerned, the preliminary point to note is the hierarchy of 
Community acts with regulations ranking as the strongest form and non-binding 
recommendations as the weakest. By far the most common are directives which leave 
the form of implementation to each Member State. However, the crucial point is that it 
is the content of a measure which is the key in deciding its nature and not the form 
which it is given by the adopting institution (See International Fruit Company v. 
Commission [ 1971 ] ECR 411). 
Though there are various procedures by which legislation can be made, the Treaty 
lays down the form which any legislation should take. -9 
"In order to carry out their task, and in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council and the 
Commission shall make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make 
recomendations or deliver opinions. 
10 
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A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable to all Member States. 
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods. 
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is 
addressed. Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. " 
Reasons for legislation 
Any regulation, directive and decision whether emanating from the Council of 
Ministers or the Commission must state the reasons on which they are based, including 
most importantly the legal basis. " 
statement of the reasons for introducing the legislation aids any review of the 
legislation by the European Court of Justice. Thus, the Court (or for that matter any 
other interested party) will know immediately the aims of the adopting institution. In 
effect,, this is an explanation of the policy objectives of the particular institution. In her 
book, European Community Law12 Josephine Shaw illustrates that the statement of 
reasons depends upon the type of act adopted. 
13 Thus, in her example, she states that a 
general legislative act requires less specific reasons than an individual act, such as one 
which imposes a fine on an undertaking for breach of competition rules. This is logical 
given the impact that such a specific piece of legislation may have on what could be a 
very narrow group within the Community. 
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The legal basis of legislation 
The need to establish the legal basis goes to the heart of whether the legislative 
proposal is valid or not. Thus, the act must always make reference to the part of the 
Treaty or the delegated legislation which gives the institution concerned the power to 
make this legislation. As Josephine Shaw quite correctly points out, 14 the choice of 
legal basis is an important element of the legislative process. This is because under the 
Treaty, the power of the institutions is specifically divided and thus there is a division of 
legislative acts between the Commission and Council. This fact has been recognised by 
the European Court of Justice as being a matter of law: - 
15 
"the choice of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an 
institution's conviction as to the objective pursued but on objective factors 
which are amenable to Judicial review" 
Implementation in the UK 
In the UK, regulations are given their direct applicability by Section 2 of the 
European Communities Act (ECA) 1972. Although regulations are binding in their 
entirety and directly applicable, supplementary domestic legislation will on occasion be 
needed to make the legislation fully effective. This is usually the case for enforcement 
provisions. 
Directives are binding upon the Member State as to the results to be achievedq with 
the form and methods of implementation left to each national authority. In the UK this 
is achieved by the passage of iiew primary legislation or by secondary legislation passed 
under Section 22 
ECA 19721. HowcN'er, whichever method is used, Parliament cannot 
chamic the substance of the legislation. Failure to implement the legislation in 
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accordance with the aims of the directive will lead to the Commission bringing an 
action against te UK government in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
Legislation adopted by the Council of Ministers following a proposal 
from the Commission 16 
The function of COREPER 
Following any consultation or discussions with national experts or interested pressure 
groups, the proposal is then considered by official permanent representatives of each 
Member State (COREPER) or in one of a number of Council Working Groups before 
the formal proposal is submitted to the Council of Ministers. 
The work of these advisory bodies is both an essential and integral part of the 
legislative process. The Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States 
(COREPER)17 comprises the ambassadors of the Member States to the Communities. 
Their work, and that of the various sub-committees and Working Groups, is an essential 
part of the Community legislative process. 
Since the Council of Ministers is not a permanent body, meeting only once or twice 
a month, and the ministers continue to have their various domestic responsibilities, 
much of the work is taken over by COREPER. The main task of this full time body is to 
scrutinise and sift proposals for legislation coming from the Commission prior to the 
final discussion by the Council of Ministers. Such a sifting process is a vital task. It 
allows the Council to agree the simple proposals with the minimum amount of debate 
and discussion, and thereby inaximising the limited time available for debate of the 
more controversial proposals. 
18 
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In addition to COREPER, there is a system of Working Groups (sometimes referred 
to as Management Committees) which aid the Council by reducing the work-load they 
face. 19 Under this arrangement the relevant committee (and there Is one for each policy 
area) examines the Commission's proposal for the implementation of an agreed 
Community policy. 
The Working Group carries out its task according to the following procedure. The 
Commission issues its proposal to the Working Group. If the Working Group decides, 
by qualified majority, to oppose the Commission's proposal, it will refer the matter to 
the Council of Ministers for it to collectively arrive at a decision. 
In the event of the Working Group not being able to achieve the necessary qualified 
majority that will ensure a referral to the Council of Ministers, the Commission's 
original proposal remains intact. However, both COREPER and the numerous Working 
Groups serve the additional function of acting as a check upon the Commission's 
executive powers. But the question of their effectiveness in performing this task must 
be raised. 
Limitations of COREPER 
The obvious criticism to be levelled at this arrangement is that it lacks any 
democratic credentials. Neither COREPER nor the Working Parties are elected, and 
furthermore their ability to scrutinise the work of the unelected Commission is also 
questionable. The fact that the Working Parties must act by qualified majority before 
any referral is made to the Council of Ministers makes such a referral unlikely. 
Obtaining the agreement of enough Member States to muster the necessary majority is 
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difficult especially if the Member States with the larger share of the votes do not support 
such a review of the proposal. 
Furthermore, if the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council is reluctant 
to slow up the legislative process, then political horsetrading will usually ensure a 
compromise that leads to the adoption of the legislation with the minimum of disruption 
to the legislative timetable. 
The contrast with established practices in the UK cannot be greater. Most 
importantly, legislation is only made in the UK by elected representatives answerable to 
Parliament and their constituents. In effect, the European legislative process is one of 
legislation being made by an unaccountable Executive body. This is the 'democratic 
deficit' so often referred to by critics of the structure and role of the European 
institutions. Aware of this criticism the European Community has responded by 
increasing the role taken by the European Parliament in the legislative process. This, in 
itself however, has been an extremely slow task, and one further complicated by the 
reluctance of national parliaments to be cast in the role of a 'bit player' in the 
formulation of legislative proposals, with the European Parliament taking the lead. 
The involvement of the European 
process. 
Parliament in the legislative 
Since the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the role of the European 
Parliament in the legislative process has been significantly extended. 20 The Parliament 
now- can provide its input in one of three ways: - 
(1) Through consultation; 
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(ii) Via the cooperation procedure; and 
(iii) Via the co-decision procedure. 
These will now be examined in turn. 
Consultation 
In those circumstances where consultation is prescribed (this will depend on the 
nature and content of the legislative proposal) the Council is under an obligation to 
consult with the European Parliament as to its views on the relevant Commission 
proposal. 21 Furthermore, in a majority of cases, the views of the Economic and Social 
Committee (ECOSOC) must also be sought. 22 The purpose of ECOSOC is to provide 
representation within a formal Community structure for disparate regional and 
economic interests. Under Article 193 of the Treaty, ECOSOC is given advisory status 
and this means being consulted by the Council and the Commission where the Treaty 
provides, e. g. Article I OOA. 
However, the Council of Ministers are under no corresponding obligation to take 
account of the views of the Parliament. Thus, there is potential for conflict between the 
two institutions where there is a substantive disagreement. However, the Council being 
mindful of criticism that it operates very much in isolation, will rarely dismiss outright 
any opinion of the European Parliament. In fact, the practice has developed in recent 
years that the European Parliament will be consulted by the Council beyond that which 
is legally required by the Treaty. The Council being ever aware of political 
considerations, does not wish to give the appearance of being an inflexible and isolated 
institution that ignores the views of Europe's elected representatives. 
Through the way it conducts itself in the consultation process, the European 
Parliament can increase its ability to influence. Most notably, if the European 
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Parliament delays in the delivery of its opinion it can influence the Council of Minister's 
negotiations. The Council will informally be aware of the Parliament's opinions but 
according to the Treaty cannot make a final decision until it has received an official 
opinion. With the President of the Council adding to the pressure of coming to an 
agreement, the Council will be forced to reflect at least some of the views of the 
Parliament in its deliberations and final opinion on the proposal. Following this 
consultation process the Commission may if it wishes amend its proposals. 
The cooperation Procedure 
The cooperation procedure23 was introduced by the Single European Act 1986. 
Under this process, the European Parliament, which had been directly elected since 
1979, would for the first time have a direct input in the legislative process. The aim of 
the co-operation procedure was to address the much debated 'democratic deficit' which 
was seen as undermining the credibility of the European Community. It went to the 
heart of the issue, that despite electing its MEPs, the European Community was still 
fundamentally undemocratic and unaccountable for the legislation it passed. 
The cooperation procedure works in the following way. The Commission submits a 
proposal for legislation to the Council of Ministers, and at the same time seeks the 
opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal. In some circumstances the 
Economic and Social Committee will also be consulted. At this stage, following 
deliberations, the Council will adopt its common position by qualified majority. The 
common position expresses the collective view of the Council on the proposal and this 
is communicated to the European Parliament, who can accept it, reject it, or propose its 
own amendments to it. 
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If the European Parliament does propose any amendments to the Council's common 
position, the Commission will then submit a further re-examined proposal based on the 
common position and taking into account the proposed amendments of the European 
Parliament. The Commission also forwards to the Council those amendments of the 
European Parliament it has not accepted, together with the reason for not accepting 
them. The Council may then adopt either the Commission's re-examined proposal as it 
stands by a qualified majority, or adopt it in an amended form. If the Council chooses 
the latter, it may also, by unanimity, accept those amendments of the European 
Parliament which have been rejected by the Commission. 
However, if the Council takes no action within three months, the Commission's re- 
examined proposal will be deemed not to have been adopted. A failure by the European 
Parliament to accept the Council of Minister's common position, will require unanimity 
by the Council for its adoption. 24 
The co-decision procedure25 
The co-decision procedure was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty-26 The process is 
based upon the pre Maastricht cooperation procedure and is a further attempt by the 
European Community to address the democratic deficit. Therefore, the main difference 
between the two procedures is that co-decision gives greater powers to the European 
Parliament and limits the role of the Commission in the legislative process. 
Furthermore, though the two legislative processes operate independently of each other, 
covering decision making in different policy areas, there are some common areas e. g 
icy where le-(-)*slat*on can be passed by either procedure. environment poll II Where this is 
the case, co-decision now appears to be the favoured vehicle. 
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The main change introduced by the co-decision procedure is to introduce an extra 
stage into the legislative process. On second reading, the European Parliament may by 
an absolute majority reject or amend the common position. This is identical to the 
position under the co-operation process. However, the difference lies in the options now 
open to the Council. 
Under cooperation, the Council will need to act by unanimity to proceed on a second 
reading where the European Parliament has rejected the proposal. However, under co- 
decision,, if the proposal is rejected, the Council may convene the Conciliation 
Committee. 27 This is commonly referred to as the 'third reading'. Similarly, if the 
European Parliament has only proposed amendments to the common position, the 
Commission issues its opinion on those amendments and the text is forwarded to the 
Council which may amend the proposal accordingly or convene the Conciliation 
Committee with a view to reaching a joint text. The Conciliation Committee comprises 
fifteen representatives each from the Council and the European Parliament. When any 
votes are taken, the Council acts by qualified majority and the Parliament by simple 
majority. 
The aim of the Conciliation Committee is to reach a compromise on the proposed 
legislation and approve a joint text. The Conciliation Committee has only six weeks to 
complete its deliberations. 28 If the deliberations lead to the adoption of a joint text then 
the proposal is adopted. However, if they end in failure, then the Council acting by a 
qualified majority may approve the original common position by qualified majority. At 
this stage, the European Parliament may only reject the common position by an absolute 
majority. 
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Qualified Majority Voting29 
Operation of Qualified Majority Voting 
The process of decision making by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) has developed 
substantially since its inception in 1965. Despite initial difficulties, which were to some 
extent overcome by the Luxembourg Accords, 30 QMV is today the main form of 
decision making in the Council of Ministers. 31 This is largely due to the changes 
brought about by the Single European Act 1986 which laid the groundwork for the 
completion of the Internal Market Programme. Furthermore, the Single European Act 
signified a shift in the attitude of Member States to a greater acceptance of the need for 
QMV if the European Community was to move away from the period of legislative 
stagnation which characterised the years in which the Luxembourg Accords prevailed. 
Qualified Majority Voting works by each Member State having a weighted number 
of votes according to population size. Thus the United Kingdom and Germany have 10 
votes each but Luxembourg has only 2 and Belgium 3. In the Council, each Member 
State votes on the proposal by casting their weighted vote and if a qualified majority is 
reached the proposal is adopted. 
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Sweden 4 
Untied Kingdom 10 
Total 87 
Adoption by the Council of an act by a qualified majority requires at least: 
-62 votes in favour (out of 87) where the Treaty requires the act to be adopted on a 
proposal from the Commission; or 
-62 votes in favour, cast by at least ten members in other cases. 
Implications of Qualified Majority Voting 
Qualified Majority Voting can be viewed as a double edge sword. Without its 
extension in the Council of Ministers it is unlikely that a legislative programme such as 
the Internal Market could have been completed. If unanimity was required on each 
occasion, Members States would use their veto to block legislation which from a 
domestic point of view may prove unpopular. Furthermore, unanimous agreement 
between 15 Member States would be unlikely. However, as Article 148 EC Treaty now 
requires 62 out of 87 votes for a proposal to be adopted, at least three Member States 
must oppose the proposal. On the basis of the weighted votes, it is almost certain that a 
legislative proposal will only be defeated if at least two of the Member States with the 
largest share of the weighted vote, vote against the proposal. Such a proposition today is 
unlikely, given the fact that France and Germany are the driving forces behind further 
European integration. 
From a domestic scrutiny perspective however, the extension of QMV is potentially 
very damaging. The aim of the scrutiny process in the House of Commons is to 
"influence" the minister34 prIor to giving final approval to a legislative proposal in the 
Council of Ministers. 
3ý The influence is exercised via the scrutiny process with the 
minister taking into account the views of Parliament when negotiating in Council. 
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However. the ability to hold a minister accountable for decisions taken in Council 
has been eroded by the extension of QMV. In a number of increasing policy areas QMV 
is now the norm. Thus. if the minister following Parliament's opinion on a particular 
proposal is outvoted, because of QMV, by other Member States in Council he or she 
cannot readily be held accountable to Parliament for a piece of legislation which they 
disapproved of and subsequently voted against. In effect ministerial accountability is 
removed. The power to make legislation has been transferred away from Parliament and 
to an executive body which is not readily accountable to, either, any domestic 
legislature or the electorate. In addition, the fact that negotiations in Council are secret 
and usually involve a degree of political horsetrading Parliamentary control of 
ministers is further undermined. The Council will always try to achieve a compromise 
in order to save a proposal and thus the final piece of legislation will be different to that 
originally scrutinised by Parliament. 
To conclude, Qualified Majority Voting appears to be a 'necessary evil' of the 
European Community today. Its importance in ensuring that the Communities 
legislative programme is carried out cannot be overstated. However, there is a very 
persuasive argument that such efficiency should not be obtained at the expense of 
accountability and democracy. This will be too high a price to pay and one not 
envisaged by the founders of the Community. 
Legislation adopted by the Commission 
Legislation adopted by the Commission constitutes the major part of legislation 
produced by the EC. Article 15 5 EC Treaty states that: - 
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"In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the of the 
Common Market, the Commission shall: 
-ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the 
institutions pursuant thereto are applied; 
-formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in 
this Treaty, if it expressly provides or if the Commission considers it 
necessary; 
-have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures 
taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the manner 
provided for in this Treaty; 
-exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation 
of the rules laid down by the latter. " 
However, the majority of Commission legislation consists of measures concerning 
procedural matters within the European Community such as the management of 
agricultural affairs within the Common Agricultural Policy or powers relating to 
competition law and state aids. 36 In all cases, the Commission's power to make 
legislation comes from powers delegated by the Council that give it the necessary 
authority to pass legislation. As a legislative body, the Commission does not involve 
itself in the more controversial or important policy areas which are primarily the domain 
of the Council. 
One further important point to note at this juncture, is that Commission made 
legislation is not suýject to the sort of scrutiny given to Council legislative proposals. 
37 
This is primarily due to the fact that the UK Parliament has no formal link with the 
Commission and that Standing Orders setting out the Terms of Reference of the Select 
Committee on European Legislation refer only to proposal for legislation coming from t) 
or submitted to the Council of Ministers. 
38 From a Parliamentary democracy 
perspectivc this is not an acccptable state of affairs as a voluminous amount of 
leoislation is coniiii-g, onto the statute book without any scrutiny by the UK Parliament. 
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The principle of Subsidiarity 
The meaning ofSubsidiarity 
This much debated principle of subsidiarity was only introduced into European 
Community law by the Maastricht Treaty. It reflects a fear held by some Member 
States, notably the UK, and latterly Denmark, that the rapid increase in the volume of 
EC law had become unacceptable and infringed upon the attempts made by government 
in the 1980's to "roll back the frontiers of the state". EC law was viewed as being 
bureaucratic and eroding the rights of groups such as the business community which 
had long argued against the limiting effect that some EC law had. 
Thus Article 3b of the EC Treaty39 formally introduced the principle of 
subsidiarity: - 
"The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon 
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned therein. 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
the reason of scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by 
the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond that which is 
necessary (my italics) to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. " 
Therefore, according to Article 3b, the European Community will only legislate 
where the end cannot be achieved by Member States acting individually and the 
Community can achievc a better result. Perhaps most importantly. the subsidiarity 
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principle introduces formally the concept of proportionality into EC legislation by 
providing that when legislating, the Community will do only the minimum necessary to 
secure the objectives of the Treaty. 
Impact of subsidiarity 
In practical terms, subsidiarity has changed the thinking within the European 
institutions. 40 For example, in 1992, a procedure was introduced within the 
Commission whereby all draft legislative proposals to the Council and Parliament have 
to now be reviewed in terms of subsidiarity. Furthermore, the Commission must now 
justify each legislative proposal from the point of view of subsidiarity. To help its staff, 
the Commission has introduced guidelines on how to apply the subsidiarity principle 
when preparing legal documents. These were drawn up by the Commission after the 
Edinburgh Council in December 1992 which had at the top of its agenda the 
development of the subsidiarity principle. The primary guideline involves a 
consideration of whether the proposal resolves the problem without going beyond that 
which is absolutely necessary. Similar provisions apply equally to the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament. 
The Inter-Govern mental Pillars4l 
The European Union created after the Maastricht Treaty is comprised of a central 
pillar formed by the three European Communities, 
42 and the two new additional pillars 
which cover inter- governmental cooperation in the areas of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. These two "flanking pillars" as they are 
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known operate independently of the European Community and legislation under them is 
not subject to the arbitration of the ECJ- 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy Pillar 
Since 1969 there has been cooperation between Member States in this field. They 
originally commissioned a report into how they could better co-ordinate both the 
gathering of information and the formation of foreign policy. This political cooperation 
was viewed as being essential if the economic objectives of the Community were to be 
achieved. The report published in 1970 recommended procedures that were strictly 
inter-governmental in nature and not governed by provisions in any of the Treaties. 
Under the arrangements as agreed, Foreign Ministers would meet on a twice yearly 
basis, with other junior ministers and specialist advisers meeting four times a year or 
when required. This was known as European Political Cooperation Thus, though there 
was coordination in the political sphere, the Community was not competent to act in this 
area. It was not until the Single European Act 1986 that the provisions for European 
Political Cooperation were codified and given a firm Treaty basis. 
43 
The present arrangements for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are 
contained within Title V, Article J of the Maastricht Treaty. 
44 To a large extent, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy confirms the arrangements used in European 
Political Cooperation, but with one important addition. It provides for the first time that 
the Council will adopt common positions and joint actions which are binding under 
international law. Furthermore, any disputes will only be subject to the arbitration of the 
European Court of Justice when the Member States specifically agree. In essence, a 
\\fhole new legislative process has been created that is distinct from existing 
arranoements within the European Community. 
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Under these arrangements, Member States must ensure that their national policies 
conform with common positions and must uphold common positions in international 
conferences and organisation. From a national scrutiny perspective, the cooperation 
under this pillar is problematical. Firstly, commitments that are imposed on Member 
States by common positions are not subject to national ratification or approval 
procedures (unlike EC legislation). Secondly, the role of the European Parliament is 
slight. Though consulted, informed and having its views taken into account, the 
European Parliament has no right to propose amendments or veto a proposal. 45 
The Justice and Home Affairs Pillar 
Title VI Article K of the Maastricht Treaty46 places inter-governmental cooperation 
injustice and home affairs on a formal Treaty basis. It provides a detailed list of policy 
areas which are of a common interest to all Member States. 47 Most controversially this 
includes the sensitive areas of immigration and asylum policies, but also provides for 
closer cooperation between national police forces in areas such as drug trafficking and 
terrorism. 48 
On the initiative of any Member State, or in certain circumstances the Commission, 
the Council of Ministers may adopt joint positions or joint actions. 
49 A joint position 
by the Council is similar to a common position under the CFSP and similarly are 
binding only under international law rather than being subject to Community 
competence. The Council has additional powers of drawing up conventions that require 
ratification bN,, national Parliaments and may also adopt measures for these 
., 50 conventions and give the ELIi-opean Court jurisdiction to interpret and apply them. 
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In carrying out its tasks. the Council is assisted by a Coordinating Committee of 
senior officials who act as a civil service. The Commission is fully associated with the 
work and the European Parliament has only the same rights as under the CFSP. i. e. it 
will be consulted as to its view but has no right of veto. There is one ftirther point to be 
noted here. Under Article K9, the Council may by unanimity transfer any area falling 
under the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar into the realms of Community competence, 
with all the effects this has, such as bringing actions before the ECJ. Article I 00c EC 
Treaty5l provides a gateway to achieve this. 
Impact of the Pillars on Parliamentary scrutiny 
Both the Common Foreign and Security Policy Pillar and the Justice and Home 
Affairs Pillar have established a new method for creating legislation. Though the 
Council of Ministers and other European institutions are involved in the process to 
varying degrees, the procedures involved are more akin to inter-governmental 
negotiation and classical diplomacy. 
As already stated, they are both legally outside Community Competence. Thus from 
a scrutiny perspective, are not within the terms of the Standing Orders for the House of 
Commons. 52 In the House of Lords there has not been the same difficulty in developing 
scrutiny arrangements to deal with legislation under the Pillars because the Standing 
Orders are less rigid and structure of the Lords Committee allows for wider 
investigation than that in the Commons. 53 At this juncture it will suffice to state that the 
Commons is still having difficulty in scrutinising legislation that is agreed in secret and 
whose content is not familiar to the Select Committee. 
This chapter has outlined the legislative processes of the European Union and 
sionposted some of the more fundamental problems which face both Houses In their tý 
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scrutiny function, in particular, maintaining the accountability of the executive. In the 
forthcoming chapters, these issues will be examined and developed further, along ý, vith 
an assessment of the difficulties Parliament faces in its attempt fulfil its scrutiny role. 
Where appropriate, reforms to the scrutiny procedures will be proposed which have the 
potentia to enhance the accountability of the executive to Parliament. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT AND THE 
INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Introduction54 
In this chapter, the constitutional position of the United Kingdom Parliament in the 
European Union will be briefly examined and evaluated. In particular, the focus will be 
on the relationship that both Houses of Parliament have with the Commission and the 
European Parliament. This exercise is important in that Parliament, which up until 1973 
was the sole legislative body for the United Kingdom, is today not competent to 
legislate on certain issues without considering European law. Thus the focus will be an 
investigation in to how far Parliament can move 'upstream' and influence the institutions 
which devise policy - and that means the Commission in particular and to a lesser 
degree the European Parliament. 
The two other institutions of the European Union namely the Council of Ministers 
and the Court of Justice will not be considered here for the following reasons. The 
relationship with the Council of Minsters will be the subject of examination throughout 
the course of the thesis. In particular the central issue is to examine how Parliament 
influences the minister prior to his or her giving agreement in Council and most 
importantly, how effective this influence is. As far as the Court of Justice is concerned, 
this is the arbiter of disputes, and thus is not involved in the legislative process. The 
Courts role is to interpret and apply the legislation and not to develop new policy. 
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The Commission and the House of CommonS55 
The House of Commons has no formal relationship with the Commission. This is 
problematical because the Terms of Reference of the Select Committee on European 
Legislation require it to examine European Community documents, whose definition 
includes "draft proposals by the Commission of the European Communities', 56. Thus 
the Select Committee is completely reliant on the government, and more precisely the 
European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office to provide the necessary documents on time 
and in the correct language. Otherwise, there will be a delay in scrutiny. 
The lack of this relationship with the Commission has another potentially greater 
impact on scrutiny. This is the fact that the scrutiny process does not encompass the 
ever increasing volume of legislation made directly by the Commission under powers 
given to it by the Treaties or under implementing powers delegated in Council 
legislation. 57 The net effect of this is that a large quantity of legislative proposals are 
not subject to any scrutiny. It is true to say that the overwhelming majority of them are 
procedural in their nature and not concerned with major issues of policy. However, 
constitutionally it is undesirable that they are not subject to any examination. 
Developing a relationship with the Commission 
The question this issue raises is whether by developing closer ties with the 
Commission the scrutiny process will be enhanced? The answer must be a resounding 
yes and for the following reasons. If through closer ties with the Commission, 
documents can be obtained earlier. then the scrutiny process will undoubtedly be more 
effective. Practically, this will mean more informed reports and higher quality debate in 
Standing Committee. In addition, closer links will also gain influence with the 
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Commission. As will be illustrated later. the House of Lords has benefited from such a 
development. 
Some steps have already been taken in this direction. For example, since 1989 the 
Commissions annual work programme had been placed in the Library of the House. 
Furthermore,, the Commission would also pass on its three month forward programme to 
national parliaments. 58 However, this does not include working texts. These are texts 
which are not yet adopted by the Commission but are only in draft form. Though some 
do make there way to national parliaments they are unreliable as a basis of scrutiny 
because being only in draft they are subject to change. 
One undoubted benefit of this is that if the Select Committee becomes aware of a 
policy proposal at an early stage, the Commissioner responsible may be invited to give 
evidence to the Committee to explain his or her position. Though under no obligation to 
attend a Commissioner usually will because it seen as an ideal opportunity to explain 
proposals to perhaps a sceptical House of Commons. 
59 In its 1989 Report, the Procedure Committee recommended that working texts be 
submitted to the Select Committee when it required them. They accepted the evidence 
that they will on occasion be unreliable but took the view that the Select Committee 
could make its own judgment as to how much reliance will be placed on them. 
60 In its 
response, 61 the govenunent welcomed this proposal and agreed to do all it could to 
ensure its success. 
Thus a close and productive relationship with the Commission is essentially the keý, 
to effective scrutiny. Tod, --, i,, - there is still no formal link, with the relationship being 
based on the proposals of the 1989 Procedure Committee report. A new Procedure 
Committee inquiry has recently been announced and this issue will undoubtedly be 
looked at again. This time it is vital that the relationship with the Commission is placed 
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at the centre of any proposals for reforming the scrutiny process. Influencing the 
formulation of policy is as important as influencing the minister prior to agreeing the 
legislative proposal. Such a development would undoubtedly redress the balance in 
favour of Parliament and address continuing criticisms of a democratic deficit in the 
European Union by making the Commission accountable to national parliaments. 
The European Parliament and the House of Commons 
Since the Procedure Committee report of 1989 the influence of the European 
Parliament has undoubtedly increased. This can be attributed almost exclusively to the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure which gave the European Parliament a much 
larger voice in the legislative process. 62 For the House of Commons this is undesirable 
because it has no formal control over the European Parliament. Inevitably this means 
there are no formal contacts with the European Parliament. Thus Parliament has no 
influence over what is increasingly becoming a powerful institution. 
Developing relations with the European Parliament 
At the outset it is necessary to state than any contacts could only be informal. MPs 
would be reluctant to allow MEPs any formal role within the House. They are 'strangers' 
and thus not eligible to be involved in the daily activity of the Commons. However two 
areas can be identified where informal contacts would be most helpful: - 
1. To act as an carly warning of forthcoming legislation; and 
2. To provide information on amendments to be proposed by the 
European Parliament under co-clecision. 
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In I above, the House of Commons would undoubtedly benefit from the relationship 
that the European Parliament has with the Commission. Commissioners regularly speak 
in the European Parliament and make policy announcements. 
63 Thus a sort of scrutiny 
by proxy could be developed. 
In 2 above the contact will be vital in that it would give the Select Committee some 
warning of what amendments the European Parliament proposes to the common 
position as agreed by the Council. This will aid scrutiny as the Select Committee will 
have an idea what the amended proposal will say and the European Parliaments position 
in the Conciliation Committee. Thus scrutiny can centre on these amendments or on the 
outcome of the Conciliation Committee meeting. Though not perfect this is better than 
no scrutiny at all - which unfortunately is what currently happens in many instances. 
Thus informal links can be beneficial. The European Parliament itself welcomes 
closer contact with national parliaments and passed a Resolution to this effect in 
February 1989. However, the difficulty lies at Westminster. Many MPs view the 
European Parliament as a threat and challenge to the constitutional position of 
Parliament as the sole legislative body for the United Kingdom. This is at the core of the 
reluctance to formalise the relationship between the two institutions.. Links with the 
European Parliament need to be cultivated, in particular to ensure that all opportunities 
of acquiring information are maximised. Information on policy developments in the 
European Union is essential for effective scrutiny. Without it, the House of Commons 
cannot effectively fulfil its constitutional task of being a check on the executive when it 
attends to the Council of Minsters. 
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The House of Lords and the Commission 
Because of the inquiry methods adopted by the Select Committee on the European 
Communities in the House of Lords, they have developed more informal contacts with 
the Commission than their House of Commons counterpart. However, there are still no 
formal links between the two institutions. 
As far as informal contacts are concerned, the Select Committee has achieved this in 
two ways. Firstly, because its Terms of Reference are not limited to just legislative 
proposals (unlike the Commons) it can carry out free standing inquiries into 
Commission Green Papers (working texts) and thereby scrutinise policy more 
effectively than the House of Commons. Thus the Select Committee in the House of 
Lords regularly moves upstream and investigates policy areas where no legislative 
proposal has as yet been produced. This inevitably involves regular close contact with 
the Commission, something which Sir Leon Brittan, a current United Kingdom EC 
Commissioner has encouraged. 64 
The second type of informal contact comes in the form of Select Committee reports 
being regularly read by the Commission. This owes much to the high calibre of report 
produced by the Select Committee which have made the Committee well respected 
throughout the Community. Practically however, the contacts are more important for the 
following reason. If the Committee carries out an investigation into a Commission 
Green Paper, it has, as already said, inquired into policy. But it is in fact more than this. 
At this point the Committee is involved in the pre-legislative stage. What this means is 
that its subsequent report may influence the Commission's decision in the final 
proposals which it presents to the Council of Ministers. Now, there is no guarantee that 
the Commission will accept anY of the Committees views, but I III be difficult for it to it wi 
completely ignore a report produced by such a well qualified and respected Committee. 
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Ideally. this procedure should be put on a formal footing and the Commission under 
an obligation to consider the views of any Committee from any national parliament. 
This would undoubtedly increase the profile of national parliaments in the EU and go 
some way to address the democratic deficit - that is bring the unelected Commission 
under some popular control. 
The House of Lords and the European Parliament 
As with its Commons counterpart, the Select Committee in the Lords has no formal 
links with the European Parliament. However, there has until recently been one 
difference. This has been the position that members of the Lords have also been MEPs. 
Though there is no restriction upon this in the Commons there are no members of the 
main political parties who take advantage of this. 65 In the Lords though this link was 
put to good use. 
Today however, there are no peers with the dual mandate and it is unlikely that it will 
happen again. After the European elections in 1994 the last of the peers, Lords Bethell 
and Kingsland lost their seats as MEPs. Practically, this means a loss of influence. The 
Select Committee would regularly consult with these peers who would keep the 
Committee and the Lords generally informed of policy and legislative developments. 
There is some exchange of information between the Lords and the European Parliament, 
in particular with reports being read by the MEPs and these MEPs giving evidence to 
Select Committee inquiries. However, the relationship is essentially ad hoc and needs to 
be reviewed to maximise the Lords influence in the European Union. 
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Concluding remarks 
What this brief discussion illustrates is that for all practical purposes the relationship 
between the United Kingdom Parliament and the European Institutions is an under 
utilised one. There is great potential on both sides for developing formal contacts which 
will undoubtedly benefit all, and most importantly benefit scrutiny in the domestic 
Parliament. This consideration should be at the core of Parliaments activity and issues 
of Parliament becoming marginalised or dominated by European institutions put into 
context. That is to say that both Houses need to react to the changes in the EU. Apathy 
and indifference will mean they become marginalised with the inevitable detrimental 
impact this will have on scrutiny. Developing closer cooperation will have the opposite 
effect. Thus , in the proceeding chapters as well as returning to some of the above issues,, 
the discussion will centre primarily on how Parliament carries out its scrutiny functions 
today and examine the limitations of the current scrutiny procedures. 
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PART 11 - THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
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CHAPTER3 
THE WORK OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 
Introduction 
In 1971 the House of Commons voted by 356 to 244 votes for the Motion: - 
"That this House approves Her Majesty's Govermuents 
decision of principle to join the European Communities on the 
basis of the arrangements which have been negotiated. " 
In the next session of Parliament the European Communities Bill passed through 
both Houses unamended and the Act's provisions became operative on I January 
1973.66 As an inevitable consequence of the entry of the UK into the Community, 
substantial and important parts of law were now to be made in new and different ways, 
with new and different consequences, e. g.: - 
(a) by way of Council Regulations which take effect 
immediately as part of the law of the UK and prevail over any 
law of the UK which is inconsistent with them; and 
(b) by way of Council Directives which place upon 
Parliament an obligation to make or change the law of the UK in 
all such respects as is necessary to give legal effect in the UK to 
the provision of the directives. 
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A striking difference between these and the existing processes for making or 
amending the law are that in the case of (a) above the Executive itself bY agreeing with 
the other Member States to a proposal for legislaton makes law which is immediately 
binding. Thus the government has assumed the constitutional function and power of 
Parliament. Whereas in the case of (b) above, whilst there is limited Parliamentary 
control over the passage of the legislation, it is in fact difficult to exert because 
Parliament cannot reject the legislation without facing the wrath of the European Court, 
or propose amendments which change substantially the nature of the directive. 
However, it remains central to the UK concept and structure of Parliamentary 
democracy that control of the law making processes lies with Parliament - and 
ultimately with the elected members of it. It followed therfore that new and special 
procedures were necessary to counter-balance the inroads made into this concept by the 
legislative process of the European Community. The scrutiny process which has been 
developed over twenty four years acknowledges the crucial fact that it is the Council of 
Ministers which is at the core of this legislative process. In this context, the primary role 
undertaken by Parliament is to influence the minister before final agreement to a 
legislative proposal is given in Council. 
This scrutiny process is a complete reversal of traditional law making procedures 
within the UK. Parliament cannot amend the legislation once the Council of Ministers 
has formally approved the proposal. In this sense, there is no equivalent to the Standing 
Committee stage procedure which, because it gives members an opportunity to propose 
amendments to a piece of domestic legislation, is an integral part to the legislative 
process in the House of Commons. Though there are two European Standing 
Committees in existence, there ftinction is not to propose amendments to the legislative 
proposal, but only to debate its merits. Thus, Parliament cannot amend European 
legislation. Its sole task is limited to the passing of enabling legislation which has the 
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specific purpose of incorporating the secondary Community legislation (directives) into 
domestic law. 
In his article European Community Legislation before the House of Commons67 
Professor T. St J. N. Bates68 made the rather astute observation of what the role of the 
Westminster Parliament is today in the European legislative process. He Said: -69 
"To put it in more negative terms Westminster, in respect of the 
European Community, finds itself in the unaccustomed and uneasy, 
although perhaps not unique role of lobbyist" 
This is an accurate statement of the relationship between Parliament and the 
Community. The point Professor Bates is making relates to the legislative process 
within the Community. Given the wide consultation procedure undertaken by the 
Commission with a variety of pressure groups in the pre-legislative stage, Parliament 
(along with other national parliaments) is just one part of this consultation process. 
Thus, scrutiny is part of this lobbying process. This is why Parliament must have 
effective procedures to influence the minister before he goes to give final approval in 
the Council. 
Establishment of the Select Committee 
Prior to the UK's accession to the Commuinty in 1973, the House of Commons voted 
to appoint a Select Committee with the Terms of Reference: -70 
"... to consider procedures for scrutiny of proposals for European 
Community Secondary Legislation". 
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The Committee was under the Chairmanship of Sir John Foster (and is more 
commonly referred to as the Foster Committee). 71 The Committee subsequently 
published two detailed reports72 which made a number of recomendations as to how the 
House of Commons might be kept informed of legislative developments in the 
Community and how it might develop an effective machinery for the scrutiny of 
proposals for legislation. 
The main recomendation of the Foster Committee was to establish a Select 
Committee on European Community Secondary Legislation. 73 Its Terms of Reference 
were such that it only performed the role of scrutiny and made no comment on the 
merits of a proposal. 74 However, during the 1988-89 session, the Select Committee on 
Procedure undertook the first major inquiry into the operation of the scrutiny system. 
This was prompted by the changes in the European legislative process brought about by 
the Single European Act 1986 and by the ever increasing volume of legislation 
emerging from the Community. Many of the recomendations of the Report75 were 
accepted by the Conservative government in its response76 and were put into effect at 
the beginning of the 1990-91 session. Today, these recomenclations still form the 
foundation of the Scrutiny arrangements in the House of Commons and will be analysed 
in this and the forthcoming chapters. 
The central issue for the Foster Committee was to put forward a framework for a 
scrutiny process that would give the Commons the greatest influence in the European 
legislative process. Legislation in the European Community is introduced primarily by 
regulations77and directives. 
78 The main disadvantage of law making by regulation is 
that in essence it is law making by decree. Once agreed by the Council it is binding 
immediately. The impact on scrutiny is clear. First, legislation is binding without any 
Parliamentary approval being necessary, and secondly, the process of agreeing the 
legislation is not transparent. In these circumstances it is impossible to have any 
effective democratic control ovcr the minister. 
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Mr Peter Shore MP, a member of the Foster Committee, argued that Regulations 
were an undemocratic and therefore an unacceptable method of law making. He argued 
that if there was to be legislation made in the European Community, the most 
appropriate method would be through directives. 79 His argument was based on the fact 
that directives are implemented by the national parliament, by means of some form of 
enabling legislation. Mr Shore thus saw this as the vital element of control which is 
lacking in the implementation of regulations. 
Mr Shore makes a valid argument. His observation that European legislation is not 
subject to the same rigorous scrutiny as domestic legislation is an extremely important 
point which is still relevant today. However, his secondary argument that directives 
afford Parliament greater control over the legislation emanating from Europe than that 
available in respect of Regulations, has consistently proved to be flawed. 
In their practical effect, there is no significant difference between a regulation and a 
directive. The national parliament in its implementation of the directive cannot change 
the contents of the directive. Any implementing legislation which is inconsistent with 
the directive will be a breach of the Treaty and leave the Member State open to an 
action in the Court of Justice. If the action is successful, the Member State must then 
change the implementing legislation. Thus, all Parliament can do, is to put the directive 
into force and not alter its content. The only control available, as the Foster Committee 
recognised, is to influence the minister through scrutiny of both the draft Regulation and 
directive before final approval in Council is given. Parliament's role is therefore reduced 
to that of a mere pressure group lobbying to make its views and concerns known to the 
minister who will relay them to his counterparts in the Council. 
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Future developments 
Since the Procedure Committee Report of 1989, the UK government has signed the 
Maastricht Treaty and brought forward the necessary legislation in the form of the 
European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 to implement the Treaty provisions in 
the UK. 
This Treaty imposes many changes but perhaps most importantly alters the decision 
making process within the Community. Most notably it is the co-decision procedure" 
which will have the greatest impact on scrutiny within Parliament. The increased role 
for the European Parliament in the legislative process will slow-up the scrutiny process 
by delaying the depositing of documents in the House until after the European 
Parliament has proposed any amendments and the Council of Ministers has then voted 
on them. The Scrutiny Committee has recognised these potential problems and 
produced an initial report highlighting the challenges it will now face. 81 A more 
detailed discussion of these issues is found in chapter 6. 
Functions of the Select Committee 
It is possible to identify three different functions of the Select Committee: - 
(1) The Select Committee as an information and access point; 
(ii) Fulfilling the requirements of the Standing Orders; and 
(Iii) Scrutinising the executive. 
These will now be examined in turn. 
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The Select Committee as an information and access point 
All proposals for secondary legislation come before the Committee and they 
produce, very rapidly it must be added, a report on the particular document. On average, 
the Committee have a turnover of at least one document per week. Thus the agenda of 
the Committee is a short horizon because in most instances, a document is not 'hanging 
around' and waiting for a draft report to be produced detailing its main provisions. This 
can be contrasted with the work of the Select Committee in the House of Lords. Prior to 
a report, the Committee conducts an in depth investigation into the document and the 
wider issues concerning it. In effect, the Lords look at the policy considerations and the 
merits of the particular document. This is the main difference between the two 
Committees. Not only does the Standing Order setting out the Terms of Reference 
prevent investigation of the merits of the document, but so does the time factor within 
which the Committee works. Yet the Committee does inform the House of the basics of 
the proposal. It provides the House with a description of the document and indicates its 
significance and really gives the House an understanding which it will not receive from 
any other source. This allows for an informed debate to take place either in one of the 
two Standing Committees or occasionally in the Chamber itself 
The Committee is also an access point for the entire Commons as it is constantly in 
contact with persons who are related to the committee system within the House both 
here and overseas. Thus, the Committee liaises on behalf of the House with other 
interested parties to exchange information and discuss legislative developments. 
However,, evidence received from MPs and officials in the Commons suggests that this 
liaison could be carried out more effcectively if relationships with committees in other 
Parliaments and other organisations (most notably the European Parliament and the 
Commission) were put on a formal footing. This cementing of the relationship would 
allow for easier access to and exchange of information and also recognise that the 
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legislative procedure is really a European one with all Member States contributing to the 
decision making process. 
Fuýfilling the Standing Orders 
The second identifiable area of activity for the Select Committee is carrying out what 
Standing Order 127 asks the Committee to do (see p. 61 below for a more detailed 
discussion of this). This is partly informative, and partly acting as a'burglar alarm'. If an 
important document comes along, the House will want to know something about it. It 
as at this stage that the alarm bells go off and the Committee will issue a report and then 
recommend what is to be debated and thus engage the next stage of the scrutiny system. 
Scrutinising the executive 
The third and final area of activity which involves a substantial amount of the Select 
Committees time is actually policing the relationship between the House and the 
government on European matters. This is because there are a whole series of agreements 
and understandings on how scrutiny is handled. 
82 If the Committee discover that some 
agreement has been reached without their knowledge then they will demand an 
explanation. If this explanation is unsatisfactory, the Committee will pursue the 
government until it gets a good reason why Parliament was not consulted. 
In the same way as the Committee constantly monitor how rapidly documents are 
deposited in the Vote Office for MPs to read, the Committee pursue very energetically 
the government's non-consultation of a document with them. This is essential, as any 
circumventin, (., 1 by the goverimient of the views of the Committee will render ineffectual zn I 
scrutiny by Parliament. If a document takes so long to arrive at the Vote Office either 
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because it has been agreed in the Council before it is deposited or if negotiations have 
progressed to an advanced stage then there is no point in Parliament trying to influence 
the minister who has already made up his mind. Any scrutiny in these circumstances 
will be post-legislative and break the terms of Standing Order 127, which states that the 
Committee will consider European Community documents which are proposals for 
legislation. Once agreed to by the minister in Council, the document is no longer a 
proposal. If this agreement comes before Parliament has had its say via scrutiny by the 
Committee and debate in the Standing Committee then no effective scrutiny has taken 
place. 
The political, legal and constitutional context of the scrutiny process 
Any analysis of the scrutiny arrangements in the House of Commons must begin 
with a review of the political, legal and constitutional context in which they are set. 
Thus the starting point for such an analysis is the fact that European legislation is almost 
exclusively initiated by an executive organisation i. e. the Commission. 83 Most 
ii-nportant to this arrangement, is the fact that the United Kingdom Parliament has no 
formal relationship with the Commission and thus no direct control over legislative 
proposals emanating from the Commission. Furthermore, the United Kingdom has, as a 
condition of its membership of the European Union, bound itself to accept the collective 
decision making and authority of a legislative body (the Council of Ministers)84 only 
one of whose fifteen members is accountable to the House of Commons. 
Thus, the difficulty facing Parliament is clear. Whilst the House may, by changes in 
its own internal procedures, find ways of increasing the influence and authority it 
commands over the government and European legislation, it cannot by such means 
increase that authoritý, nor seek to claw back powers which it has ceded by the Treaty. 
For example, the extensim of the use of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of 
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Ministers by the Single European Act 198685 has placed constraints on the Houses' 
ability to scrutinise European legislation. These can and have been alleviated but not 
removed by changes in the practices of the House. These very restrictions were 
recognised by the Foster Committee Report in 1973. The Report said that scrutiny 
would need to develop in parallel with the Community. However, though the House has 
never throughout our membership of the European Community and now the European 
Union, 86 ever realistically expected to exercise total accountability in relation to 
minister's prospective actions in the Council of Ministers, it has always demanded 
explanations and justifications after the event. 
Thus the Commons is trying to accommodate two competing principles. That is the 
legal principle of the primacy of EC law with the constitutional requirement that a 
minister's primary responsibility is to Parliament. Influencing both of these are political 
factors - namely that the government is acutely aware of its accountability to a sceptical 
electorate at home, but also that it cannot appear obstructive in Council. Today, the 
European legislative process of which scrutiny is a part, can best be described as a 
balancing act that is becoming ever increasingly more difficult to maintain. Essentially 
this means that effective scrutiny by the Commons cannot persist if developments in 
the EC, and in particular the extension of Qualified Majority Voting, continue to occur. 
The time will undoubtedly arrive when this development will make scrutiny by 
domestic parliament's irrelevant. Majority voting means that a minister following 
Parliaments opinion on a legislative proposal can be outvoted in Council. In these 
circumstances he cannot be held accountable for a decision which he did not support. 
Scrutiny is malapropos. However, this stage has not yet been reached and Parliament 
retains some influence. Iii the next section, the Standing Orders will be examined to 
establish how they facilitate the Commons objectives in the scrutiny process.. 
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Terms of Reference 
The Select Committee on European Legislation is the central element in the 
arrangements made by the House to keep itself informed of predominantly legislative 
matters which will be coming before the Communities' Council of Ministers and thus 
enable it where appropriate to seek to influence the position of UK ministers at the 
Council meeting. 
Although the Scrutiny Committee has a pivotal role in the arrangements for 
examining European legislation in the House, it is important to remember that ministers' 
European responsibilities are an important aspect of their overall departmental 
responsibilities. Thus besides the specific arrangements to be detailed below, all the 
usual methods of holding ministers to account are available to Members. Therefore, 
these scrutiny arrangements are in addition to, and not a substitute for opportunities 
such as Parliamentary questions, ministerial correspondence and adjournment debates. 
Any member can also raise European issues at departmental question time and the 
Departmental Select Committees will also investigate European issues. 87 
Working arrangements 
The Select Committee itself consists of sixteen members who are nominated by the 
House" for the duration of the whole Parliament. From their number the Committee 
will elect a Chairman. 
89 The Committee normally meets once a week on a Wednesday 
afternoon when the House is sitting. The Committee has power to meet when the House 
is in recess but rarely exercises this power, which undoubtedly has an impact on the 
scrutiny process. Because of the occasional fast moving nature of the legislative process 
it is possible for documents to be agreed in Council before the House has had an 
opportunity to debate it. 
90 
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Standing Orders 
The Committee is appointed under Standing Order No. 127. This provides for the 
Committee to examine European Community Documents and: - 
to report on the legal and political importance of each 
such document and, where it considers appropriate, to report 
also on the reasons for its opinion and on any matters of 
principle POlicY and law which may be affected; 
(b) to make recomendations for the further consideration of 
any such document pursuant to Standing Order 102 (European 
Standing Committees) and; 
(c) to consider any issue arising upon any such document or 
group of documents. 
The Standing Order was amended in October 1990 to allow the Committee to 
consider Community Documents other than those which are specific proposals for 
legislation. In its response9l to the Fourth Report from the Select Committee on 
Procedure92 the government stated that it was: -93 
II prepared to propose an amendment of the Terms of Reference which 
would give the Committee scope for considering, for example, consultative 
documents embodying important proposals for the future development of 
the Community, and for examining horizontal proposals. " 
However, this extcnded function would continue to be related to specific community 
documents deposited in Parliamcrit rather than involving free-standing investigations of 
broad policy issues which might tend to duplicate the work of other Committees. Thus 
Page - 61 
the government is as reluctant today as ever to extend the Terms of Reference beyond 
those proposed by the Foster Committee in 1973.94 The Committee is therefore best 
described as a reactive Committee. Scrutiny is its first responsibility. Policy discussion 
and consideration lies solely within the remit of the relevant Departmental Select 
Committee. 95 
Legal and Political Importance 
The key phrase of Standing Order 127 is: - 
"to report its opinion on the legal andpolitical importance of each such 
document" (my italics). 
The Select Committee carries out this principal role by sifting the Community 
documents deposited in the House by the government and then makes recommendations 
as to whether they should be debated and on their legal or political importance. The 
sifting process is vital to the efficient functioning of the Select Committee. The 
Committee has before it an average of 900-1000 documents per year. Obviously, the 
detailed scrutiny of each in turn is not possible given the limited meeting time of the 
Committee and the other demands on the Member's time. Thus, the sifting process 
carried out by the Clerk and his assistants, to select those documents which have legal 
or political importance, and then for the Committee to scrutinise them and recommend 
further debate by the House in appropriate circumstances, ensures an efficient use of the 
limited time available. 
For each document (except the most minor) members of the Committee are provided 
with an advisory brief draNN-ii tip by the Committee's staff. 
96 This advisory brief is 
designed to give members (ill the necessary information which they will need in order to 
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enable them to reach a decision on the legal and political importance of the document. 
The brief concludes with a recomendation on this point. 
There are no fixed criteria against which the Committee must assess and decide what 
actually constitutes legal and political importance. Each case must be judged 
exclusively on its merits. All those documents which the Committee has adjudged not 
to be of legal and political importance at a particular meeting (this is usually the 
majority of documents considered at the weekly meeting - approximately two thirds) are 
listed in a single paragraph at the end of the relevant report. Examples of such 
documents include inter alia: - 
- routine Common Commercial Tariff and Trade measures 
- factual Commission reports 
- proposals for consolidation of Community legislation 
- minor Commission amendments to legislative proposals 
Documents are reported to the House as raising questions of legal or political 
importance if they deal with matters which the Committee has adjudged that Members 
of the House would wish to be specifically informed about. For example, legal 
iniportance may include such things as a doubtful legal base, a questionable assertion of 
competence on the part of the Commission to propose legislation or the impact of a 
proposal on existing law. Political importance on the other hand, may relate to the 
sensitivity of a proposal's subject matter or the cost involved in implementation. In these 
instances, the Committee reports to the House, usually in some detail, about the contents 
of the document, the government's position, its own reasons for considering that the 
document raises issues of legal or political importance, and, where it considers 
appropriate. reactions of those groups or individuals affected by the proposal. 
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Provision of documents to the Select Committee 
Official texts 
The official text is the final version of the legislative proposal as submitted by the 
Commission to the Council of Ministers. This will be the document that is debated in 
the Council and perhaps most importantly from the Select Committee's perspective, it 
will be the document that is the basis of scrutiny. 
It is the lack of this official text which delays scrutiny. In its 1996 report, 97 the 
Select Committee listed 75 documents which it considered to be of legal or political 
importance that came before the Select Committee without an official text between 17 
July 1995 and 18 July 1996.98 It also identified a further 222 items that were of lesser 
importance which were also scrutinised without an official text. 99 In all these cases 
scrutiny was conducted on the basis of an unofficial text, that is to say a preliminary text 
published by the Commission. This however, is not ideal because the final version may 
be different from this preliminary text and what's more the unofficial text cannot be 
deposited in the House or made public. 
The blame for this delay lies essentially with the Commission for providing 
documents late and the Council for accepting them. This means that the Council, 
working to a very tight deadline, will want to approve the document as quickly as 
possible. The net effect of this is that scrutiny will suffer. That is to say, final agreement 
will be given in Council before the Select Committee has completed its task. This is 
unacceptable, not to say undemocratic. 
How can this situation be changed? Obviously, efficient provision of documents in 
the correct language is the starting point. Anything less makes scrutiny ineffective. 
However, this itself niav not bc enough in that the Select Committee is still reliant upon 
0 
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the goodwill of other institutions, in particular the government.. Thus the Select 
Committee has decided to take matters into its own hands. The Committee's Terms of 
Reference require it "to examine European Community Documents" and to report to the 
House. This task cannot be done without the appropriate documents. 
There are two steps that have been taken by the Select Committee. Firstly, it has 
called for a four week period to allow for scrutiny between the deposition of the official 
text and the meeting of the Council of Ministers. This has been endorsed by the 
goverm-nent and they are putting it forward at the current Inter-Governmental 
Conference (IGC). Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, the Committee has taken 
decisive action. As from the beginning of the 1996-97 Parliamentary session the 
Scrutiny Committee will not clear a document when no official text has been received. 
Furthermore, they will expect ministers to impose the scrutiny reserve until the official 
text has been deposited. Only where the minister believes a delay will damage UK 
interests can he or she give agreement, but this must be justified to the House 
immediately (for more detail on this see p. 79 below). 
This development has brought scrutiny to the fore. The Times on August 20 1996, ran 
this story under the headline "MPs plan boycott of European laws to confront Brussels". 
Sir Teddy Taylor MP, a renowned Eurosceptic, hailed this as a "symbolic victory for the 
British citizen",, and a former chairman of the Select Committee, Nigel Spearing MP, is 
quoted as saying "We have been pushed too far. It is a mixture of incompetence by 
ministers and contempt by Brussels for national parliaments. We are not putting up with 
it. II 
The issue was also the subject of an investigation by the BBC political affairs 
programme On the Rccoi-cl on October 20 1996. The programme highlighted the very 
ing anecdotal evidence. In issues discussed above and also provided some interesti I 
particular one reason pN, eii for documents arriving late is that they were sent by second 
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class post or to the wrong address! This is a sad reflection of the state of government 
today. However, the serious point is inescapable, if documents or information are not 
supplied on time to the Committee. the whole House is let down. At present it is too 
early to form any conclusion on whether the Select Committee's tactics will work. The 
Select Committee feel that they have no other option. What they are doing is protecting 
Parliament's right to scrutinise the executive and for this they must be applauded. 
Explanatory Memorandum 
The Explanatory Memorandum should be provided by the lead government 
department within 10 days of the date of the deposit of the official text in the vote 
office. The aim of the Explanatory Memorandum is to furnish the Committee with the 
government's view of the proposed legislation and how it may effect other domestic 
legislation. However, this part of the scrutiny process illustrates the wider problems 
faced by the Committee. That is the reliance of the Committee on the cooperation and 
goodwill of the government. 
If the government delays in the production of the Explanatory Memorandum or it is 
insufficient in detail then the scrutiny process grinds to a halt. If, as often happens, the 
legislative process in the Community is fast moving, then Parliament may be rushed 
into a debate on an important piece of legislation before it has all the necessary facts, or 
more alarmingly, hold no debate at all. The blame for this lies firmly at the feet of the 
government department involved. One recent example illustrates this very point. The 
Committee requested further information on document 6079/95 from the minister on 17 
May 1995. He replied on 6 November 1995 that he wished to approve the measure in 
Council on.... 6 November 1995. The result no debate and thus no scrutiny. 
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Though the government is committed to providing the Explanatory Memorandum as 
early as possible, ' 00 this situation is regularly criticised and members of the Committee 
have informed the author of their wish to see this process formalised in the Standing 
Orders of the House. The recent report of the Select Committee tackled this very issue. 
They were concerned that the scrutiny process was being held up further by delays in 
lead departments providing an EM. For example, document no. 8179/95. The English 
version was received on 7 July 1995 and deposited on 20 July 1995. However, the EM 
was not received until 9 February 1996. This is unacceptable. The government has 
pledged to ensure departments respond promptly to this issue. However, the same 
pledge was made in 1986 and appears to have had little impact. The government must 
now act firmly. It is within their power to ensure that delays for whatever reason do not 
occur. 
Un-numbered Explanatory Memorandum 
There are also special arrangements which apply in the case of fast moving 
proposals. In such an instance the lead department will provide an un-numbered 
Explanatory Memorandum based on the information available about the likely content 
of the formal proposal, from the Commission's preliminary text. This will stand as the 
main document for the Committee for scrutiny purposes, until it is deposited formally, 
where it will be treated in the usual way. Once again though, it is the quick response of 
the govermnent which is essential to the effectiveness of the scrutiny process. 
However, if the document is still under discussion in the Council of Ministers it is 
difficult to ascertain how full an explanation the government have given. This is due in 
great part to the secrecy vrhich surrounds negotiations within the Council. A minister 
will be reluctant to pive full information on a legislati al if negotiations are still ýi I ive propos i 
in progress because hc will not want to reveal his negotiating position. given the "horse- 
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trading" which takes place in Council. In this event, there is the risk that the un- 
numbered Explanatory Memorandum will be inaccurate by the time the final proposal is 
decided upon by the Council of Ministers. This is potentially damaging for the scrutiny 
process as the Committee will have to duplicate their work and delay their final 
recommendation on the document before them. 
The relationshi with the government p 
The power of the House of Commons to influence Community legislation depends of 
course upon its control over ministers. From the moment of accession to the Community 
the House of Commons has asserted its right to be informed about proposals for 
Community legislation and debate them if it thinks fit. This can only be done if the 
Committee is in possession of all relevant information. 
As is evident from the above discussion, the success or failure of the scrutiny system 
depends upon the adequate and efficient provision of information to the Select 
Committee. This very issue has been regularly highlighted by the Select Committee 
since its inception and was brought once again to the govermnent's attention by the 
Select Committee in its recent report. The current position relates only to the 
government providing information on "legislative proposals". 
In 1973, the government undertook to supply the Select Committee with copies of 
the documents in English, within forty-eight hours of having received them. However as 
the Procedure Committee noted in its Report. -101 
"The English text of a European document is usually deposited in the 
House about a n-ionth after its formal adoption by the Commission followed 
Page - 68 
within a fortnight by an Explanatory Memorandum from the responsible 
government department. " 
In evidence which was given to the Select Committee on Procedure in 1989, the 
Chairman of the Scrutiny Committee stressed the need for early notification of 
legislative proposals and the increased availability of documents which would provide 
early warning of future legislative initiatives. 102 He said: - 
"... the earlier it can alert the House to a proposal of potential legal or 
political importance, the greater is the likelihood that the House will be able 
to influence its outcome. " 
The most effective way in which this could be achieved would be for the Select 
Committee to receive Commission documents which give details of the legislative 
proposals as early as possible, and preferably when the Commission is at its 
consultative stage. In its response 103 the government undertook to provide the Select 
Committee with the forward programme of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
and has done so. In addition the Commission has provided its three month forward 
programme to national parliaments. 104 
Both these actions are positive steps but availability of other documents is still 
hampered by the inability of Parliament to contact the Commission formally. The UK 
Parliament has no direct relationship with the Commission or any other of the 
institutions in the Community. Thus as well as having no formal input into the 
legislative process, the Select Committee is reliant on the Executive to provide it with 
all the necessary documents which it needs to perform its task of scrutiny. The examples 
given above illustrate that to this day, this issue has not been resolved to the Select 
Committee's satisfaction and the Executive, still the pivotal player in the scrutiny 
process falls short in its obligations to the Committee. 
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Options for the Committee after deliberation 
For a document adjudged to raise questions of legal or political importance, the 
Committee then has to decide whether the document raises issues of sufficient 
importance to justify its further consideration by one of the two European Standing 
Committees105or exceptionally, by the Chamber itself. In reaching its decision, the 
Committee will want to consider exactly what specific Parliamentary consideration of 
the document would achieve. For example, it would be an inefficient use of 
Parliamentary time to recommend for debate a proposal which the Commission has, in 
the face of public opinion, decided to modify substantially, or to recommend the debate 
of a highly technical document which though important could not sustain an informed 
debate. On the other hand, there would be a very strong argument for debating a 
document where,, for instance, major issues are raised and where there is strong 
opposition inside or outside Parliament to the government's negotiating position. 
It will occasionally be the case that a document is considered to raise questions of 
legal or political importance, but the Committee is unclear as to whether a 
recommendation for debate would be appropriate. In this instance, it is the practice for 
the Committee to recommend "no debate at this stage". It will then attempt to seek 
further information to enable it to reach a firm view. 
There are other documents raising questions of legal and political importance, not of 
sufficient importance to justify a debate solely on it, but worthy of reference in a wider 
debate in a relevant policy area. The Committee will indicate this fact in its report. 
However, the effectiveness of this inquiry will depend exclusively on the debate of this 
wider policy issue. If this is not debated then it follows that the document is not debated. 
Once again it is the reliance on the government which is the key. The decision lies with 
the government business managers and the "usual channels" if their is to be a debate in 
the Chamber, and what the tin-iing of this debate is to be. Likewise in the Standing 
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Committee, it is the government which decides the timing of the debate and on the 
motion to be debated. Once the matter comes back to the Chamber from the Standing 
Committee a similar motion is moved by the government. However, these proceedings 
are purely formal and the government do not permit further time for debate. 106 
Exerting influence over ministers 
The Resolution of the House 30 October 1980 
Prior to 1980 formal control of the minister was not enshrined anywhere within the 
procedures of the House. The ability to influence was dependent on the goodwill of the 
governinent of the day. Though the goverm-nent rarely abused its position, the Procedure 
Committee's Report of 1978107 recommended that the government give a formal 
undertaking to consult Parliament for its opinion whenever the Committee has indicated 
that a debate needed to be held. This right was enshrined in a Resolution of the House, 
108 dated October 30 1980 , in the 
following terms: 
Resolution of the House 30 October 1980 
"That in the opinion of this House, no Minister of the Crown 
should give agreement in the Council of Ministers to any 
proposal for European legislation which has been recommended 
by the Select Committee on European legislation for 
consideration by the House before the House has given it that 
consideration unless- 
(a) that Committee has indicated that agreement need not be 
withheld, or 
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(b) the Minister concerned decides that for speclal reasons 
agreement should not be withheld ; 
and in the latter case the Minister should, at the first 
opportunity thereafter. explain his decision to the House. 109 
This Resolution by the House of Commons, recognised the basic precondition of 
effective scrutiny. That is the requirement that the House will be able to express its 
views on Community legislative proposals before they have been approved in the 
Council of Ministers. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this Resolution was contained in (b), i. e. 
where the minister decides for special reasons that consent need not be withheld. The 
Resolution itself gave no guidance as to what these special reasons will be. This was left 
to the government to define without any debate within Parliament. In giving evidence to 
the Select Committee on European legislation, I 10 the then Leader of the House, the 
Right Honourable John Biffen MP, indicated a number of factors which would influence 
a minister's decision in such circumstances: -"' 
(a) the fact that the Committee may sometimes indicate when 
they first consider a document that their recomendation for 
debate need not delay adoption. They may also agree at a later 
stage to allow adoption of a document before the scrutiny 
process has been completed; 
(b) the need to avoid a legal vacuum; 
(c) the desirability of permitting a particular measure of benefit 
to the United Kingdom to come into question as soon as 
possible. 
(d) the difficulty. particularly if the negotiations in the 
Community have been difficult or protracted, of putting a late 
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reserve on a measure which will either have little effect on the 
United Kingdom or which is likely to be of benefit to the United 
Kingdom. 
The late reserve referred to in (d) means that if it is likely that the Council will 
attempt to adopt a document on which, exceptionally, scrutiny has not been completed 
and there are no special reasons for adoption to take place, the normal practice is to 
place a Parliamentary reserve on the document. In such circumstances, other Member 
States accept that the proposal should not be adopted until Parliament has completed the 
scrutiny process. It is however accepted that the reserve will be lifted as soon as 
possible. 
Following the Select Committee Report of the 1983-84 Session the government 
undertook to draw the criteria in (a)-(d) to the attention of all government departments. 
In their Fourth Report, the Select Committee on Procedure indicated that they had no 
evidence to suggest that as they are currently defined, the criteria have been improperly 
invoked by the government departments. 
112 
The Leader of the House in his evidence of 16 May 1984, further suggested that he 
was of the opinion, and that he would advise all government departments accordingly, 
of the need to interpret criteria (a)-(d) strictly. This need for a more restrictive approach 
to the adoption of documents prior to the scrutiny process being completed was 
highlighted after the implementation of the Single European Act in 1986. The increase 
in the use of Majority Voting by the Council of Ministers eroded the power of 
indiN, idual member countries to block legislation. Given the absence of mandating by 
the House of Commons, the scrutiny of legislative proposals prior to adoption in the 
Council is the only influence which Parliament has. This must be protected vigorously if 
Parliamentary democracy is not to be undermined. 
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Within the United Kingdom. it is Parliament which ultimately controls the executive 
and the executive is reliant on Parliament for its power. But in the day to day exercise of 
authority, especially in the context of the European Union it is the executive which 
really yields this power without too much constraint from Parliament - except by the 
Resolution of the House which affords some guarantee of debate and scrutiny. 
The Single European Act and the Scrutiny Reserve 
The introduction by the Single European Act of the cooperation procedure introduced 
a complication not envisaged when the 1980 Resolution was agreed to. Under this new 
procedure, legislative proposals to which this procedure applied, were sent to the 
European Parliament for debate twice instead of once. Where the cooperation procedure 
applied to a proposall 13 the Council (having consulted the European Parliament) 
adopted what is known as a 'common position' on the proposal. 114 This was then sent 
to the European Parliament, which could propose amendments to the common position. 
It was then up to the Commission to decide whether to incorporate these amendments in 
its 're-examined proposal' to the Council. The implications for scrutiny by this 
procedure are clear. Any debate which was delayed post the adoption of the common 
position, though in compliance with the strict terms of the Resolution - Le Parliament 
looked at the proposal prior to final adoption by the Council (but after the European 
Parliament had proposed its amendments) - had very little prospect of exerting any 
significant influence on the final outcome because of the amendments which the L- 
ELiropean Parliament may then propose, could substantially alter the proposal. 
The effect of this procedure, was to diminish Parliament's influence. Any debate 
delayed post common position and prior to final adoption by the Council could not take 
into account further ainendinents by the European Parliament when the proposal went 
back to them for the so called 'second reading. Parliament could not exert any pressure 
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over a minister and ask him not to agree to an amendment proposed by the European 
Parliament on this 'second reading'. The debate would have already taken place on the 
basis of the common position adopted by the Council. The only possibility would be to 
hold a second debate. However,, the use of Parliamentary time to debate an amended 
proposal, the bulk of which has already been scrutinised was viewed as being a waste of 
Parliamentary time and should only be carried out in rare circumstances. 115 
The 1980 Resolution and the subsequent statement by the Leader of the House to the 
Select Committee on European legislation outlining what the "special reasons" 116 are 
for agreeing to a proposal prior to a debate represented the cornerstone of the scrutiny 
process. However, following the developments of the Single European Act, most 
notably in the sphere of Qualified Majority Voting it was acknowledged by all parties 
involved in the scrutiny process that these provisions were now inadequate. 117 
Government undertakings were given in respect of the changes, the most notable being 
to treat "agreement in the Council of Ministers" 118 as including adoption of a common 
position under the cooperation procedure. This would thereby give more certainty to 
debates in the House as no further amendments would be agreed to by a minister until 
scrutiny of the proposal arising from the common position had been completed. This 
would therefore ensure Parliamentary control over the minister as Parliament would 
have had its say on the legislative proposal and perhaps most importantly what further 
amendments by the European Parliament it would be prepared to accept. 
Given the importance of the changes to the scrutiny procedure it was felt that the 
government undertakings should be made formal and this was recommended by the 
Procedure Committee in their Fourth Report. 119 They further recommended 120 that the 
minister should only give consent to a legislative proposal prior to the completion of 
the scrutiny process if there are "compelling reasons" to do so. They were of the opinion 
that the presumption should, in the absence of these compelling reasons, always be on 
the side of withholding consent if scrutiny is not complete. With this in mind, the 
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Procedure Committee 'sharpened up' the special reasons outlined by the Leader of the 
House on 16 May 1984.121 This included: -122 
(a) the need to avoid a legal vacuum should be justified on the 
grounds of clear necessity and not merely of administrative 
convenience; 
(b) before voting to agree to a measure considered by the 
Government to be of benefit to the United Kingdom prior to 
scrutiny, Ministers should, as far as practicable in the time 
available,, take steps to satisfy themselves (i) that the House 
would be likely to approve the measure if time permitted a 
debate and (11) that the United Kingdom's interests would be 
materially prejudiced if consent were withheld; and 
(c) in assessing the difficulty of placing a late scrutiny reserve 
on a measure, Ministers should be guided by the likelihood that 
if consent were withheld, the passage of the measure concerned, 
or of some other measure, might be jeopardised to the detriment 
of the United Kingdoms interests. 
It is evident from these recommendations that the Procedure Committee along with 
members of the Scrutiny Committee were eager to ensure Parliamentary accountability 
was not undermined by the Executive, i. e. ministers taking decisions without 
consultation or debate, and by Parliament being totally excluded from the decision 
making process with regards legislation which would be equally enforceable in the 
United Kingdom as any other domestic legislation. 
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The Resolution of the House 24 October 1990 
As previously stated the Procedure Committee recommended an amendment to the 
Resolution of the House of 30 October 1980. This amendment would be designed to 
reflect Parliament's concerns following the Single European Act 1986 and how power 
had by virtue of this Act shifted in favour of the Executive at the expense of Parliament. 
In its response to the Fourth Report by the Procedure Committee, the government123 
accepted the Committee's recommendation to formalise the undertakings it had given in 
respect to changes in the scrutiny system. On the 24 October 1990, on a government 
motion, a Resolution of the House was passed encompassing the Committee's 
recommendations. 124 The new Resolution (still in force today) reads as follows: - 
Resolution of the House 24 October 1990 
(1) No Minister of the Crown should give agreement in the Council of 
Ministers to any proposal for European Community legislation: - 
(a) which is still subject to scrutiny (that is, on which the Select 
Committee on European Legislation has not completed its 
scrutiny); or 
(b) which is awaiting consideration by the House (that is, which 
has been recommended by the Select Committee for 
consideration pursuant to Standing Order No. 102 (European 
Standing Committees) but in respect of which the House has not 
come to a Resolution, either on a Resolution reported by a 
European Standing Committee or otherwise); 
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(2) In this Resolution. any reference to agreement to a proposal includes. in 
the case of a proposal on which the Council acts in cooperation with the 
European Parliament agreement to a common position 
(3) the Minister concerned may, however, give agreement: - 
(a) to a proposal which is still subject to scrutiny if he considers 
that it is confidential, routine or trivial or is substantially the 
same as a proposal on which scrutiny has already been 
completed; 
(b) to a proposal which is awaiting consideration by the House if 
the Select Committee has indicated that agreement need not be 
withheld pending consideration. 
(4) The Minister concerned may also give agreement to a proposal which is 
still subject to scrutiny or awaiting consideration by the House if he decides 
that for special reasons agreement should be given; but he should explain his 
reasons: - 
(a) in every such case, to the Select Committee at the first 
opportunity after reaching his decision ; and 
(b) in the case of a proposal awaiting consideration by the 
House, to the House at the first opportunity after giving 
agreement. 
(5) In relation to any proposal which requires adoption by unanimity, 
abstention shall, for the purposes of paragraph (4) be treated as giving 
agreement. 
It is an accurate statement, that this Resolution is the foundation of the scrutiny 
process today. Its primary objective is to preserve Parliament's ability to influence the 
minister before agreement is given in Council. The extensive and detailed nature of the 
Resolution reflects two thinos in particular. Firstly, the developi-rient of the legislative 
process within the Europeaii Community. It acknowledges the increased role for the 
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European Parliament. a role now even greater after the adoption of the Maastricht 
Treaty. It attempts to accommodate the need for the European Parliament to be part of 
the legislative process if the so called democratic deficit in the European Community is 
to be filled. 
However, secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Resolution endeavours to 
uphold the notion that Parliament is the Sovereign law maker in the United Kingdom. 
As paragraph (1) illustrates, Parliament will only acquiesce to a proposal for legislation 
when and if it has debated the matter fully and made the minister aware of its views. 
Thus, the authority of the minister to give agreement in the Council of Ministers still 
flows from Parliament via the Select Committee on European Legislation. This is 
illustrated by the wording of paragraph of paragraphs (3)(b) and (4) of the Resolution. 
In particular, in paragraph (4) it is Parliament which has decided on the limited 
circumstances in which a minister may give approval without first consulting 
Parliament. 
Furthermore, the element of control is still present in this situation as the minister 
must explain himself at the earliest opportunity. As suggested, by both the Select 
Committee and the Procedure Committee in its report125 the minister concerned should 
make an oral statement at the earliest opportunity to explain his special reasons. In some 
cases,, the Procedure Committee stated that the explanation could come in advance of 
the Council meeting where they are aware a decision will be made and when there is no 
time for a debate. 126 Whatever the circumstances of the statement, this statement is 
only the second best option to debate prior to final approval. However, if the statement 
is made at the despatch box by the minister concerned, then there is an opportunity to 
cross-examine the minister not only on the particular document he has agreed to (or is 
about to agree to) but also on the policy implications of this proposed legislation. In this 
case, members of the Select Committee can raise the questions which they and other 
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members would have done had there been a full scale debate. 127 prior to adoption in 
the Council. 
The Scrutiny Reserve and the Parliamentary timetable 
Ironically, it is the requirements of this Resolution which can potentially have a 
significant influence on the effectiveness of scrutiny by the Committee. The working 
methods of the European Union are such that the Presidency of the Council is held by 
Member States for six monthly periods beginning I January and I July respectively. 
However, because of the pattern of recesses taken by the House, there is a significant 
difference between the two halves of the year in the opportunities for debate. In an 
average year, (i. e. one which is not interrupted by a General Election campaign) the 
number of sitting days in the second half of the year is likely to be appreciably less than 
in the first half 128 Unless the government arrange debates with this factor in mind, 
there will be difficulties in accommodating debates on major legislative proposals put 
forward by the Member State holding the Presidency. 
Thus the working times of the Scrutiny Committee and those of the Council are for a 
considerable part of the year not synchronised. Whilst Council of Ministers meetings 
will continue throughout the summer recess, the Committee, though it has power to 
meet at the time of recess,, has not exercised this power for many years. Beside which, 
even if the Committee did meet during the recess, any debate which it recommended 
could not take place until after the recess. 
129 This has two major implications for the 
scrutiny process. 
Firstly, there is no opportunity to debate the legislative proposal and thereby 
influence the minister. The best which can be hoped for is for the minister to put a 
ScrLitiny Reserve on the document and the process be completed when the House meets. 
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Secondly, the potential for a legislative 'log-jam' is evident. If many proposals have a .1 
reserve on them, then there will be many debates to be held, but in a limited time. Such 
a shortage of time for debate can only reduce the quality of the debate, and the influence 
which the House will finally have over the minister concerned. 
The Procedure Committee recognised. this problem which has faced the Scrutiny 
Committee from day one. In its 1989 Report, the Procedure Committee recommended 
that during the recess the government should keep to the spirit of the Resolution and 
where a debate has been recommended it should only in exceptional circumstances 
invoke as a special reason for giving consent before scrutiny is completed the fact that 
Parliament will not meet for several weeks. 130 However, the government in its 
response, 131 though willing to abide by the Resolution, said that it would have to bear 
in mind how long the delay before the debate might be, and thus decide accordingly. 
Any such decision would be informed to the Committee as soon as practicable and the 
reason given. 
Despite this potential difficulty with the Resolution, it is not proposed to amend it to 
allow for the government to have a free hand in decision making at the Council during a 
recess. This would yield even more power to an already dominant Executive. However, 
this raises the wider question, beyond the scope of this work, of the working methods of 
the House of Commons. Perhaps if these were reformed to give more Parliamentary 
time, there would not be the controversy which surfaces on the occasions of legislation 
being passed without proper scrutiny. 
The Scrutiny Reserve Resolittion after Maastricht 
As far as the Select Committee is concerned, the major development introduced by 
the Maastricht Treaty has been the co-decision procedure, which builds upon the 
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cooperation procedure introduced by the SEA 1986. The primary effect of this has been 
to increase further the role of the European Parliament in the legislative process. In 
particular it has added on a "third reading" stage whereby a Conciliation Committee is 
convened,, whose task it is to achieve a compromise on the proposed legislation if the 
Council and Parliament cannot agree on the amendments put forward by the Parliament. 
This is in contrast to the position under the cooperation procedure, where, if agreement 
could not be reached,, the proposal would lapse. 
This third reading stage occurs after the Select Committee has concluded its scrutiny 
on the basis of the original proposal put forward by the Commission and submitted to 
the Council (who form their common position) and may have also included scrutiny of 
the European Parliaments amendments. The Scrutiny Reserve has operated up this point 
and it is now up to Council to decide whether to accept the proposal as amended. 
If the Council reject the amendments the Conciliation Committee is convened. It tries 
to agree a compromise proposal between the Council and European Parliament within 
six weeks. If they succeed (as is likely in a matter of days) a new proposal will emerge 
which has not been subject to scrutiny by the Select Committee. The government have 
refused to allow the Select Committee the opportunity to scrutinise the compromise 
proposal by not extending the Scrutiny Reserve Resolution to cover the Conciliation 
Committee deliberations. Their argument is based on the fact that once the text is agreed 
by the Conciliation Committee no amendment to it is permitted. The Council can only 
accept or reject it, and on this basis with only two clear options open to it, the other 
members of the Council would not accept a further delay to allow for an additional 
round of scrutiny by the UK Parliament. 
Thus the government have refused Parliament the ability to scrutinise potentially 
important legislation. It is fair to say that only significant or controversial legislation 
will find itself beforc the Conciliation Committee. To refuse scrutiny is, to undermine 
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Parliamentary democracy. In this event, ministers cannot be held accountable for their 
actions. This development raises other complex issues which together with this one will 
be discussed further in Chapter 6, where scrutiny after Maastricht is discussed in detail. 
Concluding remarks 
Widening the Terms ofReference 
In the course of an interview with the Clerk of the Select Committee on European 
Legislation, the question was put to him of how effective he thought the Committee was 
at carrying out the task Parliament has asked it to do? His reply was that it was 'totally 
effective' at carrying out this task. This response however poses a further question. 
Should the task of the Select Committee be different? Almost since day one, the 
Committee has been concerned that its remit has been too narrow. 
This concern has heightened since the passage of the Single European Act, primarily 
due to the increase of Qualified Majority Voting and the enhanced role for the European 
Parliament which both this Act and the Maastricht Treaty provide for. In this present 
climate, there is some prima. facie value in giving the Committee some latitude to base 
its reports not just exclusively on a specific proposal for legislation. A Committee which 
could report on trends and developments in broad policy areas would be particularly 
valuable especially in policy areas which crossed departmental lines. 
However, herein lies the potential difficulty which the Committee could face if it 
adopted this enhanced role. The fact that this Committee is not a departmental 
committee but a Scrutiny Committee suggests that there will be a possible duplication 
of work amongst the Committees. Yet given the increase in the number of documents 
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which may be of importance in the context of a wider debate on the development of the 
Community, and in respect of which the House might benefit from a summary and 
assessment of the kind made in respect of documents coming within the scrutiny "net", 
the risk of duplication, is far outweighed by the benefit to the House. 
In effect a discussion of merits and policy by the Scrutiny Committee (of the kind 
which takes place in the House of Lords) will only benefit debate within the House and 
consequently within the Council of Ministers. As the European Union admits new 
Member States and sets extravagant goals of Political and Monetary Union for the 
foreseeable future, the legislation proposed by the Commission will be pivotal in 
achieving these aims. The policy implications of this legislation must be debated by the 
House for two important reasons. Firstly, the legislative proposals must be shown to be 
workable within a European context. That is, the proposals will have tangible benefits 
for all Member States. 
Secondly, a discussion of the effect of the proposal on UK policy is vital. 
Parliamentary approval for a piece of legislation, which may mark a major shift in 
economic or foreign policy as laid out by the government in its election manifesto is 
essential. Such a debate would rightly be expected by Members if the government 
performs a major policy 'u-turn' of its own volition. A change to any government policy 
caused by our membership of the European Union must be scrutinised for the same 
purposes, i. e. those of accountability to the House and the electorate. 
It is at this juncture, that the Select Committee could have a significant role to play. 
If it was charged with the role of scrutinising the European policy of the government of 
the day it could provide the House with the necessary nuances involved in that policy 
being chani)ed by a piece of European legislation. Thus its role as acting as a source of Cý 
information for the House would be increased. It would have both the time and expertise 
to produce a detailed report \\-Iiich would be the foundation of debate within the 
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Chamber. Perhaps most \, itally. it would have carried out the in-depth investigation 
which the Chamber itself does not have the time to do and placed the issue within the 
European and national context. 
The Select Committee on Procedure in compiling its 1989 report132 took evidence 
from a number of interested parties including the then Chairman of the Scrutiny 
Committee Mr Nigel Spearing Mp. 133 He very lucidly described the changes which the 
majority of members of the Committee both then and today view as a positive step 
forward for the scrutiny process. At the centre of these proposals134 was the need to 
extend the Terms of Reference of the Select Committee and allow it to prepare reports 
into broad policy areas of the kind outlined above. 
However, these changes would only be effective if there was a change in the 
workings of the Commission. The most important of these would be to circulate 
legislative proposals at an earlier stage, thereby allowing the Committee and the 
national parliament to have a greater input into the final draft of the legislation. 
Obviously, these documents would not be final drafts, however, they could conceivably 
be classed as "working texts" and thus be part of the wide consultation process which 
the Commission presently undertakes. This process would fill a significant vacuum. The 
elected representatives of the Member State, who presently have no formal links with 
the Commission (other than through the minister of the day) or any involvement in the 
formulation of legislation, would now be part of this most important of procedures. 
There are two identifiable benefits flowing from this involvement. Firstly the MPs 
job of scrutiny would be made easier if they were aware of the legislative proposal at an 
earlier stage. Anything which makes scrutiny more effective must be welcomed. 
Secondly and perhaps more importantly in the present political climate, any 
involvement by MPs in the decision making process at an earlier stage, could help in the 
rnovc away trorn the present "them and us" mentall I ity which many MPs have expressed. 
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Such involvement could help bridge the gap between not just the UK, but all national 
parliaments and the European Institutions and remove the sense of isolation felt by 
many MPs who feel that their role in this process is limited to the time once the 
legislation has become afait accompli. 
Furthermore, it would help the notion held by persons both inside and outside 
Parliament, that European legislation is in some way alien to us and being imposed on 
us by an unelected and unaccountable Commission. The European Communities Act 
1972135 gives this European legislation a legitimacy on a par with domestically 
produced legislation and in cases of conflict, gives this European legislation precedence. 
Thus Parliament has by due process conceded this aspect of its sovereignty to both the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers, and, more recently (but not to the same 
extent) to the European Parliament to propose and pass legislation to be enforced 
through the UK's judicial process. Such legislation will have a greater understanding 
and acceptance by the citizens of all European Union countries if the national 
Parliaments and its elected officials played a more active part in the decision making 
process. 
However,, the observations outlined above, remain to a greater extent as aspirations 
for the Select Committee and do not seem likely to be adopted within the foreseeable 
future. The present Conservative government rejected any extension to the Terms of 
Reference of the Select Committee in its response136 to the Fourth Report from the 
Select Committee on Procedure. The goverm-nent did, agree to provide as early as 
possible certain kinds of pre-legislative documents for the Committee137 but this falls 
far short of the Committee's objective that it will examine policy issues surrounding 
legislative proposals and produce detailed reports into the policy. It has been suggested 
that this xvill only happen if there were to be a minister at Cabinet rank whose sole area 
0 t' responsibility Nvas European affairs. In this instance, it would become a 
Departmental Ministry scrutinised by a Departmental Select Committee, whi 
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examines inter alia "policy. administration and expenditure". 
138 However, no political 
party has plans to create such a ministry. 13 9 
Thus, until the government agrees to amend the role of the Committee, it will remain 
concerned predominantly with the narrow task of scrutinising proposals for European 
legislation. As has already been stressed, this task is not to be understated. Its 
importance to the legislative process, in terms of being the only opportunity for MPs to 
comment upon the Executives actions at the Council of Ministers, makes it integral to 
the concept of Parliamentary democracy. That is, Parliament must have a say in the 
passage of legislation, even if that say is in the present limited circumstances. As the 
author was informed on a number of occasions during his research, some scrutiny is 
better than no scrutiny at all. The comparison was made with other Member States such 
as Spain, Greece and Portugal who had not developed any scrutiny process until after 
the Maastricht Treaty, and where even today the Executive is not held accountable in 
the vigorous way for decisions taken at meetings of the Council as is seen in the UK. In 
fact., it can be argued, that perhaps with the exception of the Danish Folketing the UK 
Parliament is the only one which places this great an emphasis on scrutiny, and which 
jealously guards the influence it has gained over the years. 
Raising the Select Committee's Profile 
The protection of Parliamentary democracy ultimately lies with the eternal vigilance 
of MPs. It is the rigour with which they insist on asking the real questions which get to 
the heart of an issue, that will determine how influential Parliament will be in the years 
to come as far as the Furopean Union is concerned. Enlargement of the Union means a 
dilution of the UK's influence at the Council. However, this could be counter balanced 
by an increase in Parliament's and more particularly the Committee's power to hold to 
account at the national level, the decision makers. 
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Any such step forward, would have to be made as a result of an initiative from 
Westminster. Perhaps one of the least noticed failures of the Maastricht Treaty was the 
fact that an increased role for the national Parliaments in Europe was relegated to a mere 
Declaration at the end of the Treaty. This should have been an absolute requirement laid 
down by the main body of the Treaty itself. With the growth of Qualified Majority 
Voting in the Council the need for scrutiny is greater than ever. 
Thus,, more public notice should be given by the Select Committee and in turn more 
media attention given to what is going on in the Select Committee. 140 Furthermore,, the 
increase in evidence given to the Committee by those who are directly affected by 
European legislation, e. g trade associations and pressure groups is to be welcomed. 141 
However, as has already been stated, this should be extended to allow full discussion 
and debate on policy by the Committee. 
Future reforms 
Any increase in the role of the Scrutiny Committee though requiring the cooperation 
of the government, also requires the cooperation of the European institutions, Most 
notably, the assistance of the Commission and Council of Ministers is vital. The 
Commission as already stated should strive to publish legislative proposals as early as 
possible, perhaps in the form of consultative documents. The Council of Ministers itself 
must become more open. 
However, though the Terms of Reference of the Committee need amending, the 
manner in which it conducts its Nvork does not. In fact, the consensual approach of the 
Coiiimittee (as with other Departmental Select Committees) is one of its great strengths. 
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It is this concensual approach in Committee, unique to a House of Commons which is 
based on an adversarial procedure, that allows for effective scrutiny and debate. The 
Members work together to produce a report which is of benefit for the whole House. 
Furthermore, as the Committee is carrying out an important task on behalf of the 
Chamber, this removes to a great extent the party political bickering which usually 
afflicts discussions on European issues. As a forum for debate the Select Committee 
cannot be improved upon. To strengthen its powers would only assist to improve its 
effectiveness. 
Democracy requires transparency. To hold to account those who make the law, the 
Committee must know what they are doing. The Committee must be fully aware of the 
horse-trading taking place in the Council. Thus further progress must be made to 
achieve this. Members are already told of the votes in the Council, the next step is for 
them to be fully aware of the deliberations which take place leading up to the vote. This 
will mean Members of the Scrutiny Committee sitting in on Council deliberations. 
Given there are no plans to mandate the minister142it is essential to know what the 
minister does in negotiations behind closed doors. 
In this chapter, the work of the Select Committee on European Legislation, the 
integral part of the scrutiny process, has been outlined. However, this is only one part, 
albeit the first and crucial one,, of the scrutiny process. This is why the work of the 
Select Committee must be thorough. Without it, the further debate which it recommends 
could not be as influential or informed. A weak Select Committee means ineffective 
scrutiny. The pressure to reform, cannot in this authors opinion, be ignored any longer. 
It is within Parliaments own hands to introduce the necessary internal reforms to ensure 
that accountability is maintained, and scrutiny by the Select Committee strengthened. 
The Procedure Committee is once again reviewing the work of the Select Committee on 
European Legislation. It has before it an important and challenging task. Its 
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recommendations will shape the scrutiny process during a very volatile time in the 
European Union. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DEBATING EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN 
THE EUROPEAN STANDING COMMITTEES AND ON 
THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE 
Introduction 
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the whole scrutiny process within the House of 
Commons is the division of labour between the Select Committee on European 
Legislation and European Standing Committees A and B. The limitation in the activities 
of both the Select Committee and the two Standing Committees is brought about by 
their narrow Terms of Reference. It is for the Select Committee to decide which 
European document should be the subject of further debate, but this debate is then 
carried out by one of the two European Standing Committees or occasionally on the 
Floor of the House 
The primary function of the debate is to consider the merits of the legislative 
proposal and most importantly, to influence the minister concerned and make him aware 
of the Houses opinion prior to their giving agreement to the proposal in the Council. It 
is the process of debate on the Floor of the House, and, perhaps more importantly in the 
Standing Committees, that will now be the subject of further consideration. The analysis 
begins with a historical review of the development of the Standing Committee 
procedure in the House of Commons and the reasons behind the Procedure Committee's 
recommendations in 1989 for reform of the Standing Committees. 
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Historical Background 
When the Foster Committee considered the arrangements for the scrutiny of 
European legislation in 1973143 it recommended that debates on European Community 
documents be divided between a newly created Standing Committee structure and the 
Floor of the House. The reason behind this was that members felt that where an 
important document was to be debated, the whole of the House should be able to attend 
and vote. 
The original Standing Order No. 102144 provided for the appointment of one or 
more145 Standing Committees for the consideration of European Community 
documents referred to them. A motion for such a reference to one of the Standing 
Committees could only be made by the minister. However, the motion could be 
negatived if twenty or more members rose in their places to signify their objection to the 
motion. Thus,, while the initiative for the referral of the document came from the 
government, it was a matter for the whole House whether or not the document was 
actually debated in Standing Committee or whether the debate was to take place on the 
Floor of the House. 146 
The structure of the European Standing Committees was different from that of other 
Standing Committees. Perhaps the most important feature (and one retained today) was 
that in addition to the members nominated to a European Standing Committee, any 
Member of the House could attend and address the Committee, but was not counted in 
the quorum and did not vote. This issue will be discussed at greater length when the 
present Standing Orders of the European Standing Committees are examined. However, 
it will suffice at this juncture to state that thi to is excellent opportunity for Members 
question ministers and debate European policy has, regrettably, been under utillsed. 
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Despite European issues being at the top of the political agenda, the vast majority of 
Members play no active part in the debate of European legislative proposals. 
As already stated, the alternative to debate in Standing Committee was for the 
document to be debated on the Floor of the House. However, for reasons which are 
explained below, these arrangements proved to be less than satisfactory and their 
weakness was a factor behind the Procedure Committee's decision to review the 
effectiveness of the scrutiny arrangements within the House. 147 
Consideration ofEuropean Legislation on the Floor of the House 
In the evidence that was submitted to the Procedure Committee in their enquiry into 
the Scrutiny arrangements within the House of Commons, 148 the general consensus 
which emerged from all witnesses was the inadequacy of the existing arrangements for 
the debate of European Community documents. It is possible to identify two main 
criticisms of using the Chamber as a forum for debate. 
Firstly, the vast majority of debates took place after I Opm. This posed its own set of 
difficulties. The previous debate and subsequent vote would often finish later than 
planned, leaving a start time later than the 10pm scheduled. This in turn would 
compound the already existing difficulty of poor attendance of these late night debates, 
which generated little or no public and media interest not say interest among the MPs 
themselves. 
The second criticism perhaps carried more weight, because it went to the heart of the 
problem by illustrating the weakness of the Chamber as the main forum for debate. The 
then Leader of the House of Commons, The Right Honourable John Wakeham. MP, 
stated that debate in the Chamber centred primarily on the rather tired, old arguments, 
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relating to the principle of our membership of the Community rather than concentrating 
on the matter in hand, i. e. in examining the detailed merits of a part1cular legislative 
proposal. 149 The Clerk of the House, Mr Clifford BoultonCB, further reinforced the 
point. In his evidence to the Procedure Committee, he illustrated the unsatisfactory 
nature of these late night debates by stating that they were primarily attended by a 
"predictable group of Members". 150 Thus the general consensus was that the quality of 
these debates was not very high. 
Amongst the Members themselves, there was great unpopularity with these late night 
debates. 151 Most backbenchers disliked the fact that a Three Line Whip was placed on 
divisions that would seldom materialise. Thus,, the evidence from all interested parties 
pointed to a high degree of dissatisfaction with the use of the Chamber to consider 
European legislative proposals. 
What rolefor the Chamber in the Consideration ofEuropean Legislation? 
The Procedure Committee in its report took the view that the function of debating the 
merits of a particular document should primarily be within the remit of the new 
Standing Committees. 152 However, none of the evidence given to the Procedure 
Committee suggested that the Chamber should have no role in debating European 
legislative proposals. 
The key issue, in deciding upon the future role of the Chamber, was undoubtedly the 
requirement of ensuring that the limited time available for the discussion of European 
policies was put to effective use. Despite the establishment of the European Standing 
Committees, there would still be occasions when important documents would need to be 
discussed by the whole House. This would be consistent with the general approach 
towards the use of Parliamentarv time. The shift in emphasis was one of making the 
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work of the Commons less Chamber orientated and making greater use of smaller 
specialist committees. 153 If any debate of a European document were take place in the 
Chamber, the Procedure Committee recommended that if at all possible, it would take 
place in a "prime time" slot. Such a change makes sense for two reasons. Firstly. it 
would encourage a greater turnout of Members. Secondly, it is more likely that such a 
prime time debate on an important European document would achieve greater media 
attention and thus raise the profile of the scrutiny process. 
If one examines the subject matter of the debates on the floor of the House, a clear 
pattern emerges. Debates in the Chamber concentrate on major European legislative and 
policy proposals which either affect most constituencies or are politically sensitive. This 
leaves the more 'minor' proposals within the domain of the Standing Committee. A 
closer inspection of the documents recommended for debate since 1991 reveals the 
following trends: - 
154 
Documents debated predominantly 
in the Chamber 
Budget proposals 
Fisheries proposals 
CAP Price proposals 








The obvious point froi-n this table is that issues related to major government policies 
are always debated in the Chamber. The above lists are not exhaustive and merely 
illustrate a recogynisable trend wNch has developed. There are some occasions when 
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documents which are of more minor policy implication are debated in the Chamber. For 
example a debate on Two or Three-Wheeled Vehicles (Docs. 8618/94 and 8037/94) 
took place in the Chamber on 24 November 1994. However, this was part of a wider 
debate on transport policy. This is known as "tagging" and occurs when a debate on 
policy in the Chamber coincides with a debate on a similar subject document in 
Standing Committee. To ensure efficient use of Parliamentary time the document is 
discussed as part of the debate in the Chamber. 
One effect of the move towards Standing Committees was that more time would now 
be available for use in the Chamber. The Procedure Committee quite rightly envisaged 
that this time should be used to debate the government' European policies prior to the 
twice yearly Inter- Governmental Conference (IGC). This would be a major change from 
the position of there being two retrospective debates on developments over the previous 
six months. The benefit of making this change is obvious, and it corresponds with the 
general approach to scrutiny. That is, the aim of the Commons to influence 
ministersprior to their giving acquiescence in the Council of Ministers. In their response 
to the Procedure Committee Report, the government155 accepted this change and 
undertook to be helpful in the provision of texts before each IGC. Today these debates 
are an important opportunity to scrutinise the Prime Minister and other senior Cabinet 
Ministers on matters of more general European policy. 
This entire discussion on the use of the Chamber emanated from the proposals of the 
Procedure Committee to shift debate from the Floor of the House to the Standing 
Committees. The Standing Committees in a revised form were viewed as the 
appropriate vehicle to tackle the issues of raising the quality of debate, increasing 
participation by the Members, increasing the media attention and perhaps most 
importantly ensuring effective scrutiny. The discussion will now concentrate on the 
working ot I. and the procedure In the Standing Committees, in evaluating the 
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effectiveness of the present arrangements and in addressing the concerns raised by the 
Procedure Committee. 
Reforming Standing Committees - The issues 
Having considered all the evidence that was presented to them, 156 the Procedure 
Committee came to the unanimous conclusion that effective scrutiny was best served by 
the continuation of the Standing Committee process, but in a revised form. The initial 
recomendation157 of the Procedure Committee was for five Standing Committees, with 
each specialising in a particular subject area(s). 15 8 These Committees would have the 
power to hear statements from ministers and cross-examine them about the particular 
proposal before any motion relating to that document was made or debated. 
Power to obtain evidence and cross examine witnesses 
To the undoubted dismay of some enthusiasts of the Standing Committees, the 
Procedure Committee did not recommend that the Committees have the power to send 
for persons, papers and records. Though proponents felt such a power would give the 
new Committees greater impact and influence, the Procedure Committee,, rightly on 
reflection, took the view that such an extension of their remit would blur the distinction 
between the Standing Committees and the already established Departmentally Related 
Select Committees. The decision can be justified on two grounds. 
Firstly, any widening of their Terms of Reference would have led to inevitable 
duplication with the work of the Departmental Select Committees. Secondly, the main 
t- unction of these Standing Committees was scrutiny. Any expansion would mean they 
were carrying out policy investigations, a task which a committee meeting on average 
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once a week for two and a half hours could not hope to carry out. Thus. such a 
limitation had the effect of deterring the new Standing Committees from straying into 
the realms of policy evaluation and ensured focus on the important twin tasks of debate 
and scrutiny. 
Procedural Changes 
To encourage an increased use of the Standing Committees and help implement the 
main objectives behind this review of scrutiny arrangements, i. e. the move away from 
debates being held predominantly on the Floor of the House, the Procedure Committee 
recommended that a motion which referred a Community legislative proposal to the 
proposed Standing Committees could only be defeated, and thus debated in the 
Chamber, by forty rather than twenty members rising in their place. 15 9 
Other procedural changes which were recommended included the drafting of more 
pointed and clearly worded motions for debate, and that the government should be 
placed under an obligation to table an appropriate motion that would allow the whole 
House to pass judgment on the Community document after the Standing Committee has 
completed its task. 160 
The government in its detailed response to these proposaIsI61 accepted the majority 
of the Procedure Committee' recomendations. However,, the govermuent put forward 
two important qualifications. First, that there should be three and not five Standing 
Committees. Second, and perhaps most controversial, was that when the Select 
Committee on European Legislation recommended that a legislative proposal should be 
the subýject of further debate, the document would stand automatically referred to the 
appropriate Standing Committee, unless the government (and no other member) moved 
a motion that the proposal \\, oLild be debated on the Floor of the House. Thus, the 
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objection of twenty members (or forty as the Procedure Committee had recommended) 
to prevent a document being referred to Standing Committee was now irrelevant. 
This second qualification proved to be most controversial and in a Special Report 162 
the Select Committee on European Legislation strongly opposed the procedure whereby 
a document was automatically referred to a Standing Committee. In fact, the Chairman 
of the Committee unsuccessfully moved a number of amendments at the subsequent 
debate to amend the Standing Orders of the Standing Committees. The reason behind 
the Committee' hostility was the justified view that the Executive would have control 
over which documents were important enough to warrant a debate in the Chamber, a 
task hitherto undertaken by backbenchers. 
This was quite rightly viewed as another example of concentrating power in the 
hands of the Executive at the expense of the backbencher. In effect, it would now be left 
to the Executive to make judgments as to which proposal was of political significance 
and they would then frame the wording of the motion which would subsequently be 
debated in the Chamber. This would give the Executive the ability to prevent damaging 
debates on European policy taking place in the full glare of the media and the electorate 
at large. Thus, the Executive would now have a decisive degree of control over the 
scrutiny procedures which were intended to keep a watchful eye on the government's 
activities with our European partners. 
Not surprisingly, because of its large Commons majority, the views of the 
government prevailed and the Standing Orders were amended accordingly. However, 
the new Puropean Standing Committees did not begin work immediately. From the date 
of amendment of the Standing Order to the first meeting of the new committees was a 
16' delay of almost four months. ' It was reportedl. 
64 that this delay in the new Standing 
Committees beginning their Nvork was due to the difficulty in finding sufficient 
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members to serve on them. Furthermore, the number of Committees was reduced from 
three to two, confirming the difficulty in securing sufficient membership. 
The first meeting of the European Standing Committee took place on January 29 
1991, one week after the Standing Orders had been amended to allow for a reduction 
from three to two Committees. Thus the evidence presented above identifies three 
primary reasons for reforming the Standing Committees: - 
1. To bring about a move away from the late night debates on European 
legislation on the Floor of the House; 
2. To provide a more structured and thereby effective forum for debate than 
the Floor of the I-louse, and for questioning ministers on a particular 
document; and 
3. To build a body of expertise and experience on each Committee by 
appointing members for a whole session rather than on an ad-hoc basis. 
The work of the Standing Committees over the first six years will now be 
investigated in more detail to establish to what extent these aims have been achieved. 
The European Standing Committees in the House of Commons 
It can be said with certainty that the new committees remain firmly as a deliberative 
part of the House's legislative role. They remain totally distinct and separate from the 
investigating activities of the Departmental Select Committees. Thus, as observed 
abow, they have no powcr to send for persons, papers or records. 
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The Select Committee on European Legislation receives from the Council of 
Ministers all legislative proposals. It then decides whether the proposal is of "Legal or 
Political importance". If it decides that it is, and thus requires further consideration. the 
document will then automatically be allocated for debate to one of the two European 
Standing Committees. 165 The two Committees are divided according to subject matter, 
and this division is strictly adhered to. Each Committee has a permanent membership of 
thirteen who are appointed for an entire session. The two Committees are divided in the 
following manner: - 
166 
European Standing Principal subject matter 
Committees: Matters within the responsibility of 
the following departments: 
A Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; 
Transport; Enviromnent; 
Other Departments 
The above division of subject matters is one of the weaknesses of the present 
arrangements. European Standing Committee A has a much narrower brief and therefore 
works more effectively than Committee B which covers a far wider remit. For example, 
Committee A which debates documents concerning agriculture has members sitting on 
it who are experts in that field and who will represent constituencies where agriculture is 
an issue. A similar position occurs regarding fisheries issues. However, Committee B 
covering over ten other departments cannot have the same expertise amongst its thirteen 
strong membership. Thus. the debate will not be as thorough as in Committee A. It is 
I tee initially recommended five European for this reason that the Procedure Commit 
Standing Committees. This would have permitted the development of the type of 
expertise currently eilloyed by Committee A, across all the Committees. 
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European Standing Committees - The Standing Orders and procedure 
Standing Order No. 102 which governs the procedure in the European Standing 
Committees was agreed by the House of Commons on 24 October 1990.167 However, 
with the difficulties in securing sufficient Members to serve on the three originally 
proposed committees, the Standing Orders were amended on January 22 1991.168 The 
three amendments introduced the following changes: - 
(i) decreased the number of Standing Committees to two; 169 
(ii) increased membership of each to thirteen; 170 
(iii) divided the subject matter for each committee in line with the table 
above. 171 
In the forthcoming sections, Standing Order No. 102 will be analysed and the 
procedure of the two European Standing Committees examined in detail. 172 
Proposing the debate 
Standing Order (S. O. ) No. 102 (2) provides that if a document is not to be 
automatically referred to one of the Standing Committees then the minister must move a 
motion in the House to that effect at the beginning of public business. The question is 
then put to the House who vote on the motion proposed. 
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Membership of the Standing Committees 
S. O. 102 (3) deals with the membership of the Committees. Each Committee consists 
of 13 Members, and like all committees, the government will have an in-built majority, 
which usually ensures the smooth passage of even the more controversial legislative 
proposals. A unique aspect of the membership of these two Committees is that the 
thirteen members are nominated for the duration of a whole Parliamentary session. 173 
This is in stark comparison to other Standing Committees, where the membership is 
decided upon on an ad-hoc basis for each particular Bill. The reason behind this is that 
the Procedure Committee felt that by appointing the Members for an entire 
Parliamentary session, they would be able to develop a certain amount of expertise 
which would otherwise be lacking if they were appointed on an ad-hoc basis. It was felt 
that Members would be able to cope better with the nuances of the Common 
Agricultural Policy or transport policy if they dealt with these documents on a weekly 
basis. 
One further aspect of this difference, lies in the aim of the government to give the 
scrutiny process a much higher profile in the Commons. Members with a developed 
expertise would, it was hoped, become an information point for other MPs and raise the 
quality of debate within the House. Thus, debates on European Community documents 
would now concentrate on the issues and not on the dated question of our continuing 
membership of the European Community. 
Attendance by non-members 
Standing Order No. 102 (5) is further testimony to the Procedure Committee's aim of 
raising the profile of the scrutiiiy of European legislation within the House. This 
provides that any Member wlio is not nominated to a European Standing Committee, 
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may take part in the Committee's proceedings, but cannot make any motion, vote, or be 
counted as part of the quorum. Unfortunately, this is a privilege which is under used by 
all Members of the House. 174 However, the most notable exception lies when European 
Standing Committee A is discussing a document relating to Fisheries policy. In these 
instances it has been the case that up to thirty MPs will attend who represent fishing 
constituencies around the country - but this is the exception rather than the rule. The 
following table gives figures for non-members attendance at Standing Committee 
meetings during the last two Parliamentary sessions: - 
175 
Average Attendance At European Standing Committees 
1993-94 
Nominated Members (out 
of 13) 9.4 9.8 
Other Members 3.4 3.4 
1994-95 
Nominated Members (out 
of 13) 9.6 8.6 
Other Members 3.0 4.2 
The figures confirm the poor attendance of non-Members. This issue was highlighted 
by the Select Committee on European Legislation in its 1996 Report, and they urge the 
Procedure Committee to review this issue during the Course of its 1996 inquiry into the 
scrutiny process in the House of Commons. 
176 At present, the Leader of the House 
announces the meeting of the Standing Committee to all Members at Business 
Questions on Thursday afternoons and informs them what documents will be debated. 
There is no other information giveii to the whole House about the Standing Committee 
meeting. 
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However, despite the lack of enthusiasm by non-Members, Standing Order No. 102 
(5) illustrates the serious approach taken by the House towards the scrutiny process. The 
Procedure Committee in making their recommendations in 1989177 realised that if the 
scrutiny process was an alien procedure to other Members, there would be resentment. 
especially if controversial legislation was proposed that may adversely affect their 
constituents. Thus, by allowing any Member to attend, it was hoped to bring the 
scrutiny of European legislation into the mainstream of Parliamentary activity, and not 
just the concern of the few members who are nominated to attend. Unfortunately, this 
has not proved to be the case. In short, scrutiny was to be more than just a procedural 
device. It was and continues to be the cornerstone of the European legislative process, 
which like the domestic legislative process should be the concern of all Members in the 
House. 
The ministerial statement, question time and debate 
The main substance of the procedure in Standing Committee is found in Standing 
Order 102 (7) and (8). Under (7), the Chairman of the Standing Committee may permit 
(and in practice always will permit) the minister present at the meeting to make a 
statement, which will last no more than five minutes. He will then answer questions 
which are put by the Members present. This period of the session will last no longer 
than one hour. 178 
This aspect of the procedure is, undoubtedly, one of the most valuable of the entire 
scrutiny process. In this situation, the minister is on his own, and having to face one 
hour's questioning from Committee Members who are usually on top of the subject. 
Furthermore, unlike Question Time in the Chamber, the minister has not prepared 
answers prior to the scssion \\-ith the help of his Civil Servants, or received notification 
of the question in advance. Furthermore there are no 'planted questions'. For the minister 
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concemed. the least comfortable aspect of this whole procedure is that he is the sole 
minister present. The task is not shared between the ministers within the department. 
This one hour Question Time is an opportunity, which unfortunately the Opposition 
does not make full use of. This is perhaps the only occasion in the House to question a 
minister and put him on the spot, and pressure him for an answer. The forum is 
conducive to this. However, as attendance is usually limited to the Members appointed 
the govermuent is to a great extent "let off the hook". 179 
The importance of this procedure cannot be stressed enough. When one talks about 
influence through scrutiny, this is it in action. The Members of the Committee are acting 
as representatives of the whole House in putting their views across. This makes the 
session a political one - but this is in a positive way. Members are acutely aware of the 
limited time available and thus strive to use it effectively to procure information from 
the minister and convey their own views. 
On completion of the Question Time, the remaining one and a half hours of the 
session is given over to debating the document. The document is proposed in the form 
of a Motion, the wording of which is decided upon by the government. Any nominated 
Member of the Committee may put forward an amendment(s) to the Motion. The debate 
is similar to that which may take place in the Chamber, that is, the Member will make a 
short speech on the issues involved and ask questions of Members from other parties to 
outline their policies with regards the particular legislative proposal under discussion. 
The minister will sit and listen to the debate to gauge the opinion of the Committee. In 
particular he will ascertain the parameters of the Committee by seeing how acceptable 
they find the particular proposal. If the Committee has done its task effectively, the 
ininster Nvill attend the Council of Ministers meeting with the Standing Committee's 
vicws ringing in his ears. 
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Once the total two and a half hour period has expired, the Chairman I 80will interrupt 
the proceedings and ask the Committee to consider the following questions: - 
(a) the question on any Amendment already proposed from the Chair; and 
(b) the Main Question (or the Main Question as amended). 
At this juncture, the Committee will vote on the Question(s) put before it. The 
Committee will then report to the House any Resolution which it has passed. 
The procedure following debate in Standing Committee 
The final part of the Standing Committee procedure, governed by Standing Order 
No. 102 (9), has proved to be the most controversial aspect of the whole process. It 
deals with the procedure once the document returns to the Chamber for final approval 
by the whole House. 
After the debate in the Standing Committee has concluded, a vote is taken on the 
Motion proposed and on any amendments to the Motion. The Standing Committee then 
reports back to the House as a whole what decisions it came to. It is at this stage that the 
entire House will have its say on the Motion. 
The report made by the Standing Committee is the exact wording of the Motion it 
has passed (including any amendments). However, because of the wording of Standing 
Order No. 102 (9), the government, who propose the Motion in the House, are under no 
obligation to phrase the Motion in the form which the Standing Committee agreed to. A 
closer analysis of the Standing Order will illustrate the difficulty. S. O. No. 102 (9) reads 
I as tolloN\-s: - 
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(9) If'any Motion is made in the House in relation to any European Community 
Document (my emphasis) in respect of which a report has been made to the House 
in accordance with paragraph (8) of this Order, Mr Speaker shall forthwith put 
successive 
(a) the Question on any Amendment selected by him which may be moved; 
(b) the main Question (or the main Question as amended); 
and proceedings in pursuance of this paragraph, though opposed. may be decided 
after the expiration of the time for opposed business. 
The key phrase of this section is the phrase placed in italics. What this means is that 
the government can put forward any Motion it wants on the document which is before 
the House. This issue first arose in 199 1.181 Standing Committee A had considered two 
Commission legislative proposals on the compulsory use of seatbelts. 182 The 
government moved the following Motion in the Standing Committee: - 
"that the Committee takes note of European Community Documents Nos. 
9228/88 and 1033/90 on the compulsory use of seatbelts; notes that their provision 
are broadly in accord with present and proposed domestic legislation; and 
endorses the Government's intention to seek amendment of the proposal so that 
any adopted directive neither imposes unacceptable constraints nor limits the 
scope for further action perceived by Parliament to be necessary. " 
Mr Teddy Taylor MP, a Member of the Committee moved an amendment to the 
Motion to include the following words at the end: - 
183 
it without prejudice to the view of the Goverment that Article 75 does not 
cover road safety measures. " 
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The minister indicated that he had difficultY with the amendment because it 
attempted to make certain the issue, on which the government was not yet decided that 
is the competence of Article 75 as a means to introduce this particular legislative 
proposal. Despite this, with the support of the Opposition, the amendment was agreed 
without a division. 184 
However, when the document came back to the Chamber for final approval by the 
whole House, the Motion proposed by the government made no reference to Mr Taylor's 
amendment agreed to by the Standing Committee A. In a subsequent debate, Mr Taylor 
was scathing about the actions of the goverrunent: - 
18 5 
"We passed a unanimous amendment.... What happened? The House of 
Commons was not told because the Government say that they will report only the 
decisions of the Committees with which they agree. If they do not agree, they will 
not tell the House of Commons the decision.... I do not know of any time in the 
history of Parliament at which a Committee has not been able to tell the House of 
Commons what it has done. " 
Though it is still open to a Member to put forward an amendment at this stage, it is 
unlikely to succeed for two reasons. First, there is no further time for debate and thus no 
opportunity to try and convince other MPs. Secondly, the govermnent's in-built 
Commons majority and the heavy handed approach of the Whips means that it will have 
no realistic prospect of success. ' 86 
The anger felt by Mr Taylor is quite understandable. The Committee having followed 
the correct procedure has arrived at a particular opinion which the Executive now 
choose to ignore. The vie,, v has been expressed to the author in the course of his 
research that this makes a mockery of the scrutiny procedure. 
187 The Executive, which 
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is the subject of the scrutiny. is also the arbitrator in the event of any dispute between it 
and the Standing Committee. In a Parliamentary democracy, this is unacceptable. 
In his article, 188 Professor St J. N. BatesI89 appears to discount the impact of the 
problem on this occasion by stating that "the issue did not raise itself in such stark terms 
here". He justifies this by stating that the minister in attendance made it clear that the 
government did not have a clear legal opinion on the matter in issue and that the 
amendment expressed only the opinion of the Standing Committee and not the 
government. However, this in itself does not detract from the fact that the Executive 
completely ignored the view of the Committee which had passed a unanimous 
amendment. 
In the situation where the Standing Committee is doing the work of the Chamber, the 
government should be expected, at the very least, to debate the Motion passed by the 
Standing Committee and not adopt a steam roller approach towards Motions it does not 
agree with. Anything less diminishes the value of the work undertaken by the European 
Standing Committees. Even if the analysis of Professor St. J. N. Bates is correct, the 
question still remains unsatisfactorily answered of what the government will do when a 
Motion passed in Standing Committee is one with which it does not agree. At present 
the government will continue to follow the procedure laid down in S. O. 102 (9) and put 
forward their own unamended Motion before the House. 
The Select Committee on Procedure recognised this problem in its Report reviewing 
the work of the Standing Committees. 
190 It was of the opinion that the House having, 
referred a document to the Standing Committee for its consideration, it is entitled to 
expect that the Committee's conclusions will form the starting point for the House's 
decision at the final stage of the scrutiny process. 
191 In an attempt to solve this 
problem, the Committee recommended that the Motion as agreed by the Standing 
Committee should be the one put before the House. If the government did not agree 
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with it, then it should propose amendments to the Resolution reported by the 
Committee. 192 However, the Committee acknowledged the procedural difficulty with 
this, because as the Motion is in the name of the minister , it would be contrary to the 
practice of the House for the government to seek to amend it. 
It tried to overcome this problem by suggesting that any Motion before the House 
should stand in the name of the Committee as a whole. This would mean a significant 
departure from the procedure of the House where Motions always stand in the name of 
an individual. 
The government in its response to the Procedure Committee rejected outright this 
proposal. 193 They viewed it as being too radical a change to the procedures in the 
House and that the perceived problem was not in itself that big. As the Leader of the 
House pointed out in his reply, it is still open to the Member to propose his amendments 
once again in the Chamber. In the end, the only concession made by the government 
was an undertaking it gave to pay more attention to the views of the two Standing 
Committees, but reserved the right, as Standing Order 102 (9) provides, to bring 
forward "any motion" to the House. 
However, though the Members find this a frustrating aspect of the process, it is 
necessary to clarify one important issue which Members of the two European Standing 
Committees do lose sight of. That is, that the Standing Committees only have delegated 
powers given to them by the House. The Committees are the forum for debate only, the 
final decision is one for the entire House. The Standing Committees should therfore not 
be viewed as supplanting the House in this respect. 
Overall, though, this procedure is an improvement on the previous arrangements. The 
debate is focussed on the issues and the govemment has been known to be defeated in 
Standnig, Committee. which, at the minimum, does cause an embarrassment. However, 
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there still remains the unsatisfactory position once the document returns back to the 
Chamber. The government are not prepared to change the Standing Orders to provide 
for the Motion as passed in Committee to be the Motion that must be laid before the 
House. There is a persuasive argument that the whole House is entitled to debate the 
informed conclusions of the Standing Committee, to which it has delegated the power of 
debate. Anything less is an undermining of the whole scrutiny process in the Commons 
and makes all the hard work undertaken up to this point worthless. 
Standing Committee or Chamber - Which is more effective forum for 
debate? 
In making such a comparison, the first point to make is that there is in fact very little 
difference in the way the two forums operate. In fact, it is possible to describe the 
Standing Committees as a microcosm of the Chamber. The Chairman,, 194 who is an 
MP, is selected from the Chairman's Panel, and takes on the role of the Speaker, by 
keeping order at the meeting. 
The debate itself, follows the same pattern as debates in the Chamber. After, the 
minister's opening remarks, the Members will ask questions for the first hour and use 
the remaining one and a half hours to make speeches. The Members themselves sit in 
the traditional adversarial style on opposite sides of the Committee Room, and adopt 
the Commons tradition of asking the Member making the speech to "give way" when 
they wish to ask a question. 
Perhaps the main difference between the two forums lies not in the procedure, but 
rather in the way the Members conduct the actual debate. As previously stated, the 
quality of debate is generally accepted to be higher in Standing Committee, and the 
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author has found this to be the case both in the meetings he has attended and from 
talking to actual Members. Furthermore, the fact that there is a specific time devoted 
each week to the consideration of European legislation means the Members approach 
their work in a more conscientious manner than might have otherwise been the case if 
the Chamber was still used as the main debating forum. 
However,, one universal criticism of the Standing Committee's, is that the time 
available, two and a half hours in total , is not enough. The main complaint is levelled at 
the hours question time of the minister, which is generally accepted to be the most 
valuable aspect of this part of process. The Select Committee on Procedure in its 1991 
Report 195 recommended that there should be provision made to extend the time 
available if necessary. Most importantly, they felt that the period for questions could be 
extended by 30 minutes at the Chairman's discretion should it be convenient to do 
so. 196 However, they suggested this extra time for questions should come from the time 
allotted for debate and not by an extension of the overall time. Though the government 
accepted this recommendation, they did not view it as a matter of urgency, and have not 
to this date made the necessary amendment to Standing Order No. 102. 
In effect,, the Standing Committee procedure is subject to a perpetual guillotine. That 
is, even if the debate has not been concluded, the Chairman will halt the proceedings 
after two and a half hours, and a vote on the Motion(s) will be taken. It is this aspect of 
the procedure which is criticised by both the Members and the Opposition who view it 
as an opportunity for the governinent to avoid answering difficult questions on 
controversial documents. This compares less favourably with the debate in the Chamber 
which when it takes place in prime time is allotted more time for views to be aired in 
the debate. 
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Role of the Chairman and specialist advisers 
The Chairman 
As stated above, the Chairman takes on the role of the Speaker in Standing 
Committee. He ensures that there is order in the debate and that the debate stays 
focussed on discussing the documents in issue. The Chairman will select a Member to 
ask a question or make a speech in the same manner as the Speaker does in the 
Chamber. However,, the Chairman has no hand in deciding what the Members will 
debate or what the Motion(s) for debate are. At the end of the debate, the Chairman puts 
the question to the Standing Committee who vote on the Motion(s) before them. The 
Chairman, like the Speaker has the casting vote in the event of a tie. All the votes and 
proceedings in the Standing Committees appear in the name of the Chairman and thus 
the House as a whole is aware of them. 
The role of Chairman is not a permanent one on a particular Committee. The 
Chairman is selected from the Chairmans Pane1197 and only chairs the particular 
meeting for which he has been chosen. Thus the Committees rotate the Chairman for 
each meeting. 
Is there a case for permanent Chairman? 
Many Standing Committee Members 198 have argued that there is a strong case for 
having a permanent Chairman on each of the two European Standing Committees. It Is 
possible to identify to strong m-guments in favour of this change. 
First, this would ensure a greater degree of consistency in the proceedings, especially 
NvIth regard to the initial one hour Question Time. Both Gwyneth Dunwoody and 
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Daffyd Wigley 199 in their evidence to the Procedure Committee raised this point. Their 
main concern was the apparent discrepancy in calling Members to speak. Because the 
Chairmanship rotates on a weekly basis, the Chairman is not aware of which Member 
took a more active part in the previous debate and asked more questions. There is a risk, 
that the same Members may dominate the proceedings each week. 
The second argument in favour of appointing a permanent Chairman is that over the 
period of an entire session, the Chairman would develop a substantial degree of 
understanding of the issues before the Committee. Furthermore, this expertise could be 
harnessed by not only Members but by the entire House. In effect, such a change would 
mean that the role of the Chairman would now be more akin to the Chairman of a 
Select Committee rather than a Standing Committee. 
However, such a change has met with almost universal opposition. In its 1991 review 
of the European Standing Committees, the Procedure Committee considered this very 
200 
proposition. Having taken evidence from a variety of interested parties, the 
Procedure Committee came out firmly against making any such recommendation. 
In his evidence to the Procedure Committee, the then Chairman of Ways and 
Means, Harold Walker MP, stated the following: -201 
"... the existing arrangement of rotation best suited the chairing of what were 
basically Standing Committees. " 
He further reiterated his opposition by stating that the above opinion was the "firm 
and widespread" view of the Chairmans Panel. The objection stemmed from what Mr 
Walker said was a recognition that: _202 
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the European Standing Committees had been established to transfer a 
workload from the Floor of the House of Commons - that was the basic reason - 
and that for that reason the proceedings ought to be very much in a way that 
would reflect the procedures in the Chamber itself" 
He further contended that specialisation was not a real issue for the Committee. The 
main function of the Chairman was to preside over the proceedings in an efficient. 
procedurally correct and impartial manner. Thus, the appointment of a Chairman was a 
purely procedural question. 
The rejection of this proposal is justifiable on procedural grounds, but with one 
important proviso. Any change along the lines supported by Gwyneth Dunwoody would 
inevitably lead to the Standing Committee becoming more akin to a Select Committee. 
Ttiis could potentially cause difficulty with duplicating the work of the Select 
Committee on European Legislation and the Departmental Select Committees. 
However, this is an issue which should be kept under review. The increased complexity 
of many European legislative proposals may require that the Chairman will need to be 
an information access point for those Members who have not had the time to fully digest 
the document. 
Specialist advisers 
The two European Standing Committees have no specialist staff to advise them. The 
only support staff available. comes in the shape of the Clerks from the Public Bill 
Office in the Commons who have a supervising function in relation to the European 
Standing Committees. Therefore, the role of the Clerks with regards to the European 
Standing Committees is tancyential, and they are primarily concerned with the Public I- 
Bills wNch are progressing throtigh the numerous Standing Committees in the House. r-I C- ZZ, II 
Page - 116 
This lack of specialist support staff is a criticism which has been voiced by many 
Members in the course of the author's research. 203 It was viewed one of the most 
frustrating things, when having received the documents for debate less than one week 
before hand, they had no support staff available to deal with their queries. 
In its review of the operation of the Standing Committees, the Procedure Committee 
looked very seriously at this question of bringing in support staff to aid the Committee 
Members and/or introducing a permanent secretariat of Clerks skilled in European 
matters. The Procedure Committee saw the arguments in favour of this change as quite 
strong, especially in light of the increased flow of legislative proposals emanating from 
the European Community. 
However, the Procedure Committee did not recommend any change, and saw the 
arguments in favour of this change as flawed in two ways. 204 First, they argued, that by 
appointing specialist advisers, it would mean a shift in the function of the Standing 
Committees. These two Committees were set up as an extension of the Houses 
legislative functions. The use of sPecialist advisers would, they felt, mean that the 
Standing Committees were mimicking the investigative procedure of the Select 
Committees in the House. This approach was entirely consistent with that which they 
205 took in their earlier Report, where they rejected the suggestion that the Committee 
should have the power to send for persons and papers. The Chairman of Ways and 
Means expressed the sole function of these Standing Committees in the evidence he 
gave to the Procedure Committee: -206 
believe that one must start from the basic premise that the Committees 
Nvere set up to transfer a workload from the Floor of the House. " 
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The second flaw the Procedure Committee identified was that by introducing 
specialist staff, this would just mean an increase in the volume of paperwork for the 
Committee Member's. Something which they felt was undesirable. 
This rejection of the introduction of support staff, which the government approved in 
207 - its reply to the Procedure Committee's Report, is on the whole the correct approach 
because it ensures the distinct nature of the Standing Committee's work is maintained. 
However , it is an 
important point which must be kept under review, especially in the 
light of future legislative developments and major policy changes. This issue will 
undoubtedly be addressed once again by the Procedure Committee's inquiry into the 
scrutiny process which was commissioned in 1996. Most significantly, since its last 
major investigation in 1989 there have been a number of important developments which 
could cause the Procedure Committee to alter its view e. g if the Select Committee were 
to scrutinise proposals under the Inter-Governmental Pillars. 
Thus until this issue is addressed by the Procedure Committee, there must with this 
lack of specialist staff, be more cooperation with the Select Committee on European 
Legislation, the Departmental Select Committees and a greater understanding on the 
part of the government, especially in the early provision of documents. The Members 
can also help themselves by using the Library facilities in the House, and being aware of 
reports by other Departmental Select Committees and those published by the Select and 
Sub-Committees in the House of Lords. Such steps will undoubtedly assist them in what 
is a challenging task. 
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Alternatives to the Standing Committees 
The Grand Committee 
One alternative to the Standing Committees has been the proposal to set up a Grand 
Committee, similar in structure to the existing Scottish Grand Committee. A Grand 
Committee operates in similar fashion to a Departmental Select Committee, except that 
the membership is larger, 208 and it is more of a forum for questioning ministers as 
opposed to specifically debating a particular piece of legislation. In their evidence to the 
Procedure Committee in 1989 , it was the Labour Party Spokesmen on European affairs, 
George Robertson and George Foulkes, who were the main proponents in favour of 
establishing a European Grand Committee. In their evidence they said that the Grand 
Committee would provide a forum: _209 
11 which might combine the day to day questioning of Ministers which 
occurred when we had regular oral statements, the flexibility of the House of 
Lords Select Committee and the necessity of debates which are yet to go to 
the Council of Ministers. " 
The view adopted by the Labour Party was that this Grand Committee would have a 
wide membership and operate as the main forum which the minister was to address after 
meetings of the Council of Ministers. 
However, the idea of a Grand Committee was rightly rejected for two solid reasons. 
First, the Committee in the form proposed by the Labour Party would resemble more of 
a Select Committee than a debating forum. There was a substantial risk that if it 
operated with "the flexibility of the House of Lords Select Committee" it would become 
more investigative and concerned NN-ith policy than with scrutinising legislative 
proposals. Secondly, and related to the first point, is the fact that the Procedure 
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Committee was taking evidence with the view to improving the scrutiny process. The 
weak link in the chain was the debate of legislative proposals. Thus, they sought to 
establish a Committee(s) whosesole concem was to debate the merits of the legislative 
proposal before it. 
The Procedure Committee were rightly concerned to ensure there was an effective 
division of labour between the various bodies involved in the scrutiny process. This 
they correctly concluded would not be best served by the establishment of a Grand 
Committee. Parliamentary time is scarce, and therfore duplication of tasks must be 
avoided. 
One added difficulty identified with the establishment of a Grand Committee lay 
with the size of the membership. If it contained a membership of similar numbers to the 
Scottish Grand Committee, the opportunity for effective debate would be greatly 
diminished. It would be difficult to give the opportunity to all those who wanted to 
speak. Furthermore, placing any time limit similar to that now in operation in the 
Standing Committees (i. e. two and a half hours) would mean that the vast majority of 
Members would not be able to take part in the debate. Overall, the session would be of 
little value to the overall scrutiny process. 
210 Today the (New) Labour Party have no 
plans for amending the scrutiny process in the Commons. 
Concluding remarks 
How effective are the Eltropean Standing Committees? 
In making any assessment as to the success of the present arrangements for the 
debate of I 'uropean Comi-numtN' documents, it is necessary to analyse the impact of the 
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changes which have come into force since 1991. At a basic level, the author has 
received favourable comments from a variety of interested parties2l 
I regarding the 
beneficial impact of the changes. Most notably, there was a general agreement that the 
quality of debate has been raised by the more structured and systematic approach taken 
by the Committees to scrutiny. It is the hour's ministerial question time which was seen 
as being of most value. 212 
The distribution of tasks between the Committees was also viewed as a positive step. 
There is potential for the development of expertise by Members in the subject matters. 
However, this has been tempered by the fact that only two Committees are in existence, 
which results in a large workload for each Committee, and in particular, European 
Standing Committee B. 
The Standing Committees themselves have benefited from the fact that they are 
appointed for an entire session. If one attends the Committee meetings there is 
immediately evident a coherence and camaraderie amongst the Members not usually 
witnessed in the Chamber. The minister who attends is always vigorously questioned, 
even by members of his own party. Though the members do not vote together, they do 
give each other space to pursue their own avenues of interest. 
The procedure adopted does mean that the quality of debate within Standing 
Committee is much higher than that seen previously when the Chamber was the main 
forum for debate. There is less of a tendency to diverge to the pro/anti European debate 
and a greater concentration on the fundamental issues of the document before them. The 
smaller turn out means that the one hour question time is utilised effectively by putting 
challenging questions to the minister. There are no "planted" questions here. 
One negative aspect of the process which many Members expressed relates to the 
limited time available to prepare for meetings. Documents on complex issues such as 
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the Budget or the Common Agricultural Policy often add to a Member's difficulties. The 
Members of the Committee will know that the document is to be debated but they do 
not know the exact day. This is because each document recommended for debate by a 
Standing Committee is placed on the "wait list". However, they will only be notified of 
the day of the debate the Thursday before it is scheduled. It is at this stage that the 
Committee Members will receive all the necessary documents for the debate. The 
Committee itself meets on a Wednesday at I Oam. Thus they have less than one week to 
digest and become familiar with the documents that will be the basis of the debate and 
on which they are to cross-examine the minister. A task they perform admirably under 
the circumstances. 
Has the move to debate in Standing Committee been successful? 
The primary reason for the establishment of the Standing Committee structure was 
to move debates away from the Floor of the House. It is the success of this 
development which will now be the subject of further investigation. Making a subjective 
judgment about the impact of this change will only be of limited value (though it has 
undoubtedly been a major contribution to the development of an effective scrutiny 
system). In a previous section it was concluded that the Standing Committees are the 
preferred forum for the debate of European legislative proposals and evidence cited that 
there is a higher quality of debate within them. What will now be considered is whether 
the predominance of debate has actually moved from the Chamber to Standing 
Committee. 
Empirical evidence is of great value in helping one make an authoritative assessment. 
The following figures are produced by the Cabinet Office and are a six monthly up-date 
on the progress of the scrutiny process. 
213 They give the number of debates held on the 
Floor of the House, and the number held in Standing Committee. These figures are not 
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separated into Parliamentary Sessions, but rather into the six month Presidency of a 




(a) Floor of the House - 22 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee -7 debates held 
1989 
Jul-Dec. 215 
(a) Floor of the House - 15 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee -8 debates held 
1990 
216 Jan-Jun. 
(a) Floor of the House -II debates held 
(b) Standing Committee - 16 debates held 
1990 
July-Dec. 217 
(a) Floor of the House - 16 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee -5 debates held 
1991 
Jan-Jun. 218 
(a) Floor of the House -7 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee A- 13 debate 
(c) Standino Committee B- 13 debates held 
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1991 
July-Dec. 219 
(a) Floor of the House -5 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee A-4 debates held 
(c) Standing Committee B-7 debates held 
1992 
Jan-Jun. 220 
(a) Floor of the House -3 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee A-6 debates held 
(c) Standing Committee B-3 debates held 
1992 
July-Dec. 221 
(a) Floor of the House -3 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee A-4 debates held 
(c) Standing Committee B-8 debates held 
1993 
Jan-Jun. 222 
(a) Floor of the House -3 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee A- 15 debates held 
(c) Standing Committee B- 15 debates held 
1993 
July-Dec22-3 
(a) Floor of the House -2 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee A-6 debates held 
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(c) Standing Committee B-8 debates held 
1994 
Jan-Jun. 224 
(a) Floor of the House -3 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee A-7 debates held 
(c) Standing Committee B- 10 debates held 
1995 
Jan-Jun. 225 
(a) Floor of the House -I debate held 
(b) Standing Committee A-5 debates held 
(c) Standing Committee B- 16 debates held 
1995 
July-Dec. 226 
(a) Floor of the House -2 debates held 
(b) Standing Committee A-4 debates held 
(c) Standing Committee B-II debates held 
The above statistics illustrate that the developments in place since 1991 have had a 
significant effect in changing the forum for debate of European Community legislative 
proposals. As the figures show, in the six month period from July to December 1989,22 
debates were held on the Floor of the House, with only 7 being held in the old Standing 
Committee. Compare these figures with those for the six month period January to June 
1993, where only 3 debates were held on the Floor of the House, but 15 in each of the 
two Standing Committees. Though the number of debates has varied for each six month 
period (e. g. Jan-Jun 1990), it is now the norm that the two Standing Committees will 
host the overwhelming maýjoritv of the debates. 
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However, the raw figures given above do not give any indication as to how many 
documents have actually been debated. At each debate, whether it be on the Floor of the 
House or in Standing Committee, it will often be the case that more than one document 
will be debated. In fact, when there is a debate on an EC budgetary document, 227 there 
may be as many as seven documents debated at once. Debates on Environmental 
proposals regularly focus on three or more documents. Thus, the issue should not be one 
of the number of documents debated. 
The reason for this view, is that the Procedure Committee suggested the 
establishment of the Standing Committees to relieve the pressure with regards to time 
available in the House. This they have achieved with great success. The fact is, that 
whether one document or five grouped together are debated at the same time, only two 
and half hours are available for the debate in Standing Committee. Thus, debates which 
on the Floor of the House would have taken four or five hours 228 and often late at 
night, will now be completed in one two and a half hour sitting on a Wednesday 
morning. Only the important and controversial debates will now take place on the Floor 
of the House. But, even these are rarely held as individual debates. They are usually 
tagged on to a wider debate. For example, the EC budget is always included in the 
debate on the Chancellors annual budget statement and agriculture proposals as part of 
regular debates held on CAP. 
Thus, the evidence illustrates that it can be stated with certainty that the main aim of 
releasing more time for Chamber to carry out other work and shift the debate of 
European Community documents to the Standing Committees has been an 
overwhelming success. The figures prove this. 
In 1989, the other major weakness in the debate of legislative proposals lay in the 
late night schedulino of the majority of debates. A closer reveals the concerns 
the Procedure Con-imittee had. For example a debate on II December 1989 concerning 
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Research and Development began at 12.30am and concluded at 1.47 am. Similarly, a 
debate on Assistance for Asia and Latin America began at 10.58pm and ended at 
12.27am. There are other extreme examples like these, though the majority of debates in 
the Chamber before 1991 took place some time after I Opm. The only exceptions were 
debates on the EC budget and CAP. 
Today the position has undoubtedly improved. Reliance on late night debates is 
essentially a thing of the past. The relatively few debates which are now conducted in 
the Chamber begin at a more convivial time to ensure better participation. For example, 
a debate on Italian Steel Industry Aid on 9 May 1994 began at 7pm and ended at 
8.27pm. 
Through these developments, the quality of debate has unquestionably been raised 
and increased the effectiveness of the entire scrutiny process. The fact that ministers 
find the Standing Committee meetings challenging is an indication that they fulfil their 
specific task - influencing the minister. This must be welcomed, but there is no room for 
complacency. New challenges face the Standing Committees, most notably the ever 
increasing workload they face. This itself will further increase if the Select Committee 
becomes competent to scrutinise proposals under the Inter- Governmental Pillars. A 
whole new category of documents which require debate will emerge. Thus the 
Procedure Committee in its 1996-97 review of the scrutiny process must look 
favourably at increasing the number of Standing Committees and the allocation of their 
subject areas to ensure that quality debate and scrutiny are preserved. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEPARTMENTALLY RELATED SELECT COMMITTEES 
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND EUROPEAN 
AFFAIRS 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters the discussion has concentrated on the specific arrangements 
within the House of Commons that are integral to the European legislative process. 
Thus, we have seen how the Select Committee on European Legislation examines a 
document to consider whether it raises issues of 'legal or political importance' that will 
require further debate and discussion in one of the two European Standing Committees. 
However,, as already stated, the work of these bodies , in particular that of the Select 
Committee, is very much dictated by external factors, most notably the fast moving 
timetable within the European Community. This is why the Select Committee is best 
described as reactive. Not only does Standing Order No. 102 not permit in-depth 
investigation of European issues, the time constraints do in any event prevent such 
activity effectively. 
In this chapter, the role played by the Departmentally Related Select Committees in 
European affairs will be evaluated and the issue of how desirable an extension of this 
role would be, considered. The central issue is whether the present arrangements should 
be replaced with a Ministry for Europe and all the trappings that go with this, i. e. 
scrutiny by a Departmental Select Committee which is primarily concerned with policy 
developments and conductim, wide ranging political enquiries as opposed to 
scrutinising leoislati\, c developments. 
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The Select Committee System 
Following recommendations made by the Select Committee on Procedure in 
1978229 existing Select Committees such as the Expenditure Committee were to be 
replaced by a system of Select Committees that related exclusively to each individual 
government department. 230 These Departmental Select Committees were first 
established in the 1979-83 Parliamentary session, and in the intervening seventeen year 
period have developed into a highly effective machinery for scrutinising the government 
and holding accountable the individual ministers in each of the departments. 231 Their 
task is a specific one that compliments the work of the Chamber. 
In the forthcoming analysis a comparison between the work of the Departmental 
Select Committees and that of the Select Committee on European Legislation will be 
undertaken. Any such analysis must start with an examination and comparison of the 
Standing Orders of the Select Committees. 232 
The Standing Orders 
Standing Order No. 130 
All the Departmental Select Committees are appointed under Standing Order 130 and 
their Terms of Reference are as follows: - 
"To examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the [relevant 
department] " 
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The primary difference between Standing Order 130 and Standing Order 102 (which 
gives the Terms of Reference for the Select Committee on European Legislation) is that 
Standing Order 130 gives the Departmental Committees a much wider scope and 
freedom to conduct enquiries on almost any matter which is (or at some time in the 
future may be) the concern of the department. 
Perhaps of greatest significance is the fact that the Departmental Committee may 
examine policy. Thus, within the European context, it will be the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs Select Committee that will be the lead department in 
considering European policy and not the Select Committee on European Legislation. 
The practical effect of this will be that the Foreign Affairs Select Committee will 
consider the important political issues concerning the EU, and the Scrutiny Committee 
will be concerned with only the narrow task of scrutinising any subsequent legislation. 
This is indicative of the Select Committee system within the House of Commons. That 
is, there is a distinct division of labour. Each Select Committee is assigned its own task 
which it exclusively carries out. The risk of duplication is minimised and effective 
scrutiny maximised. Or at least, this is the theory. 
The consideration ofpolicy 
The role of the Departmental Select Committees in the European scrutiny process 
233 has been described as "complementary and not an alternative". In practice however, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that as far as European matters are concerned, this 
division of labour between the Select Committees can actually be detrimental. This 
main criticism levelled at the present arrangements is that the Standing Orders lead to 
the Committees working in isolation. That is, one is purely concerned with the policy 
and the other Nvith the proccdural matter of ensuring that the legislative proposal has 
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been properly scrutinised. In the course of his research, the author was informed by 
members of the various Select Committees that Departmental Select Committees 
should play a greater part in the Scrutiny of European legislative proposals, perhaps by 
the establishment of a European Sub-committee in each departmental 
committee. 23 4(This issue will be examined in more detail on p. 15 5). 
The second difference between the Scrutiny Committee and a Departmental 
Committee that arises out of the wording of the Standing Orders is that in considering a 
"policy", the Departmental Committee is not limited as to what it may enquire into. For 
example, the Departmental Committee can carry out an enquiry into an issue which is 
not within the governments legislative programme. Thus, in 1993, the Home Affairs 
Select Committee carried out a wide ranging enquiry into the controversial area of party 
political fanding. 235 The impetus for this was not because of some government Green 
Paper prior to legislation, but primarily due to public concern about funding for parties 
from less than legitimate sources. 
Once published, the report did not lead to any significant changes in the law and has 
probably been of greater use for academics (though it may be of more benefit in the 
future). However, the point cannot be lost. If the Select Committee on European 
Legislation had a similar remit, would not scrutiny be more effective? The ability to get 
behind the issues and investigate the policy which is the driving force behind a 
legislative proposal would be of immense value. Furthermore, this would be more 
effective than the present arrangements of the Standing Committee discussing the merits 
of a document in a two and a half hour session perhaps only days before final approval 
is given in the Council of Ministers. 
In its response to the Procedure Committee, the government236 rejected any such 
ication of the work of the Select extension on the grounds that this would lead to dupli I 
237 Hox\-c\, ci-, this need not necessarily be the case. If the primary role of Committees. 
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the Select Committee on European Legislation continues to be scrutiny of draft 
proposals, with only an extension of its Terms of Reference to consider in more detail 
the narrow policy implications of the particular legislative proposal, then the more 
grandiose considerations of government policy towards European affairs generally 
could be left to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, e. g. considering government 
policy at a forthcoming IGC. In this circumstance, it is unlikely that there would be any 
significant duplication. 
Furthermore, it would address what is viewed as the rather absurd situation seen at 
present. For example, in 1993, the Health Select Committee published a report on the 
proposed directive on the advertising of tobacco products. 238 Obviously, there were 
public health implications in such a report. However, it was a European directive and 
not initiated as a domestic piece of legislation. Whilst the Health Select Committee 
Report was concerned with the health effects of tobacco advertising in the UK, i. e. did 
advertising lead to an increase in the number of people smoking, there was no 
significant appraisal of European policy to this issue. Thus, the report looked at 
government policy in this area, but no effective investigation was made into European 
policy which was the driving force behind the proposal (See p. 146 below for more 
discussion on the work of the Health Select Committee). 
The above example illustrates that the Scrutiny Committee has the potential to play a 
larger role without affecting the work of the Departmental Select Committees. A second 
example illustrates that the two different types of committee can approach a similar 
problem but from two different perspectives. 
In 1986, The Select Committee on European Legislation produced a repor-t239 on the 
impact of the Single European Act (SEA 1986) on Parliamentary scrutiny. Its primary 
concern was to evaluate the impact of the Cooperation procedure on the European 
legislative procedure both within the House of Commons and in the Council of 
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Ministers. The report was very inward looking and paid little attention to the wider 
political issues of the Single European Act. 
In comparison, the 1990 report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 240 was a 
much longer and wide ranging investigation into the policy issues that resulted from the 
passage of the Single European Act. Of most interest is the fact that the Foreign Affairs 
Committee produced its report four years after the implementation of the Act, whereas 
the Scrutiny Committee made its observations about the impact of the SEA within 
weeks of its passage through Parliament. 241 
What the above two examples suggest is that the Scrutiny Committee could carry 
out an enhanced investigative role without duplicating the work of other committees. 
The fact that it has experience of working to a short time frame, will mean that any 
investigation will only cover the essential aspects of the problem. The wider policy and 
political issues can still be left to the Departmental Select Committees in the same way 
as at present. 
In these circumstances. the Scrutiny Committee could play a more active role in the 
legislative process, with the Departmental Select Committees concerning themselves 
more with reviewing how the policy has worked. Thus, the Scrutiny Committee will no 
longer be purely reactive. Developing this type of relationship between the 
Departmental Committees and the Scrutiny Committee will go a long way to making 
the arrangements for examining European issues within the House of Commons 
I complementary' and thereby more effective. 
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Powers of Departmental Select Committees 
For all practical purposes, there is no difference between the powers of Departmental 
Select Committees and the Select Committee on European Legislation to send for 
papers and persons or appoint specialist advisers. 242 Thus, the Departmental 
Committees can, and often do appoint specialist advisers when dealing with complex 
European issues. This is most common on the Agriculture Select Committee, the 
Environment Select Committee and the Trade and Industry Select Committee whose 
departments play perhaps the largest role in European policy issues. 
The role of Departmental Select Committees in the scrutiny of 
European issues 
As has been noted above,, the role of the Departmental Select Committees is to 
consider the "expenditure, administration and policy" of the relevant govermnent 
department. Their primary function is therefore not to scrutinise in detail government 
legislative proposals. This is the task of the relevant Standing Committee which has 
been appointed on behalf of the whole House to scrutinise the Bill. At present the only 
contact the Departmental Select Committees have with European Legislation will be the 
Explanatory Memorandum that will be sent to them by the Scrutiny Committee, if there 
is a legislative proposal that comes within their department's remit. Thus the minister 
will prepare the EM for the Scrutiny Conunittee, who in turn send it to the relevant 
Departmental Committee. 
In the discussion that follows, there will be an examination of the attitudes exhibited 
by the Departmental Select Committees to European issues generally as well as the 
specific question of how far these Committees keep abreast of European legislative 
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proposals. The following evidence is taken from letters written by the various Chairmen 
of the Departmental Select Committees to the Select Committee on Procedure when it 
was gathering evidence for its 1989 Report. 243 Where appropriate, this has been 
updated and compared with extracts from correspondence that the author received from 
the Chairmen and Clerks of the Committees. This will enable a comparison to be made 
to give a current assessment of the work of Departmental Select Committees in this 
area. 
The Agriculture Select Committee 
In his letter to the Procedure Committee, the Chairman of the Agriculture 
Committee replied that: 244 
"The Agriculture Committee's scrutiny of European legislation can best 
be described as sporadic .... We only enquire into new Community proposals 
where they overlap with current enquiries .... There are 
difficulties in 
persuading the Select Committee members to inquire into topics which are 
not just technically complex but the subject of delicate and ongoing 
negotiations by Ministers. " 
The above comments are surprising given the central position of agricultural policy 
in the European Community. It remains the most resource consuming aspect of 
European policy and is a very controversial area - especially reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). However, the 
Committee feel that their primary consideration is one of policy and not legislation 
though it will consider legislative proposals where they are part of a wider inquiry. In 
correspondence with the current Clerk of the Committee he explained the Committees 
role todav as folloxN-s: - 
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"The Agriculture Committee's practice in regard to scrutiny of European 
legislation remains very much as set out in the Chairman's letter to the 
Chairman of the Procedure Committee submitted as evidence to that 
Committees 1988-89 inquiry. In particular, the Committee remains wary of 
conducting inquiries into specific legislative proposals which are under 
negotiation within the Agriculture and Fisheries Councils, and it has no 
systematic procedure for sifting or examining such proposals. It continues to 
receive information from the European legislation Committee on its 
consideration of EU documents in the agricultural field. That said, the 
Committee's work in recent years has been drawn increasingly into 
consideration of general EU policy and its likely future development. I 
would cite in particular: 
(i) Sixth Report of Session 1992-93, The Effects of Conservation 
Measures on the UKSea Fishing Industry, HC 620 - this contains detailed 
analysis of the Common Fisheries Policy; 
(ii) Fifth Report of Session 1993-94, Health Controls on the Importation 
of Live Animals, HC 347 - contains analysis of the harmonization of health 
controls and veterinary certification of livestock transported across EU 
national boundaries and entering the EU from third countries; 
(Iii) Fourth Report of Session 1994-95, Horticulture HC 61-1 - deals in 
part with the European Commissions proposals for reform of the fruit and 
vegetables regime, 
(iv) Fifth Report of Session 1994-95, Pesticides Safety Directorate and 
Aledicines Dircaorale, HC 391-1 - examines,, amongst other things, the 
harmonization of pesticides registration and veterinary medicines licensing 
procedures across the EU. 
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This increased focus on EU matters is to be welcomed and encouraged. 
Comprehensive scrutiny of policy is called for. This cannot be done in isolation from 
legislation. For example, the last inquiry of the Agriculture CommIttee was into the UK 
dairy industry and the CAP dairy regime, in the course of which much evidence was 
taken on possible reforms of CAP. Similarly, a current inquiry into agri-environmental 
schemes run by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) is based on 
provisions of Council Regulation 2078/92. 
There is a definite identifiable shift in the emphasis of the Agriculture Committee's 
work. Policy is still central to its role but its inquiries do appear to have a more formal 
approach to legislative proposals. It can no longer be described as the "sporadic" 
approach as in the letter to the Chairman of the Procedure Committee in 1989. 
Furthermore, this increased awareness of legislative proposals is not a coincidence. This 
change can be attributed to the major EC development that has taken place since 1989 - 
the introduction of the Single Market. 
The Single Market has made European policy a reality in terms of being the most 
significant step towards European integration. This has undoubtedly influenced much 
domestic policy and most importantly altered the way in which European policy affects 
domestic policy. Thus the two can no longer be considered in isolation. Any 
consideration of domestic policy in the agricultural sphere must now also contain an 
evaluation of both European policy and European legislation. Only in these 
circumstances will scrutiny be effectively accomplished. The Select Committee is to be 
applauded for its positive approach. 
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The Defence Select Committee 
In his letter to the Procedure Committee, the Chairman of the Defence Committee 
replied: -245 
"The Defence Committee undertakes no 
Legislation. " 
scrutiny of European 
However, Mr Michael Mates MP, the Chairman of the Committee, felt that there was 
a need to reform the Select Committee process that would allow for a greater role in the 
Scrutiny process for the departmental Select Committees. 
In the correspondence received it is apparent that there has been no change in the 
approach of the Defence Select Committee to European issues. In particular, it was 
pointed out that defence was not an area of European Community competence and thus 
no need for systematic evaluation of European legislation was called for. 
The Education and Employment Select Committee 
Before considering the work of this Committee it must be pointed out that this is a 
newly created Committee, working only since March 1996. In 1989 only the Education 
Select Committee gave evidence to the Procedure Committee with the Employment 
Committee making no submissions. 
Back then, the Chairman of the Education Committee described his Committee's 
role as: _"146 
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11 relatively inactive in this field" 
He outlined the fact that it is the role of the Clerk of the Select Committee to keep his 
Committee informed of any relevant European legislative developments bw he 
concluded his letter with the observation that: - 
"Members of the Committee are aware that satisfactory consideration of 
EC matters requires more than can be done by the Scrutiny Committee 
alone, (my italics) as presently constituted" 
Since the above evidence was given the Department for Education has ceased to exist 
as an individual entity. In July 1995, a new department was created, The Department for 
Education and Employment. Thus, a new Departmental Select Committee was 
established that reflected this change. 
However, before considering the Employment aspects of the Committee's work there 
is one further observation to be made. In his correspondence, the Clerk of this new 
Education and Employment Committee reiterated the point that the old Committee 
"devoted little of its time to European issues, as there is little European competence in 
the education field. " This is a trend which will continue. 
From an employment perspective, the Committee is once again primarily concerned 
with domestic issues. Furthermore, the UK opt-out to the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty means that the UK enjoys much autonomy over employment matters. 
Mere are occasional situations where European legislation will affect employment 
policy, e. g. via legislative proposals made under the Health and Safety directives, but 
this is rare. 
The Clerk concluded his letter by stating that the Committee does not make any 
special arranocnients for detailed scrutiny of European Community documents and 
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what is more has no plans to develop such arrangements. This task he argues is 
exclusively one for the Select Committee on European Legislation. The Education and 
Employment Select Committee will only take account of the European dimension as 
part of inquiries into specific policy issues. It will not hold separate inquiries. 
The Environment Select Committee 
The Chairman of the Environment Select Committee in his reply to the Procedure 
Committee gave an account of how that Committee had come to terms with scrutinising 
European policy in a policy area which has had more legislation than perhaps any other. 
What his letter illustrates is that European policy and legislation cannot be viewed in 
isolation from domestic political considerations and the Committee have acted 
accordingly to accommodate this. 
The Environment Select Committee has adopted a liberal interpretation of its 
Standing Orders. Whereas other Departmental Committees have not taken a proactive 
role in scrutinising the impact of European legislative proposals in their own 
247 inquiries, the Environment Committee has done so on a regular basis. The Chairman 
justifies this by pointing out that only by being aware of the complete picture can 
effective inquiry be made. Furthermore, there is no duplication with the work of the 
Scrutiny Committee because the investigation is of a wider policy, of which the 
European legislative proposal is but one part. 
The following extract comes from the letter of the then Chairman of the Environment 
to the Procedure Committee: -248 
"The Practice of the Committee has been to consider proposals from the 
Commission tid hoc. as part of specific Committee inquiries. and I feel this 
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policy has been fairly successful. ... 
in our recent Report on Toxic Waste, the 
EC Directive on the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous waste, 
Commission proposals for common definitions of Waste throughout the 
Community and the draft Directive on Hazardous Waste 78/319 EEC. 
We have therefore instituted a more formal procedure whereby Members 
of the Committee will receive regular notice of EC documents relating to the 
responsibilities of the department of the Environment. " 
The Committee has taken its own initiative and created a process whereby it is 
informed of any relevant European legislation which it then incorporates, along with 
other information , into its inquiry. This approach is to be encouraged amongst the 
Departmental Committees. This use of specific documents in relevant inquiries can be 
adopted without any change to the Standing Orders. The approach of the Environment 
Committee illustrates this. 
Since the giving of the evidence to the Procedure Committee in 1989, it is a positive 
step that the Environment Select Committee has continued to take a proactive approach 
to European Community issues. If anything, the correspondence from the Clerk and 
Chairman of the Committee suggest a development in their modus operandi. The 
tollowing is an extract from the correspondence which gives examples of how the 
Committee have developed their scrutiny techniques in the intervening seven year 
period: - 
"The Environi-nent Committee of the current Parliament has continued to 
look for opportunities to inquire into EU matters. While many of the 
Committee's inquiries (such as the recent inquiry into World Trade and 
Environment and last years into Pollution in Eastern Europe) will have an 
EU dimension (and involve the submission of evidence by the Commission) 
certain inquiries relate more directly into European policy. For example, the 
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Committee's inquii, N, into f'olatile Organic Compounds considered in some 
depth proposals iii respect of VOC emissions from fixed (industry) and 
mobile (vehicles) sources. 
The Committee has also visited the European Commission outside the 
context of particular inquiries, most recently in November 1995. These 
visits afford an opportunity to be briefed on the full range of activities both 
current and planned, and put across the Committee's views to the 
Commissioner and her officials. A further such visit is likely to be made in 
the Coming Autumn. 
The Committee also receives, via the Department of the Environment, the 
agendas of forthcoming Environment Council meetings and a report of the 
outcome of such meetings. " 
Of most interest from the above extract is the outlining of the links the Committee 
have developed with the Commission. As previously stated, the UK Parliament has no 
formal links with the Commission. However, the Select Committee has identified the 
value and importance of the Commission in the area of Environmental policy. Thus, in 
the absence of any such formal links, the Select Committee has developed and nurtured 
its own links. Most importantly, this means that the Committee is kept fully informed of 
legislative proposals and can therefore examine their impact on both UK and European 
environmental policy. 
Obviously, this Select Cornmittee has good cause to develop such links, because of 
the evei- increasing competence of the EU in this area. Such an arrangement is plainly 
not necessary for the Defence Select Committee. However, many other Committees 
who do have some Europeaii input into their investigations could look at the 
Environment Committee as a model to ensure effective scrutiny and thus accountability. 
Page - 142 
However,, the correspondence concluded with an unequivocal statement that the 
Committee did not seek a role in the scrutiny of European legislation. The 
consideration of the merits was to be left with the two Standing Committees and this 
Committee would continue to concentrate on policy, but within a context of awareness 
of legislative developments. 
The Home Affairs Select Committee 
The Home Affairs Select Committee by its very nature would only have a limited 
role in considering European issues, and has developed no formal procedure for 
carrying out scrutiny. In his Memorandum to the Procedure Committee. 249 the 
Chairman was quite certain that there should be a clearly defined role between the 
Departmental Select Committee's and the Scrutiny Committee: - 
"Because the impact of European legislation on home affairs is so 
irregular, it would not make sense to establish a more formalised 
arrangement to ensure effective scrutiny 
The role of the Departmental Select Committees should be concerned 
with policy and expenditure involved in any European legislation. The 
technical scrutiny of legislative proposals should remain with a separate 
Select Committee, as at present. " 
This conservative and traditional approach to the workings of the House of 
Commons is still predominant within Parliament today. The division of labour between 
Committees and the aN, oidance of duplication are viewed as the key to successful 
scrutiny. However. the need for change will be irresistible. Ironically, it will be the 
Home Affairs Select Committee that Nvill be at the forefront of this change. 
Page - 1433 
These developments will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, "The Scrutiny of 
European Legislation by the House of Commons after Maastricht". There, an 
examination of how the introduction of the two new pillars of the European Union, the 
Justice and Home Affairs Pillar and the Foreign Affairs Pillar, have placed a new 
burden on the Home and Foreign Affairs Select Committees. Legislation under the new 
pillars is not made by the European Community and therefore not within the ambit of 
the Scrutiny Committee. This leads to a requirement of a distinct method of scrutinising 
these legislative proposals, a method in which the Departmental Select Committees will 
have to play a greater part. 
In the course of his correspondence, the Clerk outlined how this new task will be 
approached. The Committee is kept informed by the Home Office of any significant 
proposals under the "Third Pillar". A copy of any of the more important initiatives are 
sent to the Committee Chairman and the Clerk and these are then made available to all 
Committee Members. In addition, prior to the convening of the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council the Committee receives a copy of the draft agenda and after the meeting 
a copy of any texts agreed. On rare occasions the Home Affairs Committee will hold 
oral evidence sessions with the Home Office Minister or Officials concerning a 
particular document. This is uncommon, primarily due to a shortage of time. 
However, when considering these documents, the Committee do not go on to 
produce a separate report. The issues are considered, where relevant, in other inquiries 
and reports made by the Committee. For example, the Committee's consideration of the 
EUROPOL proposals was included in the Committee's report on Organised Crime. 
Contrast this with the House of Lords where Sub-Committee E produced a very detailed 
inquiry into EUROPOL (see pp 264-266 below). 
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The Social Services Select Committee 
The Social Services Select Committee is another Committee which does not have 
any major input into European Affairs. European documents relating to Social Security 
are rare as this is still an area off policy which is within the domain of each Member 
State. This was a point noted by the Chairman of the Social Services Committee in his 
letter to the Procedure Committee: -250 
".. I do not think it likely that any Committee concerned with Health 
and/or Social security will deal specifically with European legislation in any 
great detail. " 
Once again, this Departmental Committee favours the ad hoc approach to European 
legislation, and does not have any formal procedures for examining these documents. 
This is a sensible approach if there is little contact with European affairs. 
Correspondence from the Chairman and Clerk of the Committee shows that little has 
changed for what is now called the Social Security Select Committee. In 1989, the 
department was split with a new Department of Health being created which is 
shadowed by its own Committee. 
There are occasionally issues which do crop up and are relevant to an inquiry, for 
example thejudgment of the European Court of Justice in the Barber Case251 affected 
the pensions policy of the UK and so the Committee inquired into its effect. There are 
other incidental references to European issues, e. g. the Committee's recent Report on 
Housing Benefit Fraud mentioned the EU Data Protection Directive. In addition, a 
relaxation of the rules that allow Select Committees to travel to Brussels will now allow 
the Committee to travel to Brussels (June 24 1996) in connection with an inquiry into 
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saving for retirement, where they discussed European pensions policy with Directorates- 
General V and XV. 
However, the role of the Social Security Committee in European affairs is limited by 
the fact that the UK government secured an opt-out to the Social Chapter at the 
Maastricht Treaty negotiations. This ensured, for the time being at least, UK autonomy 
in these matters, and thus no formal European perspective in its investigations. 
The Health Select Committee 
As stated above, the Department of Health was only created in 1990 and thus gave no 
evidence to the Procedure Committee. However , in the 
intervening six year period the 
Select Committee has produced two reports on European issues. These are The 
European Community and Health Policy (HC 180 Session 1991-92) and The ECs 
Proposed Directive on ihe advertising of Tobacco Products (HC 221 1992-93). 
However, as emphasised in the correspondence from the Clerk and Chairman of the 
Committee, it does not engage in examination of European Community documents 
which fall within its reference as a matter of course. 
Two reasons were identified for this. Firstly, because of the limited competence of 
the EC in health matters and secondly because this task is viewed as being exclusively 
within the domain of the Select Committee on European Legislation. Inquiries into 
European issues as the two given above were carried out because they were part of a 
wider inquiry which the Committee was engaged in. 
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The Transport Select Committee 
Perhaps the most surprising response came from the Chairman of the Transport 
Select Committee in his letter to the Procedure Committee. 252 The author's reason for 
being taken aback by his comments is rooted in the fact that transport and related 
legislation has grown into one of the largest areas of Community competence. The 
Chairman wrote: - 
"An ad hoc rather than a systematic approach is taken to European 
legislation 
.... In view of our 
heavy programme I cannot see the Transport 
Committee being in a position to undertake a more systematic approach. " 
This is further evidence, if it is needed,, that reform of the Departmental Select 
Committees is now overdue. The lack of co-ordination between them and the Scrutiny 
Committee must be addressed. It is most unsatisfactory that a Departmental Committee 
that scrutimses government policy which is so widely influenced by European 
legislative developments, does not have a more structured response to investigating 
important European legislation. 
The evidence indicates that there has been no substantial change to the way this 
Select Committee operates as far European legislative proposals go. 
The general comment running through all the replies seen above is that each one of 
the Departmental Select Committees has an extremely heavy workload and therefore 
could not carry out any substantial investigation into European legislation. This 
response has a degree of truth to it. However, the fact must be stated that those 
Departmental Committees NvIuch are at the fore of European policy cannot afford to 
ignore the important developments. Once again, the view is reiterated that the Standing 
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Orders of the Departmental Committees must be amended to facilitate their scrutiny of 
European issues and, perhaps most importantly, to encourage them to carry out these 
investigations. The time has come to stop viewing European legislation as some form of 
'foreign' legislation which is only peripheral to our legal system. The impact of it is 
continually growing, and this impact must be effectively scrutinised and reviewed. 
The Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
The Foreign Affairs Select Committee has the responsibility for oversight of the lead 
Department for European Community matters, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
This means that it has the overall duty to review EC Policy as a whole and the attitude 
of the British government towards it. Surprisingly though, there are no distinct 
arrangements for review of European affairs and the Chairman in his letter to the 
Procedure Committee made the following observation: 25 3 
"Beyond such enquiries into the political and constitutional aspects of the 
EC, we have considered that it is for other Departmental Select Committees 
to examine EC policies in the subject areas such as trade, transport etc. or 
for the European Legislation Committee to keep the machinery of 
Parliamentary scrutiny under review. " 
The Chairman's response appears over optimistic given the replies seen by the other 
Chairmen above. With the exception of the Envirom-nent Committee none of the other 
Departmental Select Committees had any formal method of scrutinising European 
policy, and some such as the Transport Select Committee stressed their already heavy 
workload that precluded them from further activity in the area. 
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The Foreign Affairs Select Committee concentrates exclusively on review of 
government European policy and has no interest in European legislative proposals. To 
help in this process it has since 1990 conducted regular oral evidence sessions , NIth 
Foreign Office Ministers on the future programme of the Council of Ministers, 
including what the priorities of each Presidency will be. In his reply to the Procedure 
Committee, the Chairman saw this development as benefiting all other Departmental 
Select Committees and the Select Committee on European Legislation, who would have 
an earlier warning of what new European legislative proposals will be brought forward 
during the following six months and could plan their inquiries accordingly. However, 
as the Home Affairs Committee has now discovered, the involvement in European 
Affairs will now increase because of the development of the Common Foreign and 
Security Pillar. The burden of scrutiny will now fall on the Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee (This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). 
The correspondence received from the Chairman and Clerk of the Committee 
indicates quite strongly that the position has not altered in the intervening seven year 
period. The Foreign Affairs Committee still views its primary concern as one of 
scrutinising government policy towards Europe, especially via the oral evidence 
sessions where the minister was questioned about developments in the Council. 
What the above discussion helps to illustrate, is the point that a review of the 
Departmental Select Committees is long overdue. The fact that each Committee now 
has different horizons with regard European issues leads to the conclusion that the time 
has come for the Standing Orders to be reviewed and tailored to the needs of each 
individual Committee. This should not pose a major problem. Today, there are a variety 
of other non-departmental Select Committees which carry out very specific tasks as 
requested by their Standing Orders. Alternatively, following a comprehensive review, 
changes could be made to the Standing Orders of all Departmental Select Committees, 
Page - 149 
thereby giving them both the potential and encouragement to assume a greater role in 
the scrutiny of European affairs. Either way, the change cannot be resisted any longer. 
Does the UK need a Department for European Affairs? 
One question regularly posed by a variety of persons associated with the scrutiny 
process is whether we need a Select Committee for European Affairs. Most recently the 
Select Committee on Procedure investigated the issue in its 1989 report. 254 However. 
in this author's opinion, this is only half the picture. In addition to this, the question 
needs to be asked whether there is in fact a need for a Ministry for Europe? Therefore, 
whereas a Select Committee for European Affairs could operate independently 
reviewing European policy amongst all the departments, the creation of a Department 
for European Affairs would mean that such a Select Committee would now be like any 
other Departmental Select Committee, focussing on the work of that department 
exclusively. 
The United Kingdom is unique amongst its European partners in that there is no 
Ministry dedicated exclusively to the task of co-ordinating and developing European 
policies. Though there is a Minister of State255 at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office whose brief is concerned entirely with European matters, he does not have a 
place within the cabinet. The primary concern of the Minister of State is with the 
political developments in the Community, such as enlargement or the reform of the 
Qualified Voting Procedure. However, it is not his task to coordinate policy between the 
various government departments. This lack of coordination has been evident recently 
w1icre different departments, most notably the Agriculture and Health Departments have 
beeii saving different things during the so called "beef crisis". Coordination of the UK 
policy by one single department could only have been to the UK's benefit. 
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The issue which needs to be addressed is whether the scrutiny process would be 
improved by creating a Department of European Affairs,, which worked independently 
of the Foreign Office. Therefore, would the creation of some type of umbrella 
department enhance the influence of the United Kingdom in the Council of Ministers or 
would it as many have argued, create another unnecessary level of bureaucracy that 
merely duplicated the functions of other departments? 
The strongest argument in favour of creating such a department is that there would be 
a greater coordination of European policy because one minster would speak with one 
voice for the government as a whole. He would have the task of ensuring that European 
issues within each department were dealt with in a uniform manner. Furthermore, this 
would be a department that had the time to investigate and discuss policy in a detail that 
the Foreign Office cannot manage simply because of its other voluminous 
commitments. Likewise, the Select Committee that shadowed this department would be 
able to have a similar freedom in investigating the work of the department, something 
which neither the Foreign Affairs Select Committee nor the Scrutiny Committee can 
readily do at the moment. Both these important Committees have a variety of other 
pressing commitments. 
In a Memorandum presented to the Select Committee on Procedure, Professor T. St 
John BateS256 identified succinctly three specific and considerable advantages of 
establishing a Select Committee for European Affairs, which he felt could be 
established without any fundamental amendments to the existing Select Committee 
structure within the House of Commons. He wrote: -257 
"There xN, ýould be distinct advantages in the establishment of a Select 
Committee on European Affairs which had an order of reference which 
would enable it to consider- 
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(a) the efficacy of domestic arrangements in respect of Community 
Affairs for example: the arrangements within Whitehall for the co- 
ordination and preparation of the position of the United Kingdom 
Government on Commission proposals, 
(b) long term legal developments within the Communities: for example 
the growth of the external competence of the EC, and 
(c) major Commission policy proposals and legislative proposals, 
particularly those which could be identified as having a long gestation 
period. 
A Select Committee on European Affairs would thus be able to consider 
broader issues than is realistically within the capacity of the Select 
Committee on European legislation or the present Departmental Select 
Committees. " 
However, there is a strong alternative argument that any proposed creation of a 
Department of European Affairs is not possible within the present Committee 
framework and therefore the view put forward by Professor St John Bates is open to 
question. There is merit in the view of the Procedure Committee Report when it said 
that the introduction of such a Committee would have serious repercussion for the 
Scrutiny Committee and is unlikely to be possible within the present framework: -258 
"The inevitable result of grafting such a Committee on to the existing 
structure would be a considerable degree of overlap and blurring of 
responsibilities, since departmentally related committees would unless their 
Orders of Reference were amended remain charged with monitoring 
European documents within their arnbit. " 
In effect what the Procedure Committee is saying is that there would not be the room 
I for both a Scrutiny Committee and a Select Committee for European Affairs. With three 
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Committees being involved (the third being the Departmental Committee) there is 
potential for conflict and differences of opinion that may be unresolvable. 
In the quotation given above from the Procedure Committee report the key words are 
unless their Orders of Reference were amended ...... The Procedure Committee is 
suggesting that Departmental Committees with their present Standing Orders would 
take over the role of the Scrutiny Committee and monitor documents within their ambit. 
However, the point is that the Standing Orders could be amended to ensure this did not 
happen. 
The Standing Orders themselves could be amended to preserve the division of labour 
essential for effective scrutiny. The Scrutiny Committee could continue with the vital 
task of scrutinising European legislative proposals, as well as examining the narrow 
policy issues surrounding it. The Departmental Committees could focus on wider policy 
objectives, for example the Agriculture Select Committee could concentrate on the 
important issue of reforming the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies. And 
finally, the newly created Select Committee for European Affairs could be concerned 
with issues of more general government policy, for example government proposals for 
the six monthly lGC meeting at the end of the Presidency or the complex issue of 
enlargement of the European Union and Qualified Majority Voting. 
Therefore, what this author is arguing for is development in the scrutiny of European 
issues by creating a new Department of European Affairs and re-defining the roles of 
the existing Committees by amending their Standing Orders accordingly. This would in 
fact remove the risk of duplication because each Committee would be charged to do a 
specific task by its Standing Orders. 
This does not appear to be a particularly radical step. Changes could be made after an 
investigation by the Procedure Committee and a comprehensive debate. Ho,, vever, the 
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central point is that European issues are increasingly at the heart of government policy. 
Many major policies now have some European aspect to them and domestic legislation 
itself will often be influenced by some Directive or Regulation. It is therefore 
appropriate that the Select Committee arrangements in the House of Commons should 
reflect this by permitting more comprehensive analysis of European issues. 
At present, it is highly unlikely that any such reform would take place. During 
conversations with officials at the Cabinet Office259 it was pointed out that the Foreign 
Affairs Select Committee is perhaps the most influential and highly regarded of all 
Select Committees -a fact that it guards jealously. It would not readily accept any 
removal or downgrading of its role in European affairs. 
Strengthening scrutiny by Departmental Committees 
From the above discussion it can be seen that at present there is little enthusiasm for 
extending the scrutiny function of the Departmental Committees. This is apparent from 
both the Committees themselves and the government who are not in favour of reforming 
the Select Committee system. However, this leaves a gaping hole at the centre of the 
scrutiny arrangements. How then could more effective scrutiny be achieved within a 
framework of the present arrangements? 
Appointing Sub-Committees 
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One solution that has been put forward is to amend the Standing Orders to allow 
those Departmental Committees that felt the need to establish Sub-Committees which 
could hold more lengthy and detailed inquires into those European issues that merited 
them. Most significantly, such a solution could allow for the Departmental Committees 
to play a greater role in considering the impact of European legislative proposals on a 
wider policy area that may be being considered by the main Committee. 
Each Sub-Committee could consist of five to six members, who were either already 
sitting on the main Committee or were specifically co-opted onto the Sub-Committee 
for the duration of the inquiry. 260 The advantage of this approach would be to give the 
Select Committee a certain degree of flexibility to carry out inquiries into more complex 
or politically controversial areas and develop a degree of expertise which is lacking. It 
would allow each Committee to develop its own procedure, with those facing more 
European issues being able to utilise the Sub-Committee on a regular basis. 
Though proposals for establishing Sub-Committees on Departmental Select 
Committees were put forward to the Procedure Committee in 1989,261 they were 
rejected by the Committee, the government, advisers and academics. 262 The reason 
most commonly cited was that there is a lack of time and that the establishment of these 
Sub-Committees would if anything add to the workload. The Clerk of the House stated 
that such a development would lead to European business being separated from the 
26' 1 mainstrearn of the House. -' He felt that it would become isolated and not considered 
within the context of other domestic policy considerations. 
This is a slightly perpicxiii(-, comment to make. As can be seen above, the response of 
cach of the Chairmen ot' the Departmental Select Committees strongly suggests that 
European issues are already within the periphery of the House. Seven N, ears on from the 
Procedure Committee Report. none of the Committees had any formal or systematic 
arrangements for scrutinising European issues. If anything, the Select Committees tend Cý 
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to shy away from European issues if possible because of their complex and 
controversial nature. Though not ideal, the establishment of Sub-Committees could have 
addressed this reluctance on the part of the Departmental Select Committees and raised 
the profile of European issues in the House. The production of high quality and 
informative reports could only assist the House of Commons as a whole. 
Concluding remarks 
Despite undertaking this lengthy inquiry, the Procedure Committee made no 
significant recommendations to reforming the role of Departmental Committees in the 
scrutiny process. In essence it opted for the Status Quo. A Status Quo which, giveii the 
evidence from the Clerks of the Select Committees available today, appears to suit all 
the Committees concerned. One proposal was for the government to make provision for 
the earlier deposit of documents in the House and for better coordination between the 
Select Committees on European matters. 264 This proposal appears slightly 
contradictory. Why make proposals for more effective provision of European 
documents when the Select Committees by their own admission do not have the time or 
expertise to deal with them? 
Without some reform of the Departmental Committees their role in the scrutiny of 
European affairs cannot be further developed. In essence, there are two alternatives. 
Either a wholesale reform leading to the establishment of a Select Committee for 
European Affairs (the authors preferred option) or the more limited proposals for Sub- 
Committees to be appointed by the Select Committees. However, in either case there 
Nvotild be a raising of the profile of European issues within the House of Commons, 
leading to more informed debate of these issues. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SCRUTINY OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION BY THE 
HOUSE OF COMMONS AFTER MAASTRICHT 
Introduction 
The Maastricht Treaty signed by the Member States in February 1992 was the first 
significant review of the European Community since the passage of the Single 
European Act in 1986. The principal aims of the Treaty were to increase the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Community and to extend the competence of the European 
Community into new areas. 
These changes created a new organisation which has become known as the European 
Union. This Union is made up of three separate "pillars" of which the European 
Community is the central one. The two flanking pillars deal with political cooperation in 
attempting to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy ("the second pillar") and 
increasing collaboration in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs ("the third pillar"). 
The scrutiny arrangements for the two flanking pillars will be considered later in the 
chapter. In addition to this, in Chapter 10 the scrutiny arrangements for the inter- 
governmental pillars in the House of Lords are critically analysed. The issues facing 
bolh Houses of Parliament are virtually identical and thus some will be dealt with more 
comprehensively in Chapter 10. 
As far as the central pillar of the European Community is concerned, the most 
significant development related to the introduction of the co-decision procedure, which 
is designed to increase the involvement of the EuroPean Parliament in the legislative 
process. 265 At the core of this development was an attempt by the Member States to 
address perhaps the most frequent criticism levelled at the European Community - that 
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of it being undemocratic in its decision making process. The "democratic deficit" as it 
became known was criticised by all sides involved in the European debate. In particular, 
the Commission came in for most criticism, primarily because of its central role in the 
decision making process, yet it was not elected or accountable in any other meaningful 
way. 
The Maastricht Declaration 
Prior to the Maastricht negotiations, the United Kingdom government took the view 
that democratic accountability within the EC could be strengthened by encouraging the 
involvement of national parliaments in the European legislative process. In evidence 
given to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, the 
former Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Tristan Garrel-Jones 
MP made the following observation: 266 
"... the Government greatly values the whole process of parliamentary 
scrutiny and, indeed in our view the whole question of parliamentary 
scrutiny is one which we think should be acknowledged throughout the 
Community, and that would bring considerable benefits to the legislative 
process in Europe and the Community at large. " 
Because of this firmly held view articulated very succinctly by the former minister, 
the UK government insisted on a declaration being added to the end of the Maastricht 
Treaty to make formal this ambition. In fact in his evidence to the House of Lords, 
. h-istan. Garrel-Jones justified the inclusion of such a declaration: _267 
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"... This is the reason why we have proposed in the Inter-Governmental 
Conference that there should be a declaration attached to whatever Treaty 
emerges that would enable national parliaments to take the sort of interest in 
the process which is taken certainly by our Parliament but not perhaps by 
some of our partner countries. " 
These sentiments were also expressed to the author when he interviewed the former 
minister. 268 He stated quite categorically that he felt that some countries were taking 
the issue of scrutiny "not too seriously". In particular he cited the southern 
Mediterranean countries as being the worst offenders. In fact it was not until after the 
Maastricht Treaty that Spain, Greece and Portugal introduced effective machinery for 
the scrutiny of legislative proposals within their national parliaments. In retrospect, the 
Declaration can be hailed as the impetus to addressing this issue. 
The actual declaration reads as follows: -269 
"The Conference considers that it is important to encourage greater 
involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union. 
To this end, the exchange of information between national parliaments and 
the European Parliament should be stepped up. In this context, the 
governments of the Member States will ensure, inter alia, that national 
parliaments receivc Commission proposalsfor legislation in, good time for 
information or possible examination (my italics). 
Similarly, the Conference considers that it is important for contacts between 
the national parliament and the European Parliament to be stepped up, in 
particular throtigh the granting of appropriate reciprocal facilities and 
regular meetings betweeii members of Parliament interested in the same 
issues. " 
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In the author's opinion, the most significant part of this declaration is the section that 
has been placed in italics. The reason for this is that in the UK, the Select Committees of 
both Houses are solely reliant on the government not only to supply it with the 
legislative proposals but also to provide the Explanatory Memorandum which will detail 
the government's response to the proposal. These two documents are the basis of the 
scrutiny arrangements. If either is missing, effective scrutiny is impossible. 
The fact that accountability to national parliaments and the provision of texts to them 
is placed on a formal footing in the Treaty is, from a scrutiny perspective, a very 
encouraging development. However, as will be demonstrated later this is not a guarantee 
to government cooperation at all times. The evidence does suggest that the UK 
government does not keep to the spirit of the Declaration at all times. 
Reasonsfor the inclusion of the Declaration 
As previously stated the government insisted on this Declaration being included 
because they saw the involvement of all national parliaments in scrutiny as being 
essential for the EC to become more democratic. In essence, the Declaration is 
attempting to prevent what may be best referred to as a double democratic deficit. That 
is to say, one within the institutions and one at a national level. Thus by actively 
encouraging scrutiny by national parliaments, the UK government saw this as a way to 
bridge the gulf between the need for accountability, without marginalising the role of 
domestic legislatures. 
From a political perspective. it was also important for the United Kingdom 
i)overnment to sell the Treaty to its own highly sceptical backbenchers. Without their 
support the Treaty would not have been passed through Parliament. Of most anguish to 
these backbenchers Nvas the increased role noxv adopted by the European Parliament 
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through the introduction of the co-decision procedure. This was seen as a challenge to 
the constitutional position of Parliament in the UK. By guaranteeing some control over 
the legislative process through the encouragement of scrutiny by national parliaments 
the government viewed this Treaty as more palatable. However, as history will record in 
years to come, this Declaration was not in itself enough to silence the critics. In the end, 
the Treaty was passed only by the threat of a general election if the government lost the 
vote of confidence in the House. 
The above discussion illustrates, that at the Maastricht negotiations the govermnent 
tried to reconcile two contradictory principles. On the one hand it supported the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure and on the other pushed strongly for the 
Declaration. Co-decision as we shall see in the next section was intended to address the 
democratic deficit. So was the Declaration. However, the UK (and other governments it 
must also be said) was not prepared to achieve this accountability at the expense of the 
domestic legislature. Thus what has been created is in fact an unsatisfactory outcome for 
all sides. Both the European Parliament and national parliaments retain some 
accountability - yet neither is able to exert effective control over the legislative process 
and most importantly over the Council of Ministers. 
The Single European Act 1986: The co-operation procedure 
The Single European Act 1986 (SEA) is the beginning of a process which culminated 
in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Though the SEA was primarily 
concerned with establishing the legal framework of the of the Single European Market it 
did also address other criticisms - namely the charge that the European Community was 
an undemocratic organisation. 
Page - 162 
At the heart of this democratic deficit was the role of the institutions, and in 
particular, the position of the European Parliament. The European Parliament had been 
elected since 19795 however its powers had not changed in any significant way. In 
essence, it was still regarded as a mere assembly. The cooperation procedure was 
intended to remedy this by giving the European Parliament an input into the legislative 
process of the European Community. 
In any discussion relating to the scrutiny arrangements post Maastricht it is essential 
to begin with the SEA and the cooperation procedure. The reason for this is that the 
SEA can best be described as the foundation of the Maastricht Treaty. This is a process 
that was concluded at the 1997 Amsterdam Summit which devoped closer links between 
EU Member States. 
The Cooperation Procedure270 
The cooperation procedure gives the European Parliament an input into the 
legislative process. The Commission submits a proposal for legislation to the Council of 
Ministers, and at the same time seeks the opinion of the European Parliament on the 
proposal. The Council of Ministers will deliberate on the proposal, which will lead to 
the adoption of the common position. Prior to the adoption of the common position the 
Select Committee on European Legislation will conduct its scrutiny of the proposal 
(about which more is said in the next section). During this time the Scrutiny Reserve 
will operate and the UK minister cannot agree to the proposal except in special 
circumstances. 
Once the scrutiny round has been completed the minister can then cast his vote in the 
Council which by Qualified Majority Voting, will adopt the common position. At this 
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stage, the process moves to the floor of the European Parliament. The Parliament has 
three options open to it with regard the common position: -271 
(1) Approve or do nothing; 
(ii) Propose amendments to the common position; 
(iii) Reject the common position. 
As the above three options demonstrate, the avenues open to the European 
Parliament are quite limited. Most notably, the European Parliament is not involved in 
the formulation of the legislation and its role is essentially consultative. However, these 
three options do have a much greater impact on the domestic scrutiny arrangements 
within the House of Commons and in particular on the ability of the Select Committee 
to conduct effective scrutiny. 
Impact of the co-operation procedure on the Commons scrutiny process 
As was stated above, the Commons scrutiny process becomes active at the point 
before the Council adopts its common position. The document will, along with the 
government's Explanatory Memorandum, be submitted to the Select Committee. If the 
Committee are of the opinion that the document raises questions of "legal and political 
272 importance", they will then recommend debate of the proposal in one of the two 
European Standing Committees. 273 
Once the scrutiny of the common position is completed the document then goes to 
the European Parliament which then has the three options open to it. As far as domestic 
sci*utiny arrangements are concerned, options (1) and (iii) above pose least problem. If 
the European Parliament choose option (1), the Council of Ministers can then adopt the 
le(,, islativc proposal in accordance with the common position when they finally rneet. 
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Alternatively, if the proposal is rejected in line with option (iii), then the Council of 
Ministers may still adopt, by unanimity, the proposal or let it lapse. Either way. the 
original proposal has not changed. 
However, it is the proposal of amendments to the legislation in line with option (ii) 
by the European Parliament which causes most concern to the Select Committee on 
European Legislation. Following a proposal of amendments by the European 
Parliament the Commission will within one month re-examine the document and 
forward its views to the Council along with an opinion on the amendments which it has 
not accepted. 274 
The impact on the Commons scrutiny process is evident. The scrutiny round 
undertaken by the Select Committee has taken place prior to the adoption of the 
common position and most significantly before any amendments have been proposed by 
the European Parliament. Thus scrutiny has been conducted on the basis of the original 
document as published by the Commission and submitted to the Council. Therefore, any 
amendments proposed by the European Parliament will not automatically be subject to 
scrutiny by the House of Commons. 
The position is still complicated further by the options open to the Council of 
Ministers. It can, inter alia, adopt by unanimity the European Parliament amendments 
that were not accepted by the Commission. In effect, the Council can adopt a 
substantially different text from that originally proposed by the Commission. The one 
saving grace, is that unanimity is required for this to occur and thus a Member State 
does potentially have a veto. 
HoNN, cx, cr, even this is questionable for two reasons. First, the Member State holding 
the Presidency of the Council may be particularly enthusiastic on the amendments of the 
I`uropean Parliament and Nvill try to force them through. Under these circumstances, it 
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may be extremely difficult for a British minister to resist the amendments if the other 
fourteen ministers agree. Secondly, because the Council of Ministers meets behind 
closed doors,, it is highly likely that there will be some political horsetrading between 
ministers and the President of the Council to allow the amended proposal to go through. 
So where does this leave the Commons scrutiny process? There are two possibilities. 
First, prior to final adoption by the Council of Ministers of the amended proposal, the 
Select Committee may wish to re-examine this amended proposal. However, such a 
second round of scrutiny is difficult because of the limits of time and the quick moving 
process within the Council. 275 Alternatively, the Select Committee could do nothing 
and just allow the minister to accept the proposal. Ideally, the first option is to be 
preferred. However, a further scrutiny reserve is unlikely to be accepted by the 
Presidency if it is to mean a substantial delay in adoption, or if the Presidency of the 
Member State is coming to a conclusion. The net result is that the scrutiny process 
suffers and by implication so does accountability of the executive, which in the UK is 
the cornerstone of Parliamentary democracy. 
It is apparent therefore that the cooperation procedure works independently of 
scrutiny arrangements within the House of Commons. It is this fact that contributes 
most to making the procedure one which is very difficult to follow. However, despite 
the difficulties with the cooperation procedure, Member States still felt that further 
reform was needed. Perhaps most significantly, charges of a democratic deficit had not 
subsided. Thus it was felt that by increasing the role of the European Parliament in the 
legislative process could the European Community become more accountable. Though 
the jury is still out as to the success of these changes, their potential impact on the 
House of Commons and its scrutiny arrangements can already been identified. 
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The Maastricht Treaty276 
The Maastricht Treaty which was so painstakingly negotiated in December 1991 in 
the town that lends its name to the Treaty came into force on November 1 1993. Within 
the United Kingdom, the implementation of the Treaty was anything but a straight 
forward process. The government's Parliamentary majority being only 19 meant that its 
rebellious backbenchers nearly scuppered the whole Treaty and brought down the 
government in the process. The Treaty only became part of United Kingdom law when 
the government tied the fate of the Treaty to its own by putting forward a vote of 
confidence which its backbenchers, mindful of the governments ever increasing 
unpopularity, had no alternative but to support. Anything else would have led to the fall 
of the government - the proverbial turkeys voting for Christmas! 
The Maastricht Treaty made a number of significant changes to the institutional 
framework of what is now called the European Union. From the scrutiny perspective, 
the two most important changes are the introduction of the co-decision procedure, which 
gives a much greater legislative role to the European Parliament, and the establishment 
of the inter-governmental pillars on Foreign and Security Policy and on Justice and 
Home Affairs. In the proceeding sections, the impact of these developments on the 
scrutiny procedures in the House of Commons will be examined, concentrating on how 
they have affected the ability of Parliament to control the executive. 
The Co-decision Procedure277 
The co-decision procedure is set out in Article 189b Treaty on European Union. 
Broadly speaking, it is based upon the pre-Maastricht cooperation procedure described 
aboN, c. 278 The principle airn of the co-decision process is to address the democratic 
deficit still prevalent in the European Community despite direct elections to the 
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European Parliament and the introduction of the cooperation procedure in the Single 
European Act. The co-decision process aims to do this by enhancing still further the 
powers of the European Parliament in the legislative process, whilst also limiting the 
role of the unelected Commission. 
279 The co-decision procedure operates in parallel with the cooperation procedure, 
but most importantly contains one extra stage. Whereas under the cooperation procedure 
the Council of Ministers will let lapse a proposal amended by the European Parliament 
which it did not approve of, under the co-decision procedure, if the Council does not 
approve the amended text, the Conciliation Committee is convened. This extra step is 
referred to as the "Third Reading" stage. 
The Role o the Conciliation Committee280 )f 
The Conciliation Committee as its name suggests attempts to reach a compromise 
between the Council and the European Parliament when there is disagreement on the 
substance of a legislative proposal. The end result of the Conciliation Committee is for 
the Council and Parliament to agree a joint text. The Conciliation Committee itself is 
comprised of fifteen representatives of the Council and an equal number from the 
European Parliament. When the Committee meets, the Council of Ministers acts by 
qualified majority and the European Parliament by simple majority when a vote is taken 
on the joint text. 
As stated above, the principal aim of the Conciliation Committee is to reach a 
compromise on the proposed text within a six week period. Article 189b of the Treaty 
on European Union provides: -281 
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(5) If within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation Committee 
approves a joint text, the European Parliament, acting by an absolute 
majority of the votes cast and the Council acting by a qualified majority, 
shall have a period of six weeks from that approval in which to adopt the act 
in question in accordance with the joint text. If one of the two institutions 
fails to approve the proposed act, it shall be deemed not to have been 
adopted. 
(6) Where the Conciliation Committee does not approve a joint text, the 
proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted unless the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority within six weeks of expiry of the period 
granted to the Conciliation Committee, confirms the common position to 
which it agreed before the conciliation procedure was initiated, possibly 
with amendments proposed by the European Parliament. In this case the act 
in question shall be finally adopted unless the European Parliament,, within 
six weeks of the date of confirmation by the Council, rejects the text by an 
absolute majority of its component members, in which case the proposed act 
shall be deemed not to have been adopted. " 
As (6) above illustrates, the Council may act unilaterally in the event of failure by the 
Conciliation Committee to reach a compromise by resurrecting the original common 
position.. This gives the Council greater power in that only it can revive a proposal if 
the Conciliation Committee fails to agree a joint text, but this power is checked by the 
European Parliament which still has to approve this course of action. What this 
illustrates is that there is the beginnings of system of checks and balances within the 
European Community, even though this system is rather cumbersome. Thus the 
democratic deficit has been partially addressed. 
Despite this major shift in the functioning of the European Community, the co- 
decision procedure has been subject to criticism from both sides of the European debate. 
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Those who the media refer to as " Euro sceptics" view this change as the first step to a 
ý, 'uropean Superstate wIth the European Parliament taking over as the sole legIslatIve 
body. Their primary fear is that the Westminster Parliament may degenerate into no 
more than a than a mere local authority, Parliamentary sovereignty being confined to the 
pages of history. For such Europsceptics, this is the biggest challenge facing the United 
Kingdom today - how can Parliament maintain its position as the supreme legislative 
body? 
However,, for pro-Europeans the changes at Maastricht are considered a missed 
opportunity. Most significantly, they feel that the occasion was not grasped to bring full 
accountability to the European Community. That is to say, the subjecting of the 
unelected Commission and the secretive Council of Minsters to the popular control of 
the European Parliament. In effect their argument is based on the European Parliament 
becoming the legislative body in a Federal Europe with the other institutions being 
under the Parliaments control. 
The reality though is wholly different. In fact all that was achieved at Maastricht was 
a political compromise in the true European sense. That is, the Member States accepted 
the charge of the European Community being undemocratic but, for domestic political 
reasons, were reluctant for their national Parliaments to be completely removed from the 
legislative process. Countries such as the United Kingdom and Denmark which have 
developed scrutiny procedures, knew that their national Parliaments would not 
countenance any reduction in their scrutiny activities. Thus, with the introduction of the 
co-decision procedure, a legislative process has been introduced which is cumbersome, 
complicated and most importantly from a scrutiny perspective, difficult to monitor. 
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House of Commons Scrutiny of the Co-decision Procedure 
The primary difficulty experienced by the Select Committee in its attempt to 
scrutinise legislative proposals being introduced under the co-decision procedure is that 
the time frame used by the Select Committee and the one within which the institutions 
of the European Community work do not readily correspond. To a great extent, this is a 
problem which has been faced by the Select Committee during the last twenty three 
years. 
The Flow of information 
One of the distinctive features of the co-decision process is the rapidity with which 
decisions may be reached once a joint text is agreed. For scrutiny to be effective, it is 
essential that the government responds promptly to the needs of the Select Committee 
by making information about the proposal available. The Select Committee in its report 
"Scrutiny after Maastricht"282 made this very observation: 283 
"The scrutiny process is designed to give the House an opportunity to 
influence Ministers before they participate in Council decision making. A 
legislative proposal or other document caught by Standing Order 127(l) is 
deposited in the House .... In respect of each 
deposited document the 
Government prepares an Explanatory Memorandum reporting on aspects 
such as legal base, subsidiarity, financial implications and timetable, and 
setting out its policy towards the proposal. " 
In essence what the Select Committee is saying is that its objectives when 
scrutinising proposals under the co-decision process are exactly the same as before. The 
central element of scrutiny is to influence the minister and this can only be done by the 
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government supplying all the necessary information. The European Secretariat wIthin 
the Cabinet Office which is responsible for the provision of all government documents 
to the Select Committee performs its task admirably in what can best be described as 
difficult circumstances. In conversation284 with two civil servants at the European 
Secretariat the point was stressed that the government is not always to blame for the 
non-delivery of information. The government, they pointed out, must wait on both the 
European Parliament to propose amendments and the Commission to deliver opinions 
on these amendments before this information can be supplied to the Select Committee. 
If this is delayed it will inevitably cause a ripple effect. In the meantime though, events 
will move on and the Council may reach opinions on the amendments long before the 
Commission does. Only once Commission opinions are given to the Council, will the 
minister then present these to the European Secretariat who will inform the Select 
Committee who in turn will conduct their scrutiny. 
However,, the complication is if the Council has refused to include the amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament. If this occurs, the Conciliation Committee will be 
convened. Though it has six weeks to arrive at a compromise, it is likely to do so only in 
a matter of days. Thus scrutiny by the Select Committee is squeezed. Whilst it may be 
considering the European Parliament amendments and Commission opinions, the 
Conciliation Committee will in fact be agreeing a text that is wholly different. Thus 
scrutiny has been pointless. This is because the govermuent has controversially refused 
to extend the Resolution of the House to cover the Conciliation Committee stage. This 
issue is dealt with further on page 176 below. 
This is the other major difficulty now facing the Select Committee - the increase in 
the role of the European Parliament. The heart of the problem is that though the 
European Parliament may propose one set of amendments to the proposal which the 
Select Committee may scrutinise (time permitting of course), the Conciliation 
Committce may then agree a rcv1sed set. In practice therefore, the Select Committee can 
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not be confident that the amendments it has received from the European Parliament will 
be the final word. 285 
As can be seen, it is the flow of information to the Select Committee that allows the 
scrutiny process to function. In its report "Scrutiny after Maastricht", the Select 
Committee raised several important issues which it viewed as central to the maintenance 
of effective scrutiny procedures. At the heart of these, were the concerns about the 
increased role of the European Parliament and the effect this will have on scrutiny. In 
particular, the Select Committee were anxious to safeguard the value of the Explanatory 
Memorandum - the starting point of scrutiny. In situations where there is some deviation 
from the original proposal, the Select Committee recommended the following. -286 
1. If the European Parliament proposes amendments to the common 
position, the amended text plus the Commission opinion should be 
deposited. This should be done by means of an EM 
2. If the Council does not approve the European Parliament's amendments 
then the Select Committee should be informed by means of an EM 
3. If the Conciliation Committee approves a joint text, then the text should 
be deposited and an EM submitted. 
4. If the Conciliation Committee fails to approve a joint text then the Select 
Committee should be informed of the position by a supplementary EM 
The Select Committee in understanding the importance of EM's argues quite 
forcefully for their continuation during all stages of the co-decision process. In 
particular they are fighting to maintain the influence which the Select Committee has 
over the minister. 
e 
Page - 173 
The government's response 
The government provided its response to the report "Scrutiny after Maastricht" as 
part of the Select Committee's report entitled "Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Co- 
decision Procedure". 287 The response of the goverment can at best be described as 
lukewarm to the four principal recommendations given above. 
In particular, in the situations of 2 and 4 above, the government suggested that only a 
brief letter from the minister should be sent informing the Select Committee and not an 
EM as suggested. 288 However, this may not be the most appropriate method especially 
if the Council has changed its common position substantially in the light of stages 2 or 4 
above. Following 2 above, the proposal will go to the Conciliation Committee who are 
likely to agree a substantially different text. Similarly, following 4, the Council may still 
adopt the proposal and incorporate some of the European Parliament amendments. 
In either situation, there is a change from the original common position. Thus, an 
explanation of these changes will require more detailed information than can possibly 
be contained in a brief letter. Furthermore, an EM could give the Select Committee an 
up-to-date report of the Council negotiations, including, most importantly, the 
government's position regarding the European Parliament's amendments. 
Though the government is right to argue that a letter can be despatched more quickly 
than an EM, 289 it will not be as thorough. Surely, effective scrutiny should not be 
sacrificed to ensure arbitrary deadlines are met? That is to say, the government should 
give the House of Commons both the time and information needed to complete its 
scrutiny functions. As this scrutiny will be focussed on the amendments that have been 
adopted by the Conciliation Committee, it is unlikely to be a lengthy operation. 
However, exeii if it did require additional time this should be given to the Select 
Committee. Difficult choices need to be made. If the government are serious about 
Page - 174 
scrutiny then they should be not only prepared to accommodate it, but also defend the 
right of our Parliament to conduct it. After all, this would be in keeping with both the 
spirit and the wording of the Maastricht Dec aration. 
The Resolution of the House and the Co-decision Procedure 
When the work of the Select Committee on European Legislation was discussed in 
Chapter 3, the importance of the Resolution of the House of 24 October 1990 was 
stressed. It was referred to as the "cornerstone" of the scrutiny process by restraining a 
minister from giving agreement in the Council until the scrutiny process is completed. 
In the report "Scrutiny after Maastricht", the Select Committee recommended the 
extension of the Resolution to cover what it referred to as the "crucial stages,, 290 of the 
co-decision process. By this it meant not only the stage at which the European 
Parliament proposes amendments, but also the third reading stage - i. e. the involvement 
of the Conciliation Committee. To accommodate this, the Select Committee suggested 
an amendment to the Resolution. It proposed paragraph (2) of the Resolution read as 
follows: -291 
"In this Resolution, any reference to agreement to a proposal includes: - 
(a) in the case of a proposal on which the Council acts in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 189b of the Treaty of Rome (co- 
decision), agreement to a common position, to a joint text, and to 
confirmation of the common position (with or without amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament); and 
(b) in the case of a proposal on which the Council acts in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 189c of the Treaty of Rome (co- 
operation). agreement to a common position. " 
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Such an extension is not only logical but also desirable. In particular, it will make 
formal the relationship between the Select Committee and the executive which in terms 
of scrutiny has changed substantially post Maastricht. Also, it will bring the House of 
Commons into line with the Maastricht Declaration which encourages the involvement 
of national parliaments in the scrutiny process. The Declaration which it must be 
reiterated that the UK goverment insisted on being included. So what has been the UK 
government's view to this extension of the resolution? Sadly, but perhaps predictably it 
has been unenthusiastic. 
The government's opinion 
The Leader of the House, the Right Honourable Tony Newton MP, provoked most 
controversy in his response to the Select Committees proposal of extending the 
Resolution of the House. He was prepared to extend the Resolution to cover the 
amendments proposed by the European Parliament. This is logical and desirable if the 
House of Commons is to continue to exert influence over the minister and ensure 
effective scrutiny. Though the evidence suggests292 that waiting for European 
Parliament amendments and Commission opinions on those amendments may be a 
lengthy process, the government to their credit have kept to the limits of the Resolution 
and delayed giving agreement in Council until scrutiny is completed. 
However, this is not as promising as it may initially appear. The reason given for this 
is that though the Resolution of the House covers the stage up to and including the 
scrutiny of European Parliament amendments, the government have not permitted its 
extension to cover the stages that begin with the convening of the Conciliation 
Committee. This is hiý, hlv perplexing, because the scrutiny up to this point will now be 
potentially worthless. If the Conciliation Committee needs to be convened and approves 
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a joint text substantially different to that which was based on the common position and 
European Parliament amendments, the Select Committee will find it difficult to 
scrutinise this joint text. This will be due primarily to a lack of time. In essence, this 
author's argument is one that extending the Resolution only part of the way is 
fundamentally flawed. In practice it can mean that the Select Committee has wasted its 
valuable time. 
The government based its reasoning on the fact that once the joint text is agreed no 
further amendment is permitted to it. At this juncture, the Council can only accept or 
reject it. The Leader of the House stated rather optimistically that: -293 
"... it is very unlikely that the Council will then decide to throw away all 
this hard work. " 
The Leader of the House then continues his observations by stating that once the 
joint text is agreed there will be very little time before final agreement in the Council to 
allow for a further round of scrutiny. In particular he stresses that other Member States 
would not be willing to tolerate any further delay to allow the United Kingdom 
Parliament to complete scrutiny: -294 
"... it will often be impossible to operate a scrutiny reserve; other Member 
States will not countenance a delay of weeks in ratification to accommodate 
a United Kingdom reserve. " 
The response to this is that if the government has followed the limits of the 
Resolution to this stage, any further scrutiny will not be lengthy. It will concentrate 
exclusively on the changes to the common position and the amendments proposed by 
the European Parliament. Thus if the government has acted with propriety, the Select 
Committee's task will be relatively brief 
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However, there is a much stronger argument for extending the Resolution, and one 
which exposes a contradiction in the policy of the UK government to the whole issue of 
scrutiny. The government continually stresses the importance of national parliaments in 
the European legislative process. At the time of the Maastricht negotiations the 
government believed one of its many successes to be the inclusion of the Declaration 
which was intended to enhance the role of national parliaments. If the government were 
as fully committed to this as they claim to be, the Leader of the House would not be 
making such negative remarks. Surely, it would appear to make sense that once a text 
has been approved by the Conciliation Committee, every national parliament and not 
just that of the United Kingdom would want to take an interest in the amended proposal. 
If the Declaration is to have any credibility then the Council should wait until all 
national parliaments have completed their scrutiny. If this is not permitted all that will 
happen is that one democratic deficit will be replaced by another. 
House of Commons Scrutiny of the Inter-Govern mental Pillars295 
"The opportunity for greater openness and democracy offered by the last 
Inter-Governmental conference was squandered. It is a sad paradox that, 
when the democratic deficit was so widely recognised, the Maastricht Treaty 
should have introduced two areas of inter-governmental cooperation more 
effectively insulated from democratic control and accountability than almost 
anything in the existing Treaties. "296 
The two new inter-governmental pillars created by the Maastricht Treaty are intended 
to develop inter-governmeiital cooperation between Member States. In addition to the 
European Community (the central pillar), there are two "flanking pillars" whose 
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rom the central pillar. objectives are quite distinct and separate fI The second pillar is 
intended to develop closer political cooperation by means of a "common foreign and 
security policy" and the third pillar closer cooperation in the field of "justice and home 
affairs". The aims of the two new Pillars will now be briefly examined. 
Common Foreign and Security Pillar (CFSp)297 
The aim of this pillar is to increase political cooperation between the Member States 
by forming what will in effect be a single foreign policy for the European Union. Article 
J. 1.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets out the primary objectives. Taken as a 
whole these objectives reflect the ambition of the European Union to become a more 
self sufficient organisation in this area and more independent of United States influence. 
This is a reaction to the post cold war situation and the removal of American forces 
from Europe. In particular, some Member States see this as the first step towards a 
common defence policy. 
Under the CFSP a majority of the documents will be non-legislative and short term 
and will thus not require domestic legislation. Furthermore, a characteristic of 
documents under this pillar will be that they remain confidential until final agreement 
has taken place. Although the government has pledged to present all texts of CFSP 
statements, declarations, common positions and joint actions once they are agreed, it 
does not consider it appropriate in the vast majority of cases to lay drafts of CFSP texts 
before Parliament. The reason given by the governirnent is one based on maximising its 
negotiating strength in the Council by not showing its hand until it absolutely has to. 
For a similar reason it has rejected extending the scrutiny reserve to cover CFSP texts 
arguing that once a proposal is agreed there will be little or no time before final 
approval. This will mean that there can be no wait for Parliament to conduct its 
scrutiny. "98 
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The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Pillar299 
Under this third pillar Member States are developing cooperation in what Article K. I 
defines as "matters of common interest". This includes policy areas which up to now 
have been traditionally within the domestic sphere e. g. asylum policy, immigration 
policy and external border controls. In addition there is new cooperation to combat inter 
alia organised crime and drug-trafficking. 
As far as the JHA pillar is concerned, the government has taken a more flexible 
approach to the provision of documents. The Home Secretary has offered to provide the 
first full text of any convention or proposal which would if agreed require later primary 
legislation in the United Kingdom and of other documents of significant importance 
subject to possible security or operational exceptions which would only be used "where 
absolutely necessary" 
The primary reason for this more flexible approach is based on the less sensitive 
nature of the subject matter being discussed under this pillar. Proposals will not be 
concerned with diplomatic and military secrets. However, the Home Secretary's 
proposal for provision of documents only covers situations when primary legislation 
will be required and not when the convention or proposal will be implemented by 
secondary legislation. This is a discrepancy which has been questioned by both the 
House of Commons and House of Lords. 
'00 
P. -: I(, c - 180 
The initial experience 
Scrutiny of the inter-governmental pillars got off to a slow start. As with any iiew 
procedure, the Select Committee needed to find its parameters. At the outset, the 
Commons was influenced quite substantially by developments in the House of Lords 
which had already conducted a major inquiry into how the pillars could be effectively 
scrutinised. The Select Committee on European Legislation in the House of Commons 
noted that new procedures would be needed in this House when it published its report 
"Scrutiny after Maastricht" in 1993. However, in 1996 there are still no formal 
procedures within the Commons despite the increased activity under the pillars. In fact, 
the government has hailed as a success inter-governmental cooperation under the pillars 
301 in its White Paper on the lGC called "A Partnership of Nations". 
It is apparent therefore that activity under the pillars will grow and is likely to be 
extended following the IGC. As a result, this will become a growing part of the United 
Kingdom's domestic and foreign policy which will undoubtedly impose constraints 
upon the government. This must be subject to democratic control. The European 
Parliament has only a peripheral role under the pillars with the majority of the work 
being left to the Commission and Council of Ministers. In this case, the argument for 
effective scrutiny by all national parliaments of activity under the pillars is irresistible. 
The quotation from the Select Committee given at the start of this section reflects this 
increasing isolation that the Committee is feeling with regards European Union 
legislation. The evidence from the Select Committee contradicts the Maastricht 
Declaration. The United Kingdom Parliament is excluded from any effective influence 
iii the inter-gov, ci-nmental dccision making process. In the subsequent sections the 
arrmigements in the Commons desioned to redress this balance will be analysed. 
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Arrangements for Scrutiny of the Pillars in the House of Commona 
CFSP matters fall exclusively within the Terms of Reference of the Foreign Affairs 
Select Committee and the JHA is within the domain of the Home Affairs Committee. 
Both of these Select Committees have taken oral evidence from witnesses primarily as a 
means of monitoring developments under the Pillars. However up to September 1996, 
two years since the introduction of decision making under the Pillars, neither 
Committee has yet reported on a document. 
By contrast, the government has so far submitted approximately 30 JHA documents 
in draft. 302 Copies of these are sent to both the Scrutiny Committee and the Home 
Affairs Select Committee. However, the Terms of Reference of the Scrutiny Committee 
are limited to matters coming under the Community pillar and thus it cannot report on 
them or even formally consider them. As far as the CFSP is concerned, the government 
has not yet submitted any document before adoption. 303 
Both the Foreign Affairs and the Home Affairs Select Committees are Departmental 
Select Committees whose Primary task according to their Standing Orders is to examine 
"policy and expenditure" of the relevant department. In Chapter 5, there was a brief 
examination of how far these two Departmental Select Committees involved themselves 
in European issues. The following sections involve a more comprehensive analysis of 
the work each Committee does. 
The Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
This Committee is essentially concerned with policy developments in the European 
Union and in particular goveniment policy. There are no formal procedures for dealing 
with proposals tinder the CFSP Pillar, though the Committee is kept informed of 
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developments by means of documents from the Foreign Office. The primary reason for 
this concentration on policy issues is that the Committee simply does not have the time 
to carry out such inquiries into legislative proposals. Furthermore, as the evidence 
shows, there are as yet no CFSP documents that have been submitted to the Committee 
before adoption. Under these circumstances, scrutiny is not a primary consideration for 
the Committee. 
The Home Affairs Select Committee 
The Home Affairs Select Committee as its name suggests is not specifically 
concerned with European issues. However, it does have primary responsibility for 
scrutiny of proposals under the JHA Pillar. This is sensible in that such proposals will 
affect domestic policy and legislation which in the ordinary course would come within 
this Select Committee's remit. In addition,, the Home Office is the lead department in the 
Inter-Governmental negotiations and the Home Secretary the principle minister who 
attends the Council. 
As far as the procedures are concerned, the Select Committee itself has no formal 
process for dealing with such documents. The following however is an extract from a 
letter written to the author by the Clerk of the Home Affairs Select Committee outlining 
how the Committee functions on a weekly basis in this respect: -304 
"The Committee maintains monitoring of issues relating to Justice and 
Home Affairs matters within the European Union as a subject permanently 
on its agenda. In practice, this means that the Committee is kept informed 
by the f lome Office of significant proposals with copies of the more 
important initiatives being sent to the Committee Chairman and Clerk. 
These are made available to Members of the Committee. The Committee is 
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also sent a copy of the draft agenda for each Justice and Home Affairs 
Council, and a copy of any texts which have been agreed at a Council. 
The Committee sometimes asks for, and receives, special briefing on 
particular issues. Occasionally, oral evidence sessions are arranged with 
Home Office officials or Ministers, but the Committee in practice is unable 
to hold such sessions very frequently. " 
The Committee has not agreed any reports specifically on EU matters, 
but such issues are covered where relevant in other inquiries and reports 
made by the Committee (as for example, with Europol in the course of the 
Committee's inquiry into Organised Crime). 
The Home Affairs Committee appears therefore to undertake a more active role in 
the scrutiny of the relevant pillar than its Foreign Affairs counterpart. In particular it 
will include JHA proposals as part of an inquiry into a wider policy area and will 
endeavour to hold oral evidence sessions. The reason for this proactive approach can be 
traced to the fact that the government provides documents under the JHA Pillar more 
readily than under the CFSP Pillar. This is exclusively due to the less sensitive nature of 
the subject matter of these documents. It is logical therefore that unless a Select 
Committee receives the necessary documents no effective scrutiny can take place. 
Despite this more 'hands on' approach by the Home Affairs Select Committee, the 
procedures for scrutinising proposals under the Inter-Governmental Pillars in the House 
of Commons can only best be described as ad hoc. At worse they are ineffective. They 
are not on any formal footing - the Terms of Reference of these two Select Committees 
have not been amended. Neither does there appear to be any great enthusiasm for 
carryino out such scrutmv. especially by the Foreign affal I rs Select Committee. Under 
these circumstances theretorc. the argument for reviewing these procedures is now 
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overwhelming. In short the task of scrutiny of the Pillars should, in this author's opinion, 
be turned over to the Select Committee on European Legislation. 
Developing Scrutiny of the Inter-Govern mental Pillars 
"We believe that both inter-governmental pillars should now be brought 
formally within the House's European Scrutiny System.,, 305 
This view of the Select Committee on European Legislation in their report published 
on 18 July 1996 reflects the frustration felt by many in the House Commons that the 
inter-governmental pillars are not being subjected to the detailed scrutiny which is 
necessary. The only way this can be remedied is to bring the process within the remit of 
the Scrutiny Committee. This is logical for two reasons. Firstly, the Scrutiny Committee 
and the European Standing Committees will have more time to scrutinise these 
proposals which are both complex and detailed. Secondly, twenty-three years of 
experience and expertise in dealing with the European Community will be a beneficial 
factor. The Select Committee in the report put its argument thus: -306 
"We believe that the case for these changes is overwhelming. In the case 
of both pillars, a clear democratic deficit remains. Activity under them is of 
great significance to the United Kingdom, and is likely to assume greater 
importance in the future. The work already carried out by the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the Home Affairs Committee will no doubt continue; 
those Committees are independent and our recommendations are entirely 
without pre . judice 
to their work. What we wish to see is the extension to 
Pillars 2 and -33 of the system which now applies to the 
Community pillar, 
and siftingfor legal andpolitical importance 
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(my italics); rapid analysis and reporting, including seeking further evidence 
where necessary; a mechanism for debate on the most important proposals; 
and through the scrutiny reserve, a link between Parliamentary information 
and assent and Executive decision. We believe this would be welcomed in 
the House and more widely. " 
There is one aspect of the Committee's argument which does cause some concern. 
That is their contention that both Departmental Select Committees could continue their 
present functions. This may cause difficulty in that there is a potential risk of 
duplication which is an inefficient use of valuable Parliamentary time. This would 
require further consideration, with perhaps the Procedure Committee evaluating this in 
their current inquiry into the scrutiny process. 307 
The part of the above extract placed in italics represents the primary function of the 
Select Committee as it operates today. This is how the Committee would like to 
scrutinise proposals under the pillars - by concentrating on their legal and political 
importance. This is desirable as scrutiny of proposals under the pillars will essentially 
be concerned with their effect on existing UK legislation. It would also fill the vacuum 
which is left by the rather limited activity of the Departmental Select Committees in this 
area. The ball is now in the court of the government and their response is awaited to this 
report and these recommendations. This author strongly supports the Select Committee 
ii-i its aspirations. The government cannot be allowed to marginalise the Select 
Committee in what is an important area of European legislation. In this context, the 
author returns once again, with a rather depressing regularity, to the Maastricht 
Declaration. This cannot be ignored any longer in the way it is being at present. The 
current IGC must address the role of national parliaments in the European Union. Given 
the reluctance of many Member States, including the United Kingdom'308 to extend the 
powers of the European Parlian'ient to cover formal scrutinly of any legislative proposal. 
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national parliaments must be placed at the heart of the legislative process - and that 
means as guardians to ensure democratic accountability for decision making. 
The Select Committee's Terms ofReference 
At present the Terms of Reference do not permit the Select Committee to engage in 
any systematic scrutiny of proposals under the Pillars. The Standing Orders3O9 only 
provide for scrutiny of proposals coming forward under the European Community (the 
central pillar). Obviously therefore an amendment to the Standing Orders is essential. 
The Committee in its most recent report proposed the following paragraphs to be added 
to the Standing Orders: -3 
10 
" 127 (1) (c) The expression "European Union Documents" means- 
(iii) any proposal to define a common position or the joint action under Title 
V (Provisions on common foreign and security policy) of the Treaty on 
European Union which is prepared for submission to the Council and which 
is not confidential; 
(iv) any proposal for aJ oint position, joint action or a convention under Title 
VI (Provisions on co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs) of 
the Treaty on European Union which is prepared for submission to the 
Council and which is not confidential" 
These recommendations are designed to put the Pillars formally within the work of 
the Select Committee on European Legislation. During an oral evidence session the 
Leader of the House refused to be drawn on the issue of extending the Terms of 
Reference until the Committee produced its report and he had an opportunity to digest 
it. 1 It is difficult to speculate on this matter, but it is hoped that the government 
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accepts the recommendations in the form as presented by the Committee. They are not 
excessive and do not attempt to force the government to present documents which are 
sensitive or confidential. In fact they are broadly in line with the govermuents response 
to the House of Lords report "Scrutiny of the Inter-Governmental Pillars". 312 
Furthermore, the Committee are prepared to accept the confidentiality argument 
providing it is reasonable. They will accept an Explanatory Memorandum at a later 
stage giving reasons for the confidentiality and are prepared to have this included in 
their revised Standing Orders if necessary. 313 Thus the Committee are showing plenty 
of goodwill. They have accepted the limitations and will work within them. They now 
need to be given this opportunity. 
There will be no changes to the procedure before the 1997 General Election. Perhaps 
a new government (should there be a change) may be more sympathetic to a complete 
review of the entire scrutiny process. This is far more desirable than merely tinkering 
around at the edges. The Commons proposals do go further than what the House of 
Lords proposed some three years ago. This adds further weight to the argument of 
having a complete review of scrutiny arrangements in both Houses of Parliament. 
The Resolution of the House - The Scrutiny Reserve 
In Chapter 3 when the detailed work of the Select Committee on European 
Legislation was examined the fact was stressed that the Scrutiny Reserve is the 
cornerstone of the entire scrutiny process in both Houses of Parliament. At page 80 
above it has already been explained how after the introduction of the co-decision 
procedure the Scrutiny Reserve now has less of an impact. However, as far as scrutiny 
of the inter-governmental pillars is concerned,, the government are not prepared to 
extend it to cover the pillars. This position is identical to the one in the House of Lords. 
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The Select Committee is totally unimpressed by the government's refusal to extend 
the Scrutiny Reserve to cover the pillars and quite rightly so. 314 Failure to agree to this 
leaves the Committee in a very weak position. They cannot exercise their function of 
scrutinising the executive effectively. Together with the difficulties now encountered in 
scrutinising the co-decision procedure, it can be said that the introduction of the 
Maastricht Treaty has been primarily a negative development as far as the Select 
Committee is concerned. 
The issue of extending the Resolution to the Inter- Govern-mental Pillars will be dealt 
with in Chapter 10 following an examination of the work of the only specialist 
Committee in either House which scrutinises proposals under coming forward the 
Pillars. It must also be stressed here that as the House of Lords conducts the only 
detailed scrutiny of the pillars at present the examining of these issues within this 
context is more appropriate. However, where relevant reference to the procedure in the 
Commons will be made by highlighting any similarities or differences. 
Concluding remarks 
The Maastricht Treaty has definitely been a turning point for the European 
Community. The Community has now become a Union with a much wider field of 
competence. This has brought new challenges, not least for the national parliaments. 
Both co-decision and the pillars have successfully challenged the notion that Parliament 
is the sole legislative body in the UK. If anything these developments have merely 
confirmed what many have argued for some time - namely that a degree of legislative 
sovereWrity has been surrendered to the European Union. This in itself is not necessarily CN 
problematical. As members of the Union we must play by the rules of the club. The 
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issue is not one of whether the UK should be a member, but one of an acceptance of the 
fact that we are members and that as such we should play an active part. 
This is nowhere more true than in the area of involving national parliaments. Given 
the importance of scrutiny within Parliament, this is one area where the UK could and 
should be taking the lead. The scrutiny system as it stands in the UK is arguably one of 
the most comprehensive and developed within the Union. The author's experience over 
the last three years tells me this. However, this is not a reason for complacency. Post 
Maastricht there are still many important scrutiny issues to be resolved, yet Member 
States are already considering further developments at the current IGC. At the heart of 
these issues is the concept of accountability. 
Today, it is the co-decision procedure which operates independently of scrutiny 
arrangements in the House of Commons, that causes most difficulties for the Select 
Committee Though at first sight it may appear that under co-decision Parliament faces 
similar problems to those previously created by the cooperation procedure, there is one 
important difference. Under the cooperation procedure it is the Council of Ministers 
who have the final say about the proposal and it is for them to collectively decide 
whether the European Parliament amendments are to be accepted. 
Under co-decision however, the rules change somewhat. Here it is not readily 
apparent which institution has had the final word when the Conciliation Committee is 
convened. In particular it is difficult to ascertain which institution was the motivating 
force behind the joint text agreed. From a scrutiny perspective this is undesirable. The 
Select Committee can only exert control over the minister in the Council and not over 
the actions of the Europeaii Parliament. Furthermore, if the UK minister is outvoted 
when the Council approves the joint text by qualified majority, the House of Commons 
cannot hold him accountable for a document which he did not vote for because it was 
Page - 190 
fundamentally different from that originally scrutinised by the Commons (and based on 
the original common position) some months previously. 
The co-decision procedure does not fit in with the scrutiny arrangements in the 
House of Commons for two reasons. Firstly, from a practical point of view, though it is 
a lengthy and resource consuming process, it is also one that can come to a rapid 
conclusion once a joint text is agreed. This makes it difficult to monitor. Secondly from 
a political point of view. it means power is taken away from ministers and given to the 
European Parliament, which is not subject to House of Commons control. 
Thus co-decision together with the introduction of the Inter-Governmental Pillars has 
eroded further the ability of the House of Commons to hold accountable ministers who 
make legislation at a European level. This balance needs to be redressed and the 
Procedure Committee review will be a positive start to this process. Similarly the House 
of Lords with its unique modus operandi has a valuable contribution to make and this is 
examined in more detail in Chapter 10. However, whatever the final result it can be said 
with certainty that with the present institutional arrangements in the EU, full democracy 
can only be attained if national parliaments are encouraged to take their role of scrutiny 
seriously. This would be no more than is required by the Maastricht Treaty Declaration. 
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PART III - THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Introduction 
In chapters 7 to 11, the focus is upon the work of the House of Lords which flows 
from the UK's membership of the European Union. The starting point in this chapter 
will be a brief historical background into the scrutiny process in the House of Lords. 
This is then followed in chapter 8 by an assessment of the work of the Select Committee 
on the European Communities and in chapter 9 its various Sub-Committees. Throughout 
the course of chapter 9, a number of comparisons with the scrutiny arrangements in the 
House of Commons will be made. However, such a comparison, though important, is 
not the main consideration. The aim is to produce a comprehensive analysis of the work 
of the Select Committee itself, and illustrate that at present it plays a vital and arguably 
irreplaceable role in the scrutiny process. 
This latter point, will be illustrated when consideration is given as to how the 
scrutiny arrangements in the House of Lords would endure any reform of the second 
chamber (chapter 11). The central question of this discussion will be whether a reformed 
second chamber could continue its valuable role of scrutiny? This discussion is essential 
given the present political climate. In 1996, constitutional reform is at the heart of the 
agenda of both main opposition parties. Therefore, in these circumstances, the role the 
House of Lords plays today in the scrutiny process and what any reform could mean for 
this process, must be fully evaluated. 
The final aspect of this analysis (chapter 10) will concentrate on how the House of 
Lords has coped Nvitli the devc1opments post Maastricht. The primary focus will be an 
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evaluation of the arrangements for the scrutiny of legislation under the Inter- 
Governmental Pillars. This discussion will highlight the difference in approach taken 
towards this issue by the Lords and the House of Commons and will attempt to 
rationalise this difference. 
Historical Background 
The Maybray-King Report 315 
On the 20 December 1972, the House of Lords appointed a Select Committee under 
the Chairmanship of Lord Maybray-King (referred to as the Maybray-King Committee) 
to consider the most appropriate methods to introduce into the House of Lords for the 
scrutiny of European legislative proposals. The Select Committee on Procedure for 
Scrutiny of Proposals for European Instruments, as it was officially known, needed to 
work with some urgency as the United Kingdom accession to the European Community 
occurred on I January 1973. In their Report, 316 they noted that it was essential to set up 
effective procedures to scrutimse Community proposals and to do so as quickly as 
possible. 
The Maybray-King Committee had the following Terms of Reference: - 
"To consider procedures for scrutiny proposals for European Community 
Instruments. " 
In the production of its Report the Committee adopted a broad interpretation of its 
1-crms of Reference. They took the stance that their final recommendations should 
contain proposals tI or scrLitinisino all Community proposals while they are still at a 
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formative stage and before they are considered by the Council of Ministers. The point 
was not lost on Maybray-King that the only real influence the House of Lords could 
have was prior to a final decision being taken in the Council of Ministers. This is an 
identical conclusion to the Foster Committee in the House of Commons. 317 
The Maybray-King Report identified the following documents as being the prime 
objectives for scrutiny by the new Select Committee: -318 
(a) regulations, whether by the Council or Commission; 
(b) directives, whether by the Council or Commission; 
(c) decisions whether by the Council or Commission; 
(d) the Community budget; 
(c) Community Treaties to be made by the Council with third parties; 
(d) recommendations and opinions by the Council or the Commission; 
and 
(e) Commission memoranda concerning Community matters. 
The interesting point, mentioned only briefly at this juncture, is that though the 
1'erms of Reference for both Maybray-King and the Foster Committee were similar, the 
final recommendations for what type of Select Committees were to be established could 
not have been different. This in fact is a difference which has grown wider over the last 
twenty-three years. 
In forming their conclusions and recommendations, the Committee held 24 evidence 
sessions both in the House itself and in Brussels and Strasbourg and other European 
Community capitals. 319 The reason for this wide consultation lies in the fact the 
Committee tried to dra\\7 upon the experiences of other Member States and their 
approach to scrutiny. This Nvide consultation appears today to have borne fruit. It is 
readily accepted by both the Commission and European Parliament and the national 
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parliaments of other Member States. that the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities makes an outstanding contribution to the debate of European 
legislative proposals and European issues generally. The author has even received 
anecdotal evidence in the course of an interview with a Clerk to the European 
Communities Select Committee, that the former President of the Commission,, Monsieur 
Jacques Delors, read Reports produced by the House of Lords Select Committee in bed! 
The aims of the Maybray-King Committee 
In coming to its final conclusions as to what type of Select Committee should be 
established in the House of Lords, the Maybray-King Committee considered the 
following issues: -320 
(a) how and by whom proposals are made; 
(b) the number and degree of their importance; 
(c) who has the power of decision on them; and 
(d) at what point Parliamentary influence can best be brought to bear. 
Implicit in these questions is an acceptance by the Committee that the final proposals 
will at best be a compromise. Question (d) above addresses the issue which twenty-three 
years on still troubles both the Lords and Commons Select Committees. Trying to 
influence a process over which you have very little effective control is an impracticable 
notion. The fact that the Committee posed the question as how influence can best be 
brought to bear suggests that the final proposals will be a compromise. The best option 
is not necessarily the most desirable option. This is apparent today even more so than in 
19731. With the rapid increase in the use of Qualified Majority Voting by the Council of 
Ministers and the extension of the role of the European Parliament via the Co-decision 
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procedure it can be strongly argued that Parliamentary influence of the minster is in 
decline. A decline which inany have suggested is in fact terminal. 
The Maybray-King Committee like its Commons counterpart, the Foster Committee, 
recommended that the most appropriate form of influence will be to inform the minister 
of Parliaments opinion prior to him or her giving final approval in the Council of 
Ministers. However, of dismay to the Committee was the fact that the House of Lords 
would have no formal control over the Commission, the institution whose function it is 
to make legislative proposals. There is no relationship between any national parliament 
and the Commission. The only parliament to which the Commission responds is the 
European Parliament. This was a difficult point to accept by the Committee, coming as 
it did from a parliamentary tradition where accountability and scrutiny were the 
cornerstones of its work. The fact that this was not the case in European affairs, 
especially when at that time an unelected Parliament 'controlled' an unelected 
Commission, caused consternation among peers. 321 Sir Nicholas Soames who was 
Vice-President of the Commission at the time gave the following justification of this 
position to the Maybray-King Committee: _322 
11 as far as the Commission is concerned, it has one Parliament to be 
served and that is the European Parliament. We cannot have nine 
Parliamentary masters. " 
Over the years, informal links have developed between the House of Lords and the 
Commission. However, this arrangement, though a positive step forward, is still 
regarded as unsatisfactory. The influence of the Commission has certainly grown in the 
intervening twenty-three year period since the UK joined what was then known as the 
European Economic Communitý, (EEC). Today it acts as external negotiator in areas 
such as trade and environii-iental n'latters as well as having powers of delegated 
le(gislation from the Council. The author therefore shares the view of many peers and 
MPs N\-Iio belicvc that the Commission should be subject to direct scrutiny by national 
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parliaments in each Member State. This would significantly reduce the democratic 
deficit still prevalent within the EU today. 
Proposals for the Select Committee 
Appointing a Select Committee 
Having concluded a very wide and informative investigation into the issues, the 
Maybray-King Committee made a number of recommendations which they thought 
would be essential to the establishment of an effective scrutiny procedure in the House 
of Lords. In fact, what they recommended in 1973 has stood the test of time remarkably 
well. 
The initial and perhaps most important recommendation was that European 
Community affairs would be scrutinised via a Select Committee and not a Standing 
Committee. They came to this conclusion because they saw this as being the most 
appropriate vehicle for preparing in-depth and comprehensive reports which could then 
be debated by the House generally. Furthermore, this Select Committee would fit into 
the overall structure of the Lords which regularly appointed Select Committees to carry 
out a variety of inquiries. 
During its investigation and deliberations, the Maybray-King Committee was 
extremely mindful of the fact that the one thing it did not want to recommend was a 
mirror image of the House of Commons Select Committee. In an interview with MR 
Michael Pownall. a former Clerk to the Select Committee on the European Committees, 
lie stressed the importance of avoiding duplication between the two Select 
-1 1ý 
Committees. " He in fact described the duplication of work in a calamitous manner by 
Page - 198 
referring to it as "disastrous". The purpose of these two different Committees. he 
believes, is to create a "complementary scrutiny system" with an exchange of 
information between them. 
The most apparent way of avoiding this problem was to adopt a completely different 
internal structure for the Select Committee. With this in mind, they concluded that the 
most suitable proposal would be for the establishment of a number of Sub-Committees 
within the Select Committee itself. The justification for this is rooted in one of the most 
persuasive arguments for not reforming the House of Lords. That is that the House of 
Lords contains many experts who have the time to meticulously examine legislative 
proposals in detail. The Maybray-King Committee made the observation, that these 
Sub-Committees could be staffed by peers who have expertise and wide experience of. - 
324 
(a) a wide number of subjects; 
(b) the parts and regions of the United Kingdom; and 
(c) Community affairs and UK law. 
The House of Lords set its stall out right from the start. Scrutiny of legislative 
proposals was the main task of this new Select Committee. But, this would be done in 
the context of examining the wider issues of policy and the merits of that policy. This 
i-ecommendation goes to the heart of the difference between the Commons and Lords 
Select Committees. The proposal of these Sub-Committees (which was accepted by the 
(Yovernment) explicitly illustrates that the House of Lords Committee was intending to 
work to a much longer horizon than its House of Commons counterpart. The 
recommendation of six Sub-Committees covering all the major policy areas of the EEC 
meant that the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities would 
have much morc of an inquisitorial function. 
Paoc - 199 r-- 
Finally, Maybray-King recommended that the Select Committee was to have the 
usual powers to send for persons and papers, which would allow it to examine ministers, 
officials and experts in the manner of the House of Commons Committee. They also 
proposed that specialist advisers should become an integral part of the Sub-Committees. 
This was logical given the narrow policy areas they would consider and with which they 
may need assistance. All these issues will be considered in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
Select Committees in the House of Lords 
Before considering the detailed work of the Select Committee on European 
Legislation it is necessary to examine the context within which scrutiny takes place in 
the House of Lords. Most important is the fact that there is no system of Departmental 
Select Committees as are found in the House of Commons. Thus,, all European issues 
are considered by the European Communities Select Committee. This places a large 
burden upon the Committee because unlike the Commons there is no division between 
the scrutiny of European Legislation (the Scrutiny Committee) and the consideration of 
European policy generally (the Foreign Affairs Select Committee). 
Furthermore, Select Committees in the House of Lords are predominantly appointed 
on an ad hoc basis. Along with the European Communities Select Committee, the only 
other permanent Committee is the Science and Technology Select Committee. 
'I'licrefore, the House of Lords is more flexible in its review of government activity. 
These investigative Committees conduct more wide ranging and in depth inquiries 
which are often not based on miy specific government policy or legislative proposal. 
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Thus it is within this context that the European Communities Committee operates. It 
is the most active Committee in the House of Lords, producing on average 20-25 reports 
per year. These reports on the whole have proved influential both at a national and 
European level. 
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CHAPTER8 
THE WORK OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES325 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the analysis focuses on the work and working methods of the Select 
Committee on the European Communities. At this juncture, however, the specific 
concern is with the Select Committee itself and not with the five Sub-Committees which 
are appointed by it. These will be the subject of a closer analysis in the next chapter. 
Chapter 7, outlined the historical background to the establishment of a Select 
Committee in the House of Lords and the difficult task the Maybray-King Committee 
faced in devising a scrutiny system that will be both relevant and effective. In particular, 
this meant that the Select Committee would fulfil the essential function of scrutiny and, 
perhaps just as important, act as an advisory body that would consider future trends in 
the European development. In short, the Lords Committee had to fill a gap which the 
House of Commons Committee for a variety of reasons simply could not. 
To examine its success or otherwise in performing these functions it is desirable to 
start with an appraisal of the task which the Select Committee has been asked to carry 
out on behalf of the whole House. Inevitably, this means an analysis of the Standing 
Orders of the Committee which set out its Terms of Reference. 
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The Terms of Reference 
In the Second Report from the Select Committee on Procedures for Scrutiny of 
Proposals for European Instruments, 326 the Committee recommended that the new 
European Communities Select Committee should have the following Terms of 
Reference: - 
"To consider Community proposals whether in draft or otherwise, to 
obtain all necessary information about them, and to make reports on those 
which in the opinion of the Committee, raise important questions of policy 
or principle, and on other questions to which the Committee consider that 
the special attention of the House should be drawn. " 
The first comment on these Terms of Reference is that they are extremely wide and 
thus give the Select Committee great scope for conducting enquiries. 327 This is 
facilitated by the appointment of the aforementioned sub-committees. Out of this 
arrangement, the Committee produces on average 25 reports each year, many of which 
are extremely lengthy and highly detailed. The reports are regularly based on obtaining 
evidence from a wide variety of interested parties as well as government officials and 
ministers. 
At first sight, the Terms of Reference of the Select Committee on the European 
Communities may appear similar to those of its House of Commons counterpart. 
However, on closer analysis this is most definitely not the case. Firstly, the names of 
the Select Committees illustrates clearly the difference between the two. As stated, in 
the Lords it is referred to as the 'Select Committee on the European Communities'. This 
gives the impression that it is not merely a Select Committee whose sole task it is to 
*. (11 scrutinise European legislatiNýc proposals. However, that is not to say that this scrutiny 
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role is not an important function of the Committee, and this issue -will be examined 
further in subsequent paragraphs. 
Remit of the Select Committee 
The most significant aspect of the Terms of Reference is in the words "other 
questions to which the Committee consider that the special attention of the House 
should be drawn". This remit of the Committee opens the doors for it to conduct wide 
ranging enquiries into issues that are not related to any specific legislative proposal. 
These freestanding enquiries are often into Green and White Papers published by the 
Commission. For example, in 1992, the Select Committee produced a comprehensive 
and thought provoking report on the complex issue of Enlargement of the EU. 328 
Another example of this can be seen in the highly influential report on Fraud and 
Financial Mismanagement in the European Community. 329 Most recently the Select 
Committee has completed an inquiry into the 1996 Inter- Governmental Conference. 
What the production of this type of report illustrates is that the Select Committee on 
the European Communities has a much greater freedom to investigate wider issues, that 
are not related to legislative proposals. These Reports, are an in-depth evaluation of 
government or Community policy in a particular area, or an investigation into the merits 
of a legislative proposal. 
330 In his lecture to the European Institute of Public Administration, Mr Michael 
Pownall illustrated quite succinctly how wide these Terms of Reference really are. He 
made two crucial observations. 331 His first point was that the Terms of Reference 
permitted the Committee to consider draft texts under the two new Inter-governmental 
i important because the passage of Pillars, without the need for ai-iv amendments. This is " 
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legislation under the Pillars created a new legal process which is technically outside the 
competence of the EC. 
Therefore, by having this wide interpretation, the House of Lords Committee has 
avoided the problem encountered by the Commons Select Committee. Because the 
Commons Committee is charged with the scrutiny of "European Community 
Documents", 332 proposals under the Pillars are not presently within their remit. Thus, 
the Lords Committee being able to consider "other questions" has removed the 
complication faced by the House of Commons. The Lords have already conducted 
major Pillars inquiries e. g. EUROPOL., 333 whereas the House of Commons is still 
trying to develop a comprehensive scrutiny procedure. 
The second point made by Mr Pownall was that the Select Committee on the 
European Communities could consider proposals made by the Agreement of the Eleven 
(now Fourteen). This is legislation coming forward under the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty, to which the United Kingdom has secured a controversial "opt-out". 
Though these are legislative proposals which at present have no legal impact in the 
United Kingdom, the Committee can still consider them as part of a wider inquiry. 
In either of the two cases above, he said that if the government were uncooperative in 
the provision of a text, so that they could not pursue their inquiry, he as the Clerk would 
simply obtain the proposals from the Official Journal, and scrutiny would proceed on 
this basis. 
A re the Terms of Reference too wide? 
As can be see from the discussion above, the role of the Select Committee on the 
European Communities covers more than just the procedural task of scrutiny of 
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legislative proposals. This 'free' role it has, is considered by many commentators3-34 
(including this author) as the sti-ongest aspect of the entire scrutiny system in both 
Houses. Professor St J. N. Bates. identified the Committee as providing "an interesting 
example of the development of approach and influence of a Select Committee over a ten 
year period. " 
Perhaps the most telling observation about the Committee and the one which most 
illustrates its value can be seen in a comment made by Donald Shell in his chapter on 
the work of the European Communities Committee published in "The New Select 
Committees". 335 He describes the Committee as: -336 
II specifically proactive rather than simply reactive in its approach" 
This summarises succinctly the main difference between the respective Committees 
in the House of Commons and House of Lords. In Chapter Three on the work of the 
Select Committee on European Legislation the Commons Committee was described as 
being essentially 'reactive' (see p. 62 above). That is, it responds to the agenda which is 
set by the Council of Ministers. However, in the Lords, the Select Committee can 
initiate its own inquiries on a topic of its own choosing. Most significantly, this allows 
the Committee to anticipate future European Community developments. 
One further point which the above observation illustrates relates to the enduring 
applicability of the Terms of Reference of the Lords Select Committee. Since its 
inception, the Terms of Reference of the Lords Committee have undergone no change. 
They have been flexible enough to adapt to any developments. However, this has not 
been the case for the Commons Committee which since 1973 has tried to secure an 
amendment to its Standing Order on at least five occasions, and only with limited 
success. 1-1 " 37 
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Let us now turn to the issue which is central to this part of the discussion. That of 
whether the Select Committee on the European Communities has Terms of Reference 
which are too wide? The argument behind this assertion is based on the proposition that 
by having such a wider remit, the Select Committee is distracted from its task of 
scrutiny and concentrates too much on wider policy investigations, which though 
interesting may not be directly applicable to the present European agenda. 
In the most recent review of the work of the Select Committees in the House of 
Lords, The Select Committee on the Committee Work of The House338 (commonly 
referred to as The Jelicoe Committee) investigated how the role of the European 
Communities Committee could be further developed. Central to this was the question of 
whether the Terms of Reference required further modification. The general view was 
that no amendment was required. Some witnesses though suggested that the present 
remit was too wide. 
In his evidence to the Jelicoe Committee, 339 the Clerk of the Parliaments drew the 
Committee's attention to what he described as "the fundamental uncertainty" about what 
the precise role of the European Communities Committee was. He emphasised the 
point that for him this uncertainty stemmed from the fact the Terms of Reference of the 
Committee were too wide. He illustrated this point by claiming that the Select 
Committee itself was on occasion confused about how it should approach inquiries. He 
identified a variety of different approaches which the Committee adopted depending on 
the subject before them. 
During his evidence he said340 that sometimes the Committee assessed the 
desirability of proposals from a Community perspective; sometimes it scrutimsed the 
impact of European Community proposals on the United Kingdom; and sometimes it 
conducted inquiries directed largely towards domestic matters in the United Kingdom 
usin(y Community proposals as a "peg" for the inquiry. 
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Similar criticisms were echoed by other witnesses. They felt that the Committee 
would be best served by concentrating more on in-depth inquiries and leaving the 
detailed scrutiny of legislative developments to the House of Commons Committee. 
The former Minister of State at the Foreign Office, The Right Honourable Tristan 
Garel-Jones MP,, felt that the Committee could move "upstream" concentrating on earlY 
drafts of Commission papers on major issues. He gave the example of Commission 
consultative documents or "Green Papers" as being ideal for early in-depth study. He 
said: -341 
"... I can see advantages in the Committee taking a more forward looking 
approach... " 
Mr Garel-Jones makes a valid point. His concern is not so much with the Terms of 
Reference being too wide, but with the actual tasks performed by the Committee. In 
essence he is suggesting a more limited role for the Committee which concentrates on 
the sort of in-depth inquiries suggested above. This was a point echoed by other 
witnesses. Most notably, the Trades Union Congress, in written evidence it 
submitted, 342 made the point that there was a tendency to "miss the boat" on the part of 
the Lords Committee. There was no point in carrying out an in-depth inquiry if it was 
too late to influence or form part of the debate. By leaving routine scrutiny to the 
Commons Committee, the Lords Committee could have more time to ensure its major 
reports were produced at the appropriate time to have the maximum impact and 
influence. 
Along similar lines, Sir Christopher Prout MEP, leader of the Conservative group in 
the European Parliament, pointed to the need for greater focus by the Select Committee. 
Iii his oral evidence, he warmly welcomed the Select Committee's reports into wider 
Community issues by describing them as "most useful". However, he felt that this was 
achieved at the expense of scrutim, of legislative proposals, and perhaps more 
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importantly in the influence the Committee exerted over the government in the Council 
of Ministers. 343 This he identified as the main weakness of the Committee and an 
argument for it being more selective in its work. He saw the key to this selectivity lying 
in a more flexible approach to scrutiny by the Committee (See QQ 491-493, pp193- 
194). 
However, the above opinions were not shared by every witness. Perhaps the most 
respected and influential witness on this subject was the then Chairman of the Select 
Committee on the European Communities, Baroness Serota. She believed that the 
Committee had struck a good balance between the need for scrutiny and the benefit of 
undertaking more in-depth wide-ranging inquiries. 
She described the Terms of Reference in the following manner: -344 
"The Terms of Reference which are extremely broad have served us 
well. They have enabled the Select Committee to operate extremely flexibly 
and adapt to the changing situation within the Community. " 
Baroness Serota identifies the point which was made earlier. Her response is directed 
at the fact that the Select Committee is not inhibited in its work, unlike its House of 
Commons counterpart. Though wide, the Terms of Reference are viewed by her as 
being "specific". They direct the Committee into the procedures it is to use when 
carrying out an inquiry. Furthermore, implicit in her evidence is the fact that the 
Committee is fully aware that it must make its inquiries relevant for them to be 
ii-ifluential. By influential she means aimed specifically at our own government. 
345 
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How influential is the Select Committee? 
The issue of influence and how effective the Committee is, needs to be Judged in the 
light of the central aim of the Committee. The Terms of Reference direct the 
Committee to look at "... important questions of policy or principle ...... This means, at 
the core of their function is to examine the merits of the legislative proposal or policy. 
No Committee which does this can be ignored and the government accept this. The fact 
that the Resolution of the House of 30 October 1990 extends equally to the House of 
Lords, 346 indicates that the goverment takes seriously all the functions of the Select 
Committee on the European Communities. 
The contrasting views and opinions outlined above illustrate the complex nature of 
the scrutiny process. Each party, whether from the government, a European Institution 
or the Committee itself take a different view of how the scrutiny task can be best 
performed. At the heart of this dispute lies the issue of what is the most effective and 
productive manner in which to influence the government prior to the Council of 
Ministers. From this author's perspective, the House of Lords performs a task that is 
unique not only in the United Kingdom but the European Union as a whole. The high 
esteem in which the Committee and its Reports are held throughout the Community is 
almost legendary. Their reports are also said to influence the Commission. This 
undoubtedly, is an extremely positive characteristic. 
However, can this multi-task approach be sustained in a European Union which is 
continually growing" Thus, the crucial question to be asked today is whether there 
iieeds to be a complete overhaul of the scrutiny process, starting with an evaluation of 
how and where the mechanics of scrutiny will take place. Critics of the present 
arrangements point to the fact that there is duplication of work by the two Select 
Committees, i. e. each look at cvci-y document put before them. Would it not therefore 
make sense to divide this task and give it exclusively to one institution (probably the 
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House of Commons) with the other (the House of Lords) considering itself with more 
wide-ranging policy issues? 
Such a division is attractive as it would give both Committees the necessary time to 
effectively perform their respective tasks. This is a powerful argument, as members of 
both Committees have commented to the author upon the lack of time available to 
complete all their tasks. On this basis, the Terms of Reference of the House of Lords 
(and House of Commons) need to be reviewed. It would then be up to each House, after 
full consultation with the other to devise a scrutiny system that meets the needs of all 
parties and maintains and strengthens the central pillar of the scrutiny process, that of 
influencing the government in the Council of Ministers. 
However, this is an unlikely proposition in the foreseeable future. There is at present 
little cooperation between the Houses on business matters generally347 and each 
Committee desires as wide a role as possible. The main argument against this division is 
that it would be very difficult for each Committee to do this exclusive task. Thus, the 
Lords felt they could not consider policy and its merits without a constant referral to 
legislative proposals and vice versa. In this context therefore, scrutiny in the Lords will 
continue in its present multi-faceted form. 
The Scrutiny function of the House of Lords 
The discussion has up to now focussed on the wider role of the Select Committee, 
concentrating primarily on the Select Committee's ability to consider the merits of both 
a policy and a legislative proposal. What the above discussion illustrates is the fact that 
the Select Committee in the House of Lords has a much wider brief than its Commons 
counterpart. 
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However, the above discussion is only half the picture. The wider investigative 
powers are essential if the Lords is to fulfil the requirements of its Terms of Reference. 
but the key aspect of its work must be the scrutiny of each legislative proposal that is 
submitted from the Council of Ministers. 
Lets consider the Terms of Reference again. They require the Select Committee to: - 
"Consider Community proposals whether in draft or otherwise,, to obtain 
all necessary information about them and to make reports on those which in 
the opinion of the Committee raise important questions of policy or 
principle ... (my 
italics)" 
The key phrase is in italics. This demonstrates that the Committee is concerned with 
only those proposals that will have some impact on UK law. Thus in essence, their 
selection criteria for the production of detailed reports is not too dissimilar from that in 
the House of Commons where the Committee will recommend further debate in one of 
the two Standing Committees if the proposals raises "questions of legal or political 
importancell. 
However, there is one substantial difference between the two. This lies in the fact 
that even though both Committees are charged with doing a similar task of scrutiny, the 
criteria for conducting a more detailed inquiry are different. Thus, in the House of 
Lords, the Committee does have a greater discretion to recommend debate in one of the 
Sub-Committees because the concept of questions of policy or principle is much wider 
than that of legal or political importance. That is to say, a legislative proposal may raise 
important questions of policy but have minimal legal impact on the UK. 
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What is the aim of the scrutinyfunction? 
It is possible to separate the scrutiny function into two separate tasks. The primary 
task is to influence the minister prior to final approval being given to a legislative 
proposal in the Council of Ministers. In an interview with a former Clerk to the Select 
Committee he said that "scrutiny is the priority" of the Select Committee. 348 This 
assertion is undoubtedly correct and it is important that in the context of producing 
lengthy reports this vital function is not neglected. 
The reason so much emphasis is placed upon the scrutiny function is that as already 
stated , it 
is the only way in which the minister may be influenced. 349 This has been an 
enduring concern for the Committee, which stretches back to the days of the Maybray- 
King Report. In a debate on the Maybray-King Report, Lord Shepherd saw three prime 
objectives of the Select Committee: -350 
"acquiring information and knowledge; 
securing a full appreciation of the consequences of any decisions and 
proposals; and 
iqfluencing Ministers. (my italics)" 
What the above extract from Hansard illustrates is that accession to the European 
Community marked a shift in balance between the Executive and Parliament. Thus, it 
would no longer be Parliament which had the final say on a legislative proposal but an 
institution over which Parliament had no direct control except in so far as it could 
ciisure the minister would follow Parliament's wishes. 
Thus the establishment of the scrutiny procedures in both Houses was an attempt to 
shift the balance back in favour of Parliament. For the House of Lords however, this 
attempt to influence has become more pronounced. It recognises that influence mav be 
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exercised through other Community institutions. Therefore, reports are regularly sent to I 
the Council Secratariat, to the current Presidency, to the Chairman or Rapporteur of the 
relevant Committee in the European Parliament, to the Cabinet of the Commissioner in 
charge of the legislation and to all other national parliament's scrutiny committees. 
What the above illustrates is that the Lords has developed its scrutiny process to 
reflect the fact that the United Kingdom minister is just one small, but important, part of 
the legislative process. The growth of Qualified Majority Voting means that influence 
must now be sought in other corners of the European Union. For the interests of the 
United Kingdom to be preserved and even enhanced the support of other Member States 
is needed. The Lords by producing such high quality reports are both stimulating debate 
within the Community and influencing other Member States. 351 For example, the 
Select Committees recent Report on Fraud and Mismanagement in the Community's 
FinanceS352 was acknowledged as a highly valued inquiry amongst the Commission 
and the other Member States. It articulated in a non-partisan way the concerns which the 
government had held for many years, but which the government had not been successful 
in putting across, primarily because it was viewed by other Member States as another 
complaint by a 'Eurosceptic' government. 
Another example of the Committees influence over the final agreed directive was 
353 
given by the former Clerk during the course of an interview. He pointed out that 
recent legislation on Product Safety and Unfair Contract Terms354 reflected many of 
the recommendations made by the Select Committee in its Report. Likewise other 
recommendations made in the 1980s on wider powers for the Court of Auditors and 
clearer duties on Member States to fight fraud all found their way into the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
The influence therefore is clear. The Select Committee through its detailed 
mvcstioation and debatc does have a measurable degree of influence. The challenge 
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facing the Committee today is to ensure that this influence is maintained, especiallv in 
the light of the growth of Qualified Majority Voting. The other concern relating to the 
scrutiny function and the ability to influence ministers is one which was discussed 
earlier in this chapter. That is whether the wider more investigative functions of the 
Select Committee detract from the scrutiny function. The evidence given to the Jellicoe 
Committee was mixed, with a split forming between Members of the Select Committee 
on the one hand who valued the present role and others including government ministers 
and MEPs who favoured a narrowing of the Select Committee's functions. As stated 
above, the Committee performs its tasks with the primary aim of influencing the 
minister. The use of wider investigations into policy issues, is viewed as a very helpful 
part of this process. 
Similarly, the Select Committee maintains a high degree of influence by having a 
substantial political momentum to their inquiries. Thus, a greater impact and therefore 
influence is attained if an inquiry is conducted into a politically relevant issue. This has 
two benefits. Firstly an inquiry will give the Select Committee an opportunity to 
question the government on its policy without the political partisanship witnessed 
during Question Time in the Chamber. Secondly it affords the Committee the possibility 
to raise its own profile by carrying out such an enquiry. This is important for the 
Committee as it wants to be seen to be effective. 
However, one important criticism should be noted of the Committee. The evidence 
suggests that the Select Committee may, because of its working methods, be caught out 
by either the quick moving nature of decisions in the Council of Ministers or a 
significant change in policy during the course of a detailed inquiry. In either of these 
two instances it will lose its influence. It must ensure that reports are ready in good time 
to be debated bý' the House and digested by the minister. Thus, timing is a key element 
of i-naintaiiiing influence. If thcre was to be any significant difficulty in completing a L- 
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report so that it can have maximum impact, then the Committee may need to reconsider 
its working methods and most importantly be more selective in conducting an inquiry. I 
The Committee as an information point 
At the start of the previous section, the observation was made that the scrutiny 
function can be separated into two exclusive tasks. The principal task of influencing the 
minister has already been identified and discussed.. The second task is not too 
dissimilar, but has a wider target audience. That is, during the course of its scrutiny 
function the Select Committee seeks to act as an information point both for the House of 
Lords and the wider public. 
This aim to inform is based upon an important idea. Namely that scrutiny of 
European legislative proposals and policy should not be viewed as a specialist separate 
area which is completely distinct from the other work of the House. Though the scrutiny 
task is to a large degree removed from the Chamber and dealt with by specialist Sub- 
Committees. ) 
it is essential that all members are aware of important developments. 
What the discussion of the Terms of Reference of the Select Committee clearly 
illustrates is the fact that the Committee plays a pivotal role in the entire scrutiny 
process. It has been put to the author on many occasions by both Peers and MPs, that the 
extensive role of the Committee is one which could not readily be removed. The next 
section concentrates on the actual mechanics of the scrutiny process and how the Select 
Committee gets to grips Nvith the difficult task of analysing each document to decide 
\vhether it requires for inquiry. This will include examining the role of the major 
characters in the scrutiny process. analyse the use of specialist advisers and consider 
how effective the working, methods of the Committee are to cope with the task in hand. 
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The mechanics of the scrutiny process 
Before beginning the detailed analysis of the scrutiny process one important point 
needs to be reiterated. That is. that both the House of Lords and the House of Commons 
examine each and every document. There is no division between them. However, as has 
already been seen, and will become even more apparent from the following discussion. 
the House of Lords adopts an entirely different approach to scrutiny. The main 
difference lies in the choice of document which will be considered further by the 
Committee. The Committee has developed a preference for proposals which will have a 
long gestation period and are of a much wider Community significance. This contrasts 
starkly with the Commons where the Standing Committee only has at most three hours 
to consider the document and decide on its merits. 355 
The sift 
There are 800-1000 documents deposited in the House of Lords every year for the 
Committee to consider. The appropriate government department will then produce the 
Explanatory Memorandum (EM) which surnmarises the proposal by indicating its legal, 
financial and policy implications, and the procedure that will be followed in 
negotiations and the likely timetable for consideration by the Council of Ministers. 
Once completed, and signed by the minister concerned, the EM is submitted to 
Parliament within a fortnight. 356 Thus, from this perspective, both Houses start their 
scrutiny procedure from the same basis. Most importantly, however, as in the House of 
Commons, the Resolution of the House of 24 October 1990 applies equally to the 
Lords. This means the government is subject to the same limitations of not giving final 
approval to a proposal in Council until the scrutiny process is completed. 
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The trigger for the sift is the deposit of the EM. The sift in the Lords take place everý, 
Monday at 9.30 a. m. and therefore everything received up to this time will be included. 
However, the former Clerk stated in his interview357 that the Committee xvill not be 
prepared to accept an unsigned EM or a document by fax. 
The actual sift is carried out by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of 
the Clerk. 358 They aim is to have the sift completed by the end of business on 
Monday. It is worth noting at this juncture that the governinent does not deposit all 
documents on the grounds of confidentiality. Most commonly these are documents 
submitted to the Inter-Governmental Conference convened under Article 236 TEU (See 
Chapter Ten). 
However if a document is submitted and has been sifted by the Chairman, it then 
begins the next stage of the scrutiny process. In the House of Lords, a document is then 
placed in one of seven categories which determine what the next step will be. These are 
as follows: -359 
(i) List A, of documents recently transmitted to the Committee, though not 
to require special attention; 
(li) List B, of documents which have been remitted to the Committee or 
Sub-Committees for further consideration; 
(Iii) List C, of documents which have been remitted to the Committee or 
Sub-Committee, are not to be reported to the House; 
(iv) List D, of documents reported since January 1992 for the information of 
the House, 
(N,, ) List E. of reports to the House on European Communities documents for 
debate includino Reports since January 1992 and those to be debated; 
(vi) List F, of documents which have been the subject of Correspondence 
Nvith Ministers since JuIv 1994, which will be published in a Report to the 
House. 
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(vii) List G, of outstanding government responses. 
Of most importance are Lists A and B. These contain a majority of the documents 
which are considered during the course of the Chairman's sift. The critical factor which 
determines whether a document is placed in List A or B depends upon whether it is 
considered that the proposal raises important questions of policy or principle (as per the 
Terms of Reference). However, there are no formal criteria which the Chairman follows 
in coming to his decision that it raises questions of policy or principle. They make the 
judgment as to what needs to be looked at with advice from the legal adviser. The only 
variable which may affect the Chairman's judgement is whether there is enough time to 
complete a detailed inquiry. It is the function of the Clerk to ensure that the timetable is 
both manageable and can be met. This he will do with the consultation of Clerks from 
the various Sub-Committees, where the detailed scrutiny and investigation will take 
place. 
If the Clerk confirms that the time is available, the Sub-Committee will be informed 
immediately and they will receive all the necessary documents. This decision will then 
be confirmed at the next meeting of the whole Select Committee. The main Committee 
i-neets only every two to three weeks. It is therefore different from its House of 
Commons counterpart which meets on a weekly basis when the House is sitting. This 
fact confirms the different working methods of the two Committees in the respective 
Houses. In the Lords the majority of the scrutiny takes place in smaller specialised Sub- 
Committees which indulge iii longer more detailed inquiry. 
Does the weekly sýft ensure scrutiny is effective? 
If during the sift the Chairman and his advisers recommend that the proposals are 
remitted to one or morc of the Sub-Committees, this does not automatically mean that 
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the Sub-Committee will conduct a detailed inquiry. This would not be possible. as 
nearly half of all proposals are deposited in this way. 
It is the case more often than not that the Sub-Committee will not consider the 
proposal as meriting further consideration. This means that the proposal has 'cleared' the 
scrutiny hurdle and so the scrutiny reserve may be lifted and the minister can give his 
agreement or otherwise in the Council. Approximately one tenth of proposals are the 
subject of full reports to the House. The following statistics will show the workload of 
the Committee and the sift statistics for each calendar year: 360 
Workload of the Committee and its Sub-Committees 
Sift Statistics (By Calendar Year) 
190 
Documents in Sift "A" 586 
191 '92 '93 '94 '95 
605 645 670 667 778 
Documents in Sift "B" 283 
Total number of documents 869 
% documents in Sift "B" 32.5 
208 203 191 229 193 
813 848 861 896 971 
25.5 24 22 25.5 20 
Sift "A" - Documents not requiring further scrutiny by Sub-Committee. 
Sift "B" - Documents referred to Sub-Committee for further consideration. 
The above figures make interesting reading especially in the light of the view of the 
Maybray-King Committee. In 1973 it was of the opinion that only about 5 percent of 
documents would be referred to one of the Sub-Committees. as the figures above show 
liowever, in recent years the figure has been on average at least five times that amount. Z-- 
This therefore raises the question of whether the Select Committee is recommending too 
many documents for further debate'? 
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From the earliest days of the scrutiny process, the Select Committee has regularly 
referred more than the envisaged five per cent of documents. Furthermore. the referral 
number may on occasion be as high as 33 per cent, for example when a new Member 
State joins the Community or when Commission activity is particularly high. 
The present sift system is probably the most effective way of ensuring that the Select 
Committee carries out the function that it has been charged with. This was the opinion 
of the Jelicoe Committee in 1992,361 and one which the author readily shares. It 
recommended no amendment to the way it works. If we examine the aim of the sift for a 
moment, then it will become more readily apparent why it is considered so effective. 
The sift aims to be objective. This means that the Select Committee refers legislative 
proposals to the Sub-Committee which raise questions of legal, financial or policy 
importance. The referral is made irrespective of what the Sub-Committee's actual 
workload is. This is based on the premise that it is up to the actual Sub-Committee to 
determine whether further inquiry is required. In effect, there is a double sift. This is 
completely different to the procedure in the House of Commons. When the Select 
Committee recommends further debate in one of the two Standing Committees, the 
Standing Committee has absolutely no discretion as to whether it conducts the debate 
whereas in the Lords the matter is purely one of discretion for the Sub-Committee. They 
take the final decision, about what type of report will be produced, i. e whether it is a full 
inquiry followed by a debate in the Chamber, or one produced merely for information 
purposes. 
The one negative aspect of this may be that the Sub-Committee have too great a 
workload. What this 'secondary sift' means in practical terms for the Sub-Committee is 
that it has to give time at the beginning or end of an evidence taking session to consider 
NvIiether they should undertake an inquiry at some future time and what mode this 
inquiry will take. More often than not, however, they will decide not to pursue an 
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inquiry, primarily due to lack of time. An alternative will be to conduct the inquiry after 
it has concluded the current one, but this may lead to scrutiny which is too late to catch 
the Council deliberations and therefore have no influence. This prospect is not desirable. 
This means the Committee may conduct a limited inquiry based on Correspondence 
with Ministers, in which the final report is only produced for "Information Purposes". 
This is a problem which the former Clerk discussed with the author. He felt that it 
may be possible for the full Select Committee to take a more considered approach 
during the sift and make judgments about the importance of a proposal more frequently. 
However, such increased activity would inevitably mean more meetings and work for 
the Select Committee. This difficulty with the Sub-Committees workload is a problem 
which the Select Committee feels must be addressed,, especially in the light of recent 
developments in the European Union's decision making process. The practical effect of 
this development is that inquiries will be conducted more rapidly, Council decisions 
may intervene before the Committee concludes its deliberations or the Conciliation 
Committee proposes far reaching amendments to the original legislative proposal. Thus, 
there needs to be a less rigid approach to the conduct of inquiries. This may be more 
readily achieved, if the initial sift was more selective and the Sub-Committees would 
therefore concentrate primarily on legislative proposals that affect major policy 
considerations. Whether such a change could occur without an amendment to the Terms 
of Reference is unclear. However, given the recent developments outlined above and the 
increasingly large workload, the time may have arrived for this to be considered. 
The use of Correspondence with Ministers 
In the course of the intei-\, ic\N- with the former Clerk of the Committee he stated that 
the role of the actual Select Committee is predominantly a formal one. Its primary task 
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is one of endorsing the work of the five Sub-Committees. In addition it also considers 
all correspondence between the Sub-Committee and ministers. This use of 
Correspondence with Ministers by the Committee and Sub-Committee has developed 
substantially in recent years and will now be considered in more detail. 
It is often the case that the initial Explanatory Memorandum provided by the minister 
will not be sufficient. This may be due to a number of reasons including the fact that the 
proposal has changed and therefore a new EM may be required, or that the initial EM 
was just to brief Either way the Sub-Committee will require more information if 
scrutiny is to be completed on time and thus be effective. 
If Correspondence needs to be sent, then it is established practice that it is sent in the 
name of the Chairman of the whole Select Committee (at present this is Lord Tordoff). 
He will draft a letter which will then be placed before the entire Committee for approval 
before being sent to the minister for a reply. However, given that the scrutiny process 
can be a fast moving one and that the Committee meets only every two weeks there may 
not be time to obtain the approval of the entire Committee. In such circumstances, the 
Chairman of the Sub-Committee will write direct to the minister and inform the 
Chairman of the Select Committee immediately of his action. 
However, if the Chairman of the Sub-Committee is pursuing an issue of policy with 
the minister concerned, then he must inform the Select Committee first. This will be 
dispatched to both the Clerk and the Chairman. In most cases the a draft copy of the 
letter will be sent. But, there will be some rare occasions where only a note that the 
letter has been dispatched will be sent to the Clerk and Chairman, because of the 
urgency of the Correspondence. The practice for Correspondence with Ministers is set 
out at the beginning of each Report that contains all recent correspondence. It reads as 
follows: - 
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CORRESPONDENCE WITH MINISTERS 
"As part of their work on Community proposals the Select Committee 
send letters to Ministers to express their views on proposals under scrutiny. 
The procedure of sending a letter may be adopted when the timetable of the 
Council of Ministers is too short for the Select Committee to publish a 
report, or if the enquiry indicates that the points at issue do not warrant a full 
report. Such letters pass the same stages of approval as a Report, and are 
normally signed by the Chairman. Occasionally, the Chairman delegates 
authority to a Sub-Committee chairman. Letters on complex legal issues are 
sent by the Chairman of Sub-Committee E (Law and Institutions). 
Chairmen of other Sub-Committees may be authorised to write where the 
timing of discussions in the Council of Ministers does not permit 
consideration by the Select Committee. In such cases the Select Committee 
consider the letter at their next meeting. " 
The former Clerk informed the author that he actively encouraged the Clerks of the 
Sub-Committees to utilise Correspondence with Ministers as frequently as possible. His 
reasoning for this centred on the fact that it is more effective and less time consuming 
than trying to arrange an oral evidence session when the minister will attend the Sub- 
Committee in person. Often such a meeting may not be possible for a number of weeks. 
Furthermore, he stated that such Correspondence with the Minister allows the Select 
Committee to obtain a brief summary of the document or any amendment. Given the 
large number of documents coming before the Sub-Committee, this is an efficient way 
of conducting an inquiry. 
The Correspondence with Ministers is published every six months. 362 It sets out all 
letters that have been sent to the Committee and any reply which was given. Such a 
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report is produced for the Information of the House. The Correspondence with Ministers 
has been an extremely successful development in the House of Lords scrutiny 
procedure. Ministers have welconied the development as being particularly time 
efficient and the correspondence has attracted some public interest as well. 
Membership of the Select Committee 
Permanent Members 
The actual Select Committee today has a membership of 20 Peers. This was reduced 
from 24 following the report by the Jellicoe Committee in 1992. However, that 
Committee recommended that the total number of members on the main Select 
Committee be cut even more radically to just 12 members. In addition, the Jelicoe 
Committee recommended most controversially that members of the main Select 
Committee would not be members of one of the five Sub-Committees. 
This proposal was however rejected as being unworkable, a sentiment echoed by the 
former Clerk of the Select Committee who was also Clerk to the Jelicoe inquiry. In his 
interview, he stressed the point that such an arrangement would lead to an inevitable 
duplication of work by the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee would need to consider 
the issues before beginning its inquiry, thereby inevitably doing all the preparatory work 
whicli the main Committee had already carried out. Thus, the benefit of having Peers as 
members on both the main and one or more of the Sub-Committees is clear. It ensures a 
familiarity with the issues and a continuity that leads to more efficient and effective 
scrutiny. 
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Selection of Members 
In total there are approximately 60 Peers who are involved in the work of the 
European Communities Committee. On the whole recruitment to the Committee is easy, 
with many Peers having some particular interest in European affairs. There is a 
Committee of Selection in the House of Lords which is charged with the task of 
selecting members for the Committees and ensuring that the rotation rule is observed 
(see below). Likewise, attendance is also very good. This is primarily due to the fact 
that the specialist Sub-Committees are composed of Peers with a keen interest in the 
subject. This ensures that they are more likely to attend. Furthermore, a majority of the 
Peers involved in the Committee are Life Peers. These are the Peers who are often 
referred to as the "working Peers", that is they take an active role in the work of the 
House. Life Peers are usually those who have had a political career in the House of 
Commons and are thus familiar with the working and methods of Select Committees. 
When the Select Committee was first established in 1973,, the membership rotated 
every 3 years. This was subsequently raised to 5 years. However, the Jelicoe Committee 
viewed this as being too long and recommended a return to the original 3 year 
period. 363 However, this was rejected and a compromise of a4 session rotation rule is 
now in place. A Peer can only rejoin the Committee after he has been absent for one full 
Parliamentary session. 
The reason for this was that the Jelicoe Committee saw this rotation rule as a way of 
ensuring the maintenance of the high standard of scrutiny by the Committee. They saw 
this 3 year rotation period as achieving a balance between ensuring that there is 
continuity on the Committee, but also as a means of guaranteeing the appointment of 
new- Members, especially those who may have been admitted to the Lords in the last 
INN,, o or three sessions. c., -, after a General Election. However. the above rule only relates 
to each indiN, idual Sub-Committee. Thus there is nothing preventing a Peer from joining 
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another Sub-Committee after 4 years have passed. This is a point which the Jelicoe 
Committee strongly disagreed with. 
The final point worth noting about the membership of the Lords Select Committee is 
the existence of the dual mandate. This is the situation that Members of the Lords are 
also Members of the European Parliament. Though this also exists in the Commons 
(most notably among the Ulster MPs) the Lords made a more positive usage of this 
arrangement, by using it as an strong informal link with the European Parliament. 
However, following the 1994 European Parliament Elections this dual mandate came to 
an end in the Lords and it looks unlikely to be resurrected. The former Clerk, regretted 
this to some extent because he viewed the dual mandate as a positive step that allowed 
the United Kingdom Parliament to exert its influence within the European Parliament. 
The use of Co-opted Members 
One of the main differences between the membership of the Commons Committee 
and the Lords Committee is that the Lords makes greater use of Peers who have a 
particular specialist knowledge. It does this by co-opting Peers on to the relevant Sub- 
Committee for the duration of that particular inquiry. This is an effective way of 
titilising the variety of specialist knowledge available in the Lords. The Jelicoe 
Committee went one stage further by recommending that a if a co-opted Member is 
sought for a particular inquiry then a Member with less expertise should stand down to 
tI or the duration of that inquiry. 364 This will ensure that membership of the Sub- 
Committees is kept to the 12 that has been in place since 1973. 
Though this procedure outlined is somewhat akin to the permitting of attendance and 
speaking of MPs at Standing Committee meetings, NvIiere an MP who has a particular 
constituency interest may attend. thcre is one main difference. Unlike the MP who does 
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not form part of the quorum nor can he vote, the co-opted Peer is a full Member of the 
Committee with all the voting and attendance rights of the full time Members. This 
undoubtedly encourages participation in the Sub-Committee. 
The Chairman of the Select Committee 
The Chairman of the Select Committee, at present Lord Tordoff, is an office holder 
in the House of Lords. His full title is the Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees. 
Though his role is not limited to the European Communities Select Committee, this is 
his primary function. Uniquely amongst Peers he receives a salary for his duties. It is 
worth pointing out that all other Peers are not paid for their membership of the Select 
Committee. As stated above,, the most important function of the Committee Chairman is 
to carry out the sift every Monday morning and be responsible for all Correspondence 
with Ministers. 
Like all members of the Committee,, the Chairman is also subject to the rotation rule 
and will not usually hold the position for more than three Parliamentary sessions. The 
Chairman is elected by the main Select Committee with nominations usually being 
unopposed. 
The Staffing of the Select Committee365 
Clerks and Support Staff 
The Clerk can best be described as the secretary of the Committee. The main task is 
to plan the ýi(., cncla of the Committee. This requires a great deal of forward planning to cý 
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ensure that inquiries are both current and relevant. Thus the Clerk must always have one 
eye on the Commission and the proposals it makes as well as being aware of the 
Council of Minsters who may reject a proposal leading to the convening of the 
Conciliation Committee. Thus under these circumstances,, it is essential that the Clerk 
and Chairman have a very good working relationship. The Chairman and therefore the 
whole Committee are reliant on the Clerk for procedural guidance and administrative 
back-up. Most notably, the Clerk should have an intimate knowledge of previous 
inquiries carried out by the Committee. 
The Clerks are composed of a career staff who work exclusively in the House of 
Lords. There are approximately 20 Clerks in the Lords, and 8 of these are devoted to 
European Community business. The Clerks are rotated on a3 yearly basis. In evidence 
given to the Jelicoe Committee, the Clerk of the Parliaments indicated that the staff 
levels are on occasion too low, especially when there are a large number of Sub- 
Committee inquiries. The most relevant criticism was that of a Clerk not being able to 
be involved in two simultaneous inquiries without experiencing great difficulty. Despite 
this, there were no changes made to the staffing levels following the Jelicoe inquiry. 
Legal Advisers 
The Select Committee has its own staff of full time legal advisers whose primary task 
is to advise the Committee on the impact of European legislative proposals on UK law. 
The majority of the work for the legal advisers is concerned with Sub-Committee E, the 
Law and Institutions Sub-Committee. Here the legal advisers take over the function of 
the Clerk and co-ordinate the work and timetable of the Committee. Their role will be 
looked at more closely N\, hcn examining the work of Sub-Committee E in the next 
chaptcr. 
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Specialist Advisers 
The use of specialist advisers by the Select Committee and the various Sub- 
Committees is a very positive aspect of the Lords scrutiny process. In evidence to the 
House of Commons Procedure Committee the use of specialist advisers in the Lords 
was described as "flexible, economical, effective and should be retained at more or less 
its present level. ', 366 This was a view that was fully endorsed by the Jelicoe Committee. 
Quite correctly, they viewed specialist advisers as being integral to effective scrutiny. 
Not only can they provide the necessary background knowledge needed to carry out an 
inquiry, they can also contribute to the greater understanding of European issues in the 
House as a whole. For this reason, the Jelicoe Committee saw advantage in the 
establishment of a panel or pool of specialists to whom the Committee could turn 
whenever they needed the appropriate advice. Today there is no formal panel in 
existence and specialists are appointed as and when they are needed. 
Concluding remarks 
What the above discussion illustrates is the fact the primary concern of this Select 
Committee, as is the case with its House of Commons counteipart, is to influence the 
government in the Council. The influence comes via the scrutiny process and is L- 
entrenched through the Scrutiny Reserve in the Resolution of the House of 30 October 
1990. 
HoNvever, this is perhaps \\-here any substantial similarity between the two 
Committees ends. As the next chapter xvill illustrate more starkly, the Lords Committee 
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gives more autonomy to the Sub-Committees to decide whether or not to conduct a 
more in-depth inquiry. The main Committee itself merely rubber stamps any decision 
they come to. 
Whilst considering the influence of the Committee, it is important to note once again 
that the Lords Committee has a much wider audience than merely the government. Theý, 
also target the European Institutions, most notably the Commission and Parliament. The 
lack of any formal links means that the development of strong informal links is 
important. To influence and be aware as early as possible of legislative developments 
means the Lords is in a strong position. The fact that House of Lords Reports are 
regularly cited by the Commission, e. g. the inquiry into Fraud and Mismanagement in 
the Community is a testimony to this influence. In the authors opinion, this is an 
influence that needs to be nurtured. Thus, the Committees primary value lies in its 
ability to synthesize and distil a mass of information for both the House and the wider 
general public. 
However, despite all these successful wide ranging inquiries, it would be wrong to 
overstate the Committees influence. The point cannot be forgotten that the House of 
Lords is just one Chamber in Parliament out of fifteen in the European Union and there 
is always the risk that both it and the House of Commons may become isolated if 
(, overnments continue to adopt a negative approach to European Community affairs. 
The risk is that all the good work of the last twenty-three years and the cultivating of 
relationships around the Community may be for nothing. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE WORK OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES IN THE HOUSE 
OFLORDS 
This chapter is concemed with the methods and process by which the House of 
Lords conducts the rigorous scrutiny of European legislative proposals. The analysis 
will centre on the work of the five Sub-Committees which are permanently appointed 
and charged to undertake this task. In addition, the contribution made by ad hoc Sub- 
Committees to the scrutiny process will be assessed and evaluated. In both cases, the 
appraisal will concentrate on how effective these Committees are in fulfilling the 
primary task of the Committees identified in the last chapter - that of influencing the 
minister in the Council via scrutiny of European Community legislative proposals. 
Introduction 
The first point to make at the outset is that the scrutiny work undertaken by the Sub- 
Committees in the House of Lords is,, in the author's opinion, probably the most 
developed and productive part of the entire scrutiny process in both Houses of 
Parliament. This premise is based on several grounds. The first lies in the quality of 
personnel who are involved in one or more of the Sub-Committees. If one examines the 
iiiembership list of the Sub-Committees'367 it becomes readily apparent that a majority 
of the members are former MPs with a history of involvement in European affairs, Peers 
who have some specialist knowledge about a particular area of European policy or 
Lords of Appeal whose expertise in legal matters concerning the European Union is 
second to none. 
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The second reason is rooted in the quality of reports which are produced by the Sub- 
Committees. This proposition will be examined in more detail later on in this chapter, 
but at this point the argument will be only briefly outlined. The members of the Sub- 
Committees have the valuable commodity of time on their side. Thus, \N, -hen carrying 
out an inquiry in to a legislative proposal they do not work to such a narrow deadline as 
the Standing Committees in the House of Commons. This permits a wide consultation 
of a variety of witnesses, all of whom have a contribution to make to the inquiry. It is 
this extensive consultation which in the authors opinion is the foundation of an 
influential report. 
It is the primary task of the Sub-Committees to carry out an investigation into the 
merits of a legislative proposal. Following the main sift by the Chairman of the Select 
Committee, who decides whether the proposal 'raises important questions of policy or 
principle', the document is then passed on to the appropriate Sub-Committee, which is 
divided on subject grounds. It is then up to the Sub-Committee to decide whether or not 
to conduct an in-depth inquiry in to the legislative proposal. The alternative for the 
Committee is to only produce a brief report for information purposes or to just note the 
document and conduct no further scrutiny. The fact is that out of approximately 1000 
documents before the Select Committee every year, only 25 reports are on average 
produced. Thus, the overwhelming majority of documents do not raise 'important 
questions of policy or principle' and are predominantly procedural in their nature. 
The use of Sub-Committees by the House of Lords to do the essential scrutiny work 
is wliat differentiates the process there from its House of Commons counterpart. Though 
the Select Committee and thus the five Sub-Committees are required to draw such 
important questions of policy or principle to the House, the Chamber itself plays no 
part M this part of the process. This is in stark comparison to the House of Commons 
N\ licre Lip until 1991 . all 
debates on European Community documents took place in the 
Cliamber. Evcii since 199 1, some proposals are still debated in this way, notably the 
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Community's draft Budget. Today. the Standing Committees only having the power to 
debate for two and a half hours -a major difference to the House of Lords. 
However, from its inception in 1973, the House of Lords has delegated European 
Community matters exclusively to these specialised Committees. This has on occasion 
led to the criticism being levelled that the scrutiny process in the Lords is conducted in 
isolation from the remainder of the Houses work. This is somewhat unfair especially if 
the comparison with the Commons is being made. It must therefore be stressed that 
unlike the Commons there is no system of Departmental Select Committees which will 
consider European Policy of their relevant department. In the Lords all scrutiny of 
European matters is conducted by the Select Committee and its Sub-Committees. 
Therefore, given the voluminous nature of this task, delegation of the task is 
probably the most effective way for European affairs to be considered. However, as the 
Standing Orders state, the Committees carry out this task on behalf of the House. They 
must place all reports before the House and there will often be a vigorous debate of the 
reports findings giving all peers an opportunity to contribute. In addition, all peers have 
the opportunity to raise European issues at Departmental Question Time in the Lords. 
What therefore the Lords have achieved over the last twenty-three years is a balance of 
effective scrutiny within a limited time frame in Committees and ensuring the 
participation of the whole the House in the final debate. 
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Historical Background 
The Maybray-King Recommendations 
The proposal of Sub-Committees was put forward initially by the Maybray-King 
Committee in 1973.368 The Committee was of the opinion that only via a system of 
Sub-Committees could the necessary scrutiny of legislative proposals take place. Thus, 
the use of small specialist Sub-Committees has become the key feature of the scrutiny 
system in the Lords. The Maybray-King Committee left the initial decision as to the 
number of Sub-Committees and their subject areas up to the Select Committee itself. 
369 However , it made the 
following suggestions as to possible Sub-Committees: - 
Finance, Economics and Regional Policy. 
Agriculture. 
External Trade and Treaties. 
Environment, Social Health and Education. 
Energy and Transport. 
Law. 
What the Maybray-King Committee did was to identify the dominant areas of 
European Community activity and those which would have a major impact on UK 
policy and legislation. Thus in 1973, the House of Lords had taken a more considered 
approach to scrutiny than the House of Commons. In the Commons, debate of European 
Community documents took place on the floor of the House and only in Standing 
Comi-nittee in exceptional circumstances. The effect of this was that,, unlike the Lords, 
the Commons did not build up any body of expertise in European Community issues. In 
I tact, the Commons did not move over to using Standing Committees more until 
1991.3170 Hox\, cN, cr, these are not comparable to the Sub-Committees in the Lords. Even 
though the Standing Conimittees are split into subjects, their primary function is t, Z-1 
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different,, namely the detailed scrutiny of the merits of a legislative proposal. Unlike the 
Lords Sub-Committees, they are not investigative and therefore do not hold witness 
sessions or receive written evidence except from the minister concerned. 
The Maybray-King Committee further recommended that the Membership of each 
Sub-Committee should be minimal. Thus three to six members was seen as being the 
most appropriate. The rationale behind this was that only in such small Committees 
could the detailed inquiry take place. Too many members and the Sub-Committee 
would in effect be a Select Committee. Furthermore, the larger the membership, the 
greater the potential for disagreement. This does not mean that the Sub-Committees 
were not intended to be a forum for debate. In fact quite the reverse. The debate was 
intended to lead to a consensual decision that reflected the views of the entire Sub- 
Committee. Thus,, by recommending a small membership the Maybray-King Committee 
was encouraging consensus, and most importantly avoiding the production of minority 
reports. 
Over the intervening twenty-three year period, this consensual approach has grown 
into one of the major strengths of the Sub-Committees. It has ensured that debate always 
concentrates on the fundamental issues before the Sub-Committee and the production 
of high quality reports. 
The Law and Institutions Sub-Committee 
At this juncture it is appropriate to point out that during the course of this chapter. 
the work of the Law and Institutions Sub-Committee as it has become known, will be 
tile sub ject of 'special treatment'. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, in the authors 
opinion this Sub-Committee carries out the most important work of any of the Sub- 
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Committees. Its concentration on the legal implications of legislative proposals goes to 
the heart of the scrutiny function. Secondly, as this investigation has been approached 
from a lawyers standpoint, a Sub-Committee that concentrates on matters legal holds 
more interest for the author. especially in the light of the Sub-Committees Terms of 
Reference. However, all other Sub-Committees will undergo a rigorous analysis but the 
emphasis there will be on how these remaining Sub-Committees concentrate on issues 
of policy as well as the mechanics of scrutiny. 
From the outset of the scrutiny procedures in the House of Lords, there have been 
special arrangements for the consideration of the legal implications of European 
legislative proposals. The Maybray-King Committee made the following suggestions as 
to issues a Law Sub-Committee might wish to consider: -371 
(a) whether Regulations impliedly repeal existing UK legislation; 
(b) whether any Regulation may make it desirable to amend other UK 
legislation, even where this is not obligatory, in order to comply with that 
Regulation-, 
(c) the most appropriate means (whether by statute law or by delegated 
legislation) for bringing draft Directives into operation in the United 
Kingdom in those cases where they cannot be brought into operation by 
administrative action. 
The Report then continued by confirming a recommendation made in the First Report 
by the House of Commons Committee that considered that Houses arrangements for 
the scrutiny of European issues. 372 They agreed with the view that the government 
should be under an obligation to inform Parliament of the effect which any Community 
legislation would havc on the United Kingdom law and what additional legislation 
\\ ould be introduced, if the instrument were made. Thus. it would then be up to the La,, v 
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Sub-Committee to examine the governments views when considering points (a) to (c) 
above. 
Today, the above arrangements have been condensed into one task for the Sub- 
Committee, that of considering the vires of a legislative proposal. Most importantlY, the 
Committee will consider whether a particular proposal does impliedly repeal existing 
UK legislation (as per (a) above). This is important because the Sub-Committee is 
guarding one of the most important Constitutional principles in English Law - that of 
implied repeal. 
Structure of the Sub-Committees 
Subject orientated Sub-Committees 
The Sub-Committee arrangement in the House of Lords has evolved over the last 
twenty-three years. The major changes have centred on the actual subject brief of each 
of the Sub-Committees. Originally, there were five Sub-Committees, covering the 
subject areas recommended by the Maybray-King Committee. This was increased to 
seven in the 1975-76 session but reduced to six in the 1986-87 session, primarily to 
allow for the staffing of ad-hoc Sub-Committees. The six Committees appointed were 
as follows: - 
List of Sub-Committees 1986-1993 
Sub-Committee A Finance, Trade and Industry and External Relations 
Sub-Committee B Encr-gly, Transport and Technology 
Sub-Committee C Social and Consumer Affairs 




Agriculture and Food 
Law and Institutions 
Environment 
The Sub-Committees appointed during this period reflected the dominant areas of 
Community activity. For example, originally in 1973, there was no separate 
Environment Committee, but this changed in 1975 and was kept until 1993. During this 
eighteen year period, environmental matters came to the fore, with many legislative 
proposals being developed by the Commission and the Council of Ministers. However, 
following the Report for the Select Committee on the Committee Work of The 
House, 373 the Sub-Committees were re-arranged once more to reflect more accurately 
the main areas of Community legislative activity. Thus since 1993 they have had the 
following structure: 
Sub-Committees 1993-1996 
Sub-Committee A Economic and Financial Affairs, Trade and External 
Relations 
Sub-Committee B Energy, Industry, Transport and the Working 
Environment 
Sub-Committee C Environment, Public Health and Education 
Sub-Committee D Agriculture, Fisheries and Consumer Protection 
Sub-Committee E Law and Institutions 
(Sub-Committee F Home Affairs and Social Policy - see p 238 below) 
Two points are readily apparent on examination of the above Sub-Committee list. 
First is the reduction to five Sub-Committees, as was the case when the Sub- 
Committees Nvere originallý, established in 1973. The primary reason for this was to 
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address the staffing problems that had become more regular with an increase in the use 
of ad hoc Sub-Committees by the House of Lords generally. 
The second point relates to the organisation of the subjects among the Sub- 
Committees. The area of social affairs previously dealt with by Sub-Committee C is 
now no longer specifically mentioned. This reflects the fact since the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the United Kingdom has retained autonomy in social affairs via its 
'opt-out'. Thus, consumer affairs which was previously coupled with social affairs is 
now scrutinised along with Agriculture and Fisheries. A strange combination! 
Similarly, the emphasis on environmental issues is no longer as great and thus it too 
does not warrant its own Sub-Committee. It will be interesting to see how this particular 
development works out. Most notably, it is the question of whether environmental 
affairs and legislation are receiving the detailed scrutiny that is required for the many 
complex proposals still coming forward? 
Over the last Parliamentary session, Sub-Committee C has conducted two major 
inquiries, both of which relate exclusively to enviromnental affairs. The first inquiry 
was in to a proposed directive on Drinking Water (7208/95) and the second in to Access 
to Information on the Environment. Thus, it is apparent that environmental issues are 
still dominant within the Community and therefore, the evidence suggests there is still a 
need for a specialised Sub-Committee to investigate and scrutinise them. 
In their report, the Select Committee on the Committee of the Work of the House 
(the Jelicoe Committee) criticised the Sub-Committee structure for being too rigid (this 
important issue Nvill be returned to after a detailed consideration of the work of each of 
the Sub-Committees in the next section). The Jelicoe Committee were of the opinion 
that in particular: 
374 
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"there is a need for a Sub-Committee structure which has a degree of 
flexibility and is capable of adjustment in line with priorities and in response 
to the requirements of the House. " 
This view was behind their recommendation for a decrease in the actual number of 
Select Committees and an increase in the use of ad hoc Sub-Committees. In fact, the 
Jelicoe Committee even flirted with the idea of recommending only three subject based 
Sub-Committees and placing a greater emphasis on the use of ad hoc Sub-Committees. 
Therefore, if we take a closer look at the Sub-Committees appointed before 1993 and 
those after 1993 it is evident that they do quite accurately reflect the political priorities 
of both the government and the European Community. Thus, Sub-Committees prior to 
1993 reflected the needs and aims of the establishment of the Single European Market. 
For example, a Sub-Committee on Social and Consumer Affairs reflected accurately 
much of the legislation coming forward under the Single Market programme. However, 
post 1993, a Sub-Committee dedicated exclusively to these two areas no longer exists. 
This is primarily due to the fact that, as already stated, post Maastricht, the UK is not 
subject to legislative proposals coming forward under the Social Chapter. 
However, most important are the changes made by the Maastricht Treaty in the area 
of Inter- Governmental cooperation. These are important developments which require 
much detailed scrutiny. In particular is the fact that the proposals have not, initially at 
least, been subject to any organised scrutiny by the House of Commons. Thus. the 
ability of the Lords to be more flexible and meet these new challenges and shoulder the 
burden of the detailed scrutiny has been extremely important. This has only been 
possible because of the decrease in the number of permanent Sub-Committees and the 
ability to appoint more ad hoc ones. 
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Today therefore, the central theme in the Sub-Committee structure is one of 
flexibility. This aim of flexibility relates to two recent developments. Firstly the 
legislative changes introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and secondly to the increased 
role of the Sub-Committees in the areas of policy evaluation. Since 1993, the evidence 
suggests that the Sub-Committees have become more forward looking by anticipating 
both legislative and policy developments within the Community. At the forefront of this 
development is the increase in the use of ad hoc Sub-Committees by the Lords. 
At the start of the 1996-97 Parliamentary year, the Select Committee appointed a 
sixth permanent Sub-Committee, Sub-Committee F. It is charged with investigating 
Social Affairs, Education and Home Affairs. A legal adviser's to the Select Committee 
informed the author that this decision was taken to fill the gaps which were left in the 
Sub-Committee structure. It was felt that these policy areas were not receiving the 
detailed scrutiny they deserved. The area of Home Affairs is designed to scrutinise 
proposals under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar and has thus relieved some of the 
pressure on Sub-Committee E. 
However,, the decision to scrutinise Social Affairs is questionable given the UK opt- 
out. A Sub-Committee focussing on this area was not deemed necessary in 1993 and it 
is difficult to justify its inclusion. This said, by January 1997, the Sub-Committee had 
yet to begin any inquiry and thus any further judgment about its appointment would be 
premature and needs to be considered in the light of its activity over an entire 
Parliamentary session. 
Ad hoc Sub-Committees in the Lords 
Fhe Jelicoe Con-imittee in its investigation saw great advantage in the increased use 
of acl 170C Sub-Committees. This was a view shared by the then Leader of the House, 
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Lord Waddington. in his written and oral evidence to the Jelicoe Committee. 375 In his 
evidence he argued, quite correctly as it has turned out, that many of the important 
issues which will confront the Community over the next ten years will not be 
completely suited to subject related inquiries. This therefore will be the realm of the ad 
hoc Sub-Committees. 
Recently, an ad hoc Sub-Committee concluded an important inquiry into the 1996 
I nter- Governmental Conference. As can be seen from the nature of the inquiry, it did not 
fit within any of the existing subject Sub-Committees and was not based on any 
legislative proposal. In fact the inquiry concentrated on specific political issues facing 
the European Union, for example, the enlargement of the Union and the progress of 
Economic and Monetary Union (this inquiry is considered in more detail on pp 268-270 
below). 
This is the structure of the Sub-Committees today. They are designed to meet the 
diverse needs of the main Select Committee in its complex scrutiny task. In the 
forthcoming sections an evaluation of how each of these Sub-Committees addresses this 
task and how successful they are in achieving it will be made. In the course of this, 
reference will be made to particular inquiries carried out by the Sub-Committees as 
examples of the type of inquiry a Sub-Committee may conduct throughout the session. 
The work of the Sub-Committees 
The Terms of Reference 
The most interesting point here is that the five of the current Sub-Committees do not 
possess individUal Terms of Reference. Rather, they are subject to the same Terms of 
Page - -143 
Reference which are given to the main Select Committee (there are exceptions to this 
rule, most commonly when an inquiry is launched into a matter which has not arisen 
from an EC directive). Only Sub-Committee E, the Law and Institutions Sub- 
Committee has its own specific Terms of Reference. This is because of the nature of the 
work of the Sub-Committee, i. e. its concentration on legal issues raised by European 
Community proposals. 
In the light of what has been said above, it will be of benefit to look at the relevant 
part of Terms of Reference once again to have a clear view of what the Sub- 
Committees task actually is: - 
"To consider Community proposals whether in draft or otherwise, to 
obtain all necessary information about them, and to make reports on those 
which, in the opinion of the Committee, raise important questions of policy 
or principle, and on other questions to which the Committee consider that 
the special attention of the House should be drawn" 
As can be seen from the opening line above, the primary task is to scrutinise 
European Community legislative proposals and also to consider any other important 
questions of policy. This task carried out by the Sub-Committees is done so on behalf of 
the House. Thus, the Select Committee and each of the Sub-Committees have delegated 
to them the function of detailed scrutiny. Therefore, either the Chairman of the Select 
I ommittee during the weekly sift decides that no further scrutiny is needed, or the 
document is passed on to the Sub-Committee who decide whether it merits a full 
investigation. Alternatively. a Sub-Committee may conduct a free standing inquiry into 
a particular EC policy. In either case, the requirements of the Terms of Reference are 
met. 
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Sub-Committee Membership 
4 
Since the Jelicoe Report, the membership of each of the Sub-Committees has been 
reduced to a maximum of twelve. It was felt that if the membership were any larger, 
then this would inhibit the effectiveness of the Sub-Committees. As mentioned 
previously, the major strength of the Sub-Committees is their consensual approach and 
ability to investigate complex issues in a methodical manner. These strengths are 
undoubtedly reduced if the Sub-Committees are too big. 
The use of co-opted Members is a very beneficial step by the Sub-Committees. They 
add their wide experience and expertise to the inquiry. They sit with two to four 
Members of the main Select Committee on each of the Sub-Committees. This ensures 
a degree of continuity amongst the membership, but is flexible enough to allow the Sub- 
Committee to alter its composition to meet the needs of each particular inquiry. All 
permanent members of the Sub-Committees are subject to the three year rotation rule as 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
Support staff 
Each of the Sub-Committees has a Clerk attached to it, though the Clerks do have 
other duties to perform, most notably working on other Sub-Committees. The vital 
function each Clerk performs is to ensure that the Sub-Committee has all the necessary 
information to conduct an inquiry and that there is sufficient time to complete the 
inquiry. 
Uniquely, Sub-Committee E, the Law and Institutions Sub-Committee has two full 
I 
time legal advisers who assist the Sub-Committee to carry out its specific task. Most 
importantly, they ensurc that the SA-Committee has all necessary information, before 
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embarking on any inquiry. of the legal background and implications of a particular 
proposal. 
Specialist Advisers 
The continued use of specialist advisers by the Sub-Committees continues to be one 
of the great assets of the whole scrutiny process in the Lords. Their experience and 
expertise, which when coupled with that of the co-opted peers makes for a formidable 
combination. However, the Jelicoe Committee felt their influence could be increased 
still further if the specialist advisers were retained after the conclusion of an inquiry to 
give advice and assistance on future inquiries and programmes. 376 It was felt,, this 
would help the Sub-Committees to be more selective in selecting subjects for inquiry. 
This proposal is a positive step for the reason that, with the increase in the number of 
legislative proposals coming forward, the Sub-Committees will be under increased time 
pi-essure when it comes to the completion of an inquiry. On this premise, the Sub- 
Committees will have to be even more selective in the future in deciding which subjects 
will be inquired into more fully. The advice of specialist advisers under these 
circumstances will be even more valuable. 
In the forthcoming sections, a closer investigation of the work undertaken by each of 
the five Sub-Committees is presented. Though this will involve an analysis of some of 
the reports produced over the last two Parliamentary sessions the primary issue will be 
the working methods and aims of the reports as opposed to evaluating the subject 
matter of the report. For the analysis, a cross section of reports on a variety of issues 
x\hich reflect fairly the work of the Sub-Committees in an average Parliamentarý, year, 
liave been selected. This presents the opportunity to examine the various approaches 
Page - 246 
taken to scrutiny and examination of European issues generally, by the different Sub- 
Committees. 
Sub-Committee A- Economic and Financial Affairs, Trade and 
External Relations 
The subject matter of this Sub-Committee has broadly remained the same for the last 
twenty-three years. Essentially, the Sub-Committee has been concerned with economic 
issues. Any changes have revolved primarily around what title is to be given to the Sub- 
Committee as opposed to any amending its role significantly. 
Over the past two Parliamentary sessions (1994/95 and 1995/96) Sub-Committee A 
has conducted two major inquiries, both of which illustrate in their own way the broad 
approach to scrutiny which the Sub-Committees have adopted. 
The Maghreb inquiry 
In the 1994/95 session, this Sub-Committee produced a highly detailed report on the 
Relations between the EU and the Maghreb Countries. 
377 This inquiry was initially not 
based on any EC document. The inquiry was conducted because the Sub-Committee felt 
that. -378 
"Mediterranean questions were going to be an important part of the 
European Union's agenda in 1995. " 
What the above quote illustrates is that firstly, the Sub-Committee sets its own 
agenda, and secondly, the Sub-Committees adopt a very forward looking perspective in 
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relation to issues of policy. During the course of this inquiry, the Commission published 
several documents on this very issue, which the Sub-Committee considered in close 
detail. 379 However, the point is clear. When the Terms of Reference state for the Sub- 
Committee to consider "other questions to which the Committee consider that the 
special attention of the House should be drawn", the Sub-Committee interpret this as 
including future policy developments. It also illustrates that the Select Committee and 
the five Sub-Committees are not exclusively scrutiny Committees in the mould of their 
House of Commons counterpart. 
If one takes a closer look at the background to the inquiry, the Sub-Committees 
reasons for conducting it are even more apparent. Furthermore these are reasons which 
one would not automatically view as being directly connected either with the European 
Union or with UK Foreign policy. The Sub-Committee pointed out that up until mid 
1996 the Presidency of the EU will lie with France, Spain and Italy - all countries with 
close ties to the Maghreb countries. Thus, it was felt, that during this eighteen month 
period, policy would be influenced to quite a degree by activity in the Mediterranean. 
Secondly, the Sub-Committee also state that they felt there was a "widespread lack of 
knowledge of the Maghreb countries in the United Kingdom". 380 On this basis, they 
also viewed their role as an informative one, for both the House and the country at large, 
about the political and economic situation in these countries. 
A closer look at the wide variety of evidence received during the course of the 
inquiry illustrates further the point that the Sub-Committees are not merely scrutiny 
committees. On the basis of this evidence it can be argued that scrutiny is no longer the 
primary task of the Sub-Committees. Reports produced over the last two or three 
Parliamentary sessions indicate a definite move towards consideration of policy. This 
xvill become even more apparent in the forthcoming sections. 
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In relation to the inquiry concerning the EU and the Maghreb countries. the Sub- 
Committee took evidence for a period of approximately six months. In terms of a 
Parliamentary session, almost an entire one. This therefore precluded the Sub- 
Committee from any other inquiry into legislative proposals, with all other documents 
coming forward under the sift not being subject to the same detailed scrutiny. There 
were thirteen evidence sessions in total, which included the Ambassadors of Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia,, the European Commission and several academics. 381 Visits to 
the three countries were also arranged during the course of the inquiry. In the light of 
this,, are not these Sub-Committees now more akin to the Departmental Select 
Committees in the House of Commons whose brief is to consider the policy, 
expenditure and administration of the relevant department? 
The EMU inquiry 
At the start of this chapter when the Terms of Reference were considered it was 
stated that there were occasions when a Sub-Committee would have specific Terms of 
Reference that related to the inquiry at hand. This is usually the case if the inquiry is 
into a subject that has not arisen out of a legislative proposal. The recent EMU inquiry is 
one such investigation. Once again, as with the Maghreb inquiry, the primary 
consideration of the Sub-Committee is an issue of policy and not legislation. The 
Terms of Reference illustrate the point clearly- 
"If EMU goes ahead and a significant number of Member States are not 
willing to join at the outset, what are the implications for the Single Market, 
the EU budget, and for relations with other non-participating countries more 
generally. and what does the UK need to do now to prepare for EMU, 
irrespective of the eventual decision whether or not to join? " 
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The reason for this inquiry is to consider future EU and government policy. The 
primary aim of this inquiry though is to contribute to the controversial EMU debate. 
This is notwithstanding the fact that the United Kingdom have opted out of automatic 
Monetary Union. Thus, the Sub-Committees illustrate once again that they work to their 
own agenda. 
Above it was stated that the Sub-Committees are behaving in a similar way to the 
Departmental Select Committees in the House of Commons. This current EMU inquiry 
adds weight to this assertion. The nature and subject matter of the inquiry is one which 
could easily have been conducted by the Treasury Select Committee in the House of 
Commons. 
This examination of the work of Sub-Committee A over the last two Parliamentary 
sessions demonstrates the diversity of issues which face the European Union in 
Economic and Trade matters. Obviously, this Sub-Committee, like all others, has a 
limited amount of time and must make difficult decisions about how best to use it. 
However, in this authors opinion, Sub-Committee A has, over the last two 
Parliamentary sessions at least, veered to far into the realm of policy consideration at the 
expense of the scrutiny of legislative proposals. 
Sub-Committee B- Energy, Industry, Transport and the Working 
Environment 
Sub-Committee B today has a broad remit. Since 1993 it has been concerned with a 
range of industrial and infrastructure issues. In the last two Parliamentary sessions, it 
has undertaken two major inquiries, one on European Union Energy Pollcy382 and the 
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other investigating Tourism in the European Union. 
383 Both of these Reports related to 
a politically non-controversial subject matter. 
The Energy Policy inquiry 
The Report on European Union Energy Policy is an example of the House of Lords at 
its best. That is, the Lords held an inquiry into a complex II varied issue, where opinions 
across the EU, and yet produced a report that has been valuable to the debate. Once 
again the use of many expert witnesses was at the core of the successful report. 
The basis for the inquiry was not a legislative proposal but merely a Commission 
Green Paper. This is merely a consultative document published by the Commission 
when it seeks views and opinions on a given subject. Thus, if we return to the Terms of 
Reference for a moment , it can 
be seen that such inquiries are permitted because the 
Sub-Committee can consider Community proposals "whether in draft or otherwise". 
The Sub-Committee considered the following Commission papers: - 
4523/95 COM(94) 659 final Green Paper "For a European Union energy 
policy" 
11 881/94COM(94) 1918 final Commission Report on the collection of 
information concerning investments of the 
interests to the Community in the petroleum, 
natural gas and electricity sectors 
The most apparent point from these two documents is that the Sub-Cornmittee in 
inquiring into them, is engaging in scrutiny of a pre-legislative nature that is different in 
substance to the scrutinv it undertakes prior to the minister giving agreement in the 
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Council. The aim of such a report is to influence the actual legislative proposal put 
forward by the Commission to the Council of Ministers. Thus the House of Lords has 
realised the importance of this influence despite the lack of any formal links with the 
Commission. It is well known that the Commissioners read reports produced by the 
Lords and it is also common knowledge that the Commission cannot ignore a report, 
such as this one on European Union energy policy, that is based on the opinions of 
many leading experts in the field. 
Sub-Committee C- Environment, Public Health and Education 
The subject areas of Sub-Committee C changed substantially in 1993. Prior to this 
date the Sub-Committee was concerned with Social and Consumer Affairs. Today 
however, though concerned with the Environment, Public Health and Education, it is 
apparent from the reports produced over the last two Parliamentary sessions that 
environmental issues dominate the Sub-Committee's agenda. 
The Phare Programme inquiry 
In the 1994-95 session, the members were concerned with an inquiry entitled 
"Environmental issues in Eastern Europe: The Phare Programme". 
384 The basis for this 
inquiry was that the House of Lord's Select Committee felt more information was 
needed about countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary who they saw 
as being full members of the European Union in the near future. 
This inquiry was similar M its form to that conducted by Sub-Committee A into the 
relationship between the Et I and the Maghreb countries. Most notably, it was not based 
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on any particular Commission document or legislative proposal but was merely an 
evaluation of a particular EU enviromental programme. Within this context therefore, 
the Sub-Committee thought it appropriate to have specific Terms of Reference for this 
inquiry which reflected more accurately the aims of the Sub-Committee and be of more 
value for information purposes for the entire House. Thus the Sub-Committee had the 
following Terms of Reference: -385 
"to consider the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU's Phare 
programme to prepare the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to meet 
the environmental obligations on EU membership" 
The Terms of Reference gave the Sub-Committee a very wide brief. It allowed for a 
wide variety of evidence, both oral and written, to be submitted and involved visits 
overseas to all the countries concerned. In addition, a specialist adviser was also 
appointed specifically for the duration of this inquiry. 386 This reflects what is now 
common practice within the House of Lords when preparing a report. 
The most obvious point about this inquiry is that it was concerned purely with EU 
policy. To be more specific, it was concerned with the development of an EU policy. It 
was a forward looking report that was aimed at both the Commission and Council of 
Ministers and was intended to contribute to the debate on enlargement of the EU. 
In the light of what has just been said above, the assertion made earlier in this chapter 
deserves to be repeated. That is, that the Sub-Committees appear to be shifting towards 
the consideration of policy as being their primary task. This inquiry lasted 
approximately five months and occupied all the Sub-Committee's resources. It thus 
prevented any other inquiry from taking place. 
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However, on the positive side, the inquiry was another example of what the House of 
Lords Sub-Committees do best. That is,, long, detailed and influential inquisitorial 
investigations carried out in a consensual manner. This fact alone adds much weight to 
the argument against reforming the House of Lords. But, it also raises the difficult 
question of what role the House of Lords should have in the European legislative 
process. Given the increased concern with policy issues, is the case for a strict division 
of labour between the two Houses now irresistible? This author's opinion, stated 
previously, is that a review of the present arrangements in both Houses is long overdue. 
However, neither House will be willing to restrict its role. Thus in these circumstances, 
Sub-Committees in the Lords will continue to devote the majority of their time to 
evaluating policy developments and not concentrating on the detailed scrutiny of 
legislative proposals. 
Sub-Committee D- Agriculture, Fisheries and Consumer Protection 
The subject matter of this Sub-Committee has not varied much since it was 
established in 1973. Then as today, it is predominantly concerned with agricultural 
issues and most notably the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries 
Policy. Over the last two Parliamentary years, the Sub-Committee has conducted two 
major inquiries. The first was based on Commission proposals to 'Reform the Sugar 
Regime'387 and the most recent one was concerned with the'Veterinary Certification of 
Animals and Animal Products'. " 
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The Sugar Regime inquiry 
The report into the Reform of the Sugar Regime was one based on a specific 
Commission proposal. The document, 1141/94, was to form the bas1s of European 
Union's response to the decisions taken at the GATT Uruguay Round. The background 
to this document was that the Commission had intended to issue its proposals in time for 
adoption by the Council in December 1994. However, as they were only published in 
late November of that year, the Council was not ready to adopt the measures in 
December. 
In the report the Sub-Committee states that it carried out this inquiry to: _389 
II enable the Select Committee's opinion on the proposals to be 
published before decisions are made in the Council. " 
In essence, the Sub-Committee is performing its primary function. That is to 
scrutinise a particular legislative proposal and inform the minister of its view so as to 
influence the minister prior final adoption by the Council. Obviously, in scrutinising a 
particular piece of legislation the Sub-Committee also examines the policy implications 
of the legislation. However, the difference between this inquiry and say the one carried 
out by Sub-Committee C in to the Phare programme is that this inquiry has as its focus 
the Commission legislative proposal. The aim therefore of the two inquiries is quite 
different. The one by Sub-Committee C is designed to influence at the consultation 
stage whereas this one by Sub-Committee D is intended to influence at the decision- 
making stage. 
This report also illustrates the main limiting factor of the entire scrutiny process. 
Above, a brief background to the inquiry was given. As can be seen, the time between 
the publication of the lcoislati al by the Commission and the date intended for ýi ive propos 
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adoption by the Council was particularly short. In this case however because of the late 
publication of the proposal the Council meeting was put back and the Scrutiny Reserve 
ensured that the Sub-Committee could give proper attention to the proposal. This 
though will not always be the case. There are occasions where an immediate decision 
will be needed by the Council and thus the Scrutiny Reserve will be ignored. It will then 
be up to the minister to come to the dispatch box an explain his or her actions. 
Similarly, the growth in Qualified Majority Voting will mean that the United Kingdom 
minister may be outvoted by the other Member States. They know that they will not 
have to observe the United Kingdom's Scrutiny Reserve if they can achieve the desired 
majority without the UK's support. This today is one of the biggest challenges to the 
scrutiny process both in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. 
Sub-Committee E- Law and Institutions 
Since 1973, there has been a specialist Sub-Committee whose sole task has been to 
scrutinise the legal implications of particular legislative proposals as well as examining 
the Treaty base and to vet questions of vires. This multiplicity of these tasks places an 
extremely heavy burden upon the Sub-Committee, both in man hours and resources. 
The point must be stressed that Sub-Committee E is the only specialist committee to 
look exclusively at the legal implications of legislative proposals in both Houses of 
Parliament. 
In addition, this role has recently increased substantially. Since 1994, Sub- 
Committee E has taken on the difficult and complex task of scrutinising proposals 
coming forward under the I nter- Governmental Pillars. Following the Select Committee 
on the European Communities Report into the House of Lords Scrutiny of the Inter- 
Govenimental Pillars of the European Union, 390 it was decided that this additional task 
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would fall to Sub-Committee E with no special arrangements to facilitate this change. 
Fhe first such inquiry undertaken by the Sub-Committee was in to the EUROPOL391 
proposals for establishing greater co-operation between national police forces. 
Structure o Sub-Committee E )f 
Given the nature of work of the Sub-Committee it is no surprise to learn that the 
membership is predominantly lawyers. It has now become established practice that the 
Chairmanship of Sub-Committee E is in the hands of a Law Lord. Such an appointment 
makes sense because it allows some of the most senior lawyers in the United Kingdom 
to carry out the scrutiny of many technical and complex legislative proposals. In the 
author's opinion, there is no substitute for the type of experience they can bring to the 
task and their contribution is arguably one of the strongest aspects of the entire scrutiny 
system. 
The Sub-Committee itself comprises a maximum of twelve members. Like all the 
other Sub-Committees , it makes effective use of co-opted 
Members for inquiries, 
especially lawyers who may have a particular interest in the inquiry. For example, Lord 
Wilberforce and Lord Lester of Herne Hill are regularly co-opted on to the Sub- 
Committee. 
Specialist Staff 
Like all other Sub-Committees, Sub-Committee E has the assistance of a permanent 
staff to assist it in its weekly task. However, unlike the other Sub-Committees where the 
Clerk is responsible for organising, the agenda and ensuring there is enough time to 
conduct an inquiry, here it is the function of the legal adviser. At present there are two 
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legal advisers for the Sub-Committee. In the course of an interview, a former legal 
adviser392 stressed the importance of having the necessary documents prepared for 
each meeting as well as making the appropriate decision about which document will 
actually be the subject of an investigation. Legal issues are always difficult because thev 
have to be viewed in the context of the European Court of Justice which is the final 
arbiter in any dispute. Thus the Sub-Committee always has to be fully aware of the 
Court's views as they may affect their own inquiry. 
Sub-Committee E- The Terms ofReference 
As previously stated, Sub-Committee E is unique amongst its counterparts in that it 
has always had its own very specific Terms of Reference. These are tailored to meet the 
requirements of the Sub-Committee in its crucial task of advising the government about 
the correct legal base for a Commission proposal. In performing this task, Sub- 
Committee E makes very frequent and effective use of CorresPondence with Ministers. 
This strong reliance on letters as the means for obtaining government views on a 
proposal reflects the fact that the Sub-Committee usually works to a very tight deadline. 
The Terms of Reference which were revised and extended in 1983 are as follows: - 
"To consider and report to the Committee on: 
(a) any Community proposal which would lead to significant changes in 
United Kingdom law, or have far reaching implications for areas of United 
Kingdom law other than to which it is immediately directed: 
(b) the merits of such proposals as are referred to it by the Select 
Committee. 
(c) NN-liether aný, important developments have taken place In Community 
laNv; and 
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(d) any matters which they consider should be drawn to the attention of the 
Committee concerning the vires of any proposal" 
From the Terms of Reference it is immediately apparent that the Sub-Committee has 
a very wide ranging and important role in the scrutiny process. In (a) above, the Sub- 
Committee is charged with the task of evaluating the likely impact on existing UK 
legislation of Community proposals. In particular, the Sub-Committee concentrates on 
the question of implied repeal. This also extends to an assessment of the impact on 
legislation which is not specifically targeted by the Community proposal. This is an 
ideal task for a Sub-Committee whose membership is composed predominantly of 
lawyers! 
The task itself requires the Sub-Committee to make a judgment about the likely 
impact of the proposal. In (a) above reference is made to proposals which will have 
either a "significant" effect on UK law, or have "far reaching implications" on other 
unconnected legislation. Thus in both cases, the Terms of Reference appear to imply 
that the Sub Committee is concerned only with those proposals that will have a major 
impact. Each legislative proposal will inevitably have an effect. The question that the 
Sub-Committee has to address is whether the effect is one that will merit further 
detailed scrutiny by way of an in-depth inquiry. 
In coming to this conclusion, the Terms of Reference themselves offer a degree of 
guidance. The Sub-Committee should have regards to the "merits of the proposal", 
whether it is part of a "important development" in Community law, and perhaps most 
crucially the vires of the proposal. The issue of the vires of the proposal will now be 
considered in more detail. 
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Legal Work of the Sub-Committee 
In considering the Ores, the Sub-Committee are primarily concerned with the 
question of whether the powers as provided by the Treaty have been used in the 
appropriate way. This has been particularly important in scrutinising additional powers 
given to the Commission both by the Single European Act and within the Maastricht 
Treaty. Thus, in addition to investigating secondary legislation, Sub-Committee E is 
also concerned with primary legislation, i. e. the Treaty base and whether secondary 
legislation is being brought forward under the correct Treaty provision. 
A prime example of this aspect of the Sub-Committee's work was seen immediately 
after the introduction of the Single European Act 1986. Under the SEA Article I OOA of 
the EEC Treaty provided for the Council of Ministers to adopt Single Market measures 
by qualified majority. All these measures were introduced via proposals originating 
from the Commission. Sub-Committee E held the opinion that the Commission had 
given an extremely wide interpretation to Article I OOA and argued that some of the 
proposals should have been introduced through some alternative Treaty provision such 
as Article 100 or Article 23 5, both of which require the Council to act in unanimity. 
By the effective use of the Correspondence with Ministers, the Sub-Committee were 
able to Mform the government of their view in time to influence the minister before the 
final decision was taken by the Council. In the majority of instances, the government 
shared the Sub-Committee's concern about the over enthusiastic use of Article I OOA. 
Similarly, in its 1989 Report on the Border Control of Persons'393 the Sub-Committee 
concluded that Article 8A of the EEC Treaty did not impose the obligation to remove 
national border controls. The UK government adopted an identical position. However. 
the Sub-Committee and the government are not always in agreement. For example in its 
1990 Report on the Rights of Student Residence, 
394 the Sub-Committee adopted the 
Commission's view where ffiev used Article 7 of the EEC Treaty as the legal basis for 
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the Directive. Article 7 contained provisions against discrimination on grounds of 
nationality and allowed the Council to adopt provisions to this effect by qualified 
majority. The UK government however, contended that such legislation should have 
been introduced via Article 235 which required unanimity in decision taking by the 
Council of Ministers. Thus, the Sub-Committee acts independently of government and 
puts its duty to scrutinise the UK goverm-nent and the views its holds above any 
exclusive national interest. Furthermore, as the above example illustrates, it will criticise 
the goverment when it feels that this is appropriate. 
What is apparent therefore, is that in consideration of the vires of a proposal, the 
Sub-Committee is particularly directing its attention at the Commission and the use of 
its powers as given to it by the Treaty. However, the influence can only be exerted over 
the minister in Council -a wholly different institution. This is perhaps the most pressing 
argument for establishing direct formal links with the Commission. The Sub-Committee 
with its great legal experience and knowledge, would be a persuasive force on the 
Commission in disagreements of the type outlined above. Whereas the minster may be 
viewed as being obstructive, the Sub-Committee independent of the Executive and with 
no political agenda may be regarded as being constructive. Their ability to be persuasive 
in a subtle way is a great strength of the Sub-Committee structure as a whole. The 
establishment of formal links with the Commission would give this persuasiveness an 
added impact. Influencing the initiator of legislation would be far more effective than 
influencing only your own minister who may be outvoted by a qualified majority. 
Residualfunctions of Sub-Committee E 
In addition to the primary function of considering legal issues surrounding the 
Treaty, the Sub-Committee also has an important role to play in the evaluation of 
policy. As can be seen in the Terms of Reference, the Sub-Committee is required to 
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consider the merits of any documents referred to it ((b) above) and to keep abreast of 
any important developments in Community Law ((c) above). Most importantly, in the 
latter task, the Sub-Committee must follow carefully any developments xý-ithin the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, this role is restricted to purely one of 
monitoring the ECJ. Though it is regularly informed of decisions it does not express any 
opinion or criticism of a decision. It must be remembered that its task is limited to 
examining only Community Proposals that would lead to a significant change in policy. 
It does not extend to examining ECJ decisions which may clarify a particular existing 
directive. 
From the above discussion it is evident that Sub-Committee E has an extremely 
heavy burden placed upon its members. Its dual task of inquiring into both legal issues 
and policy developments is one that no other Sub-Committee will face. In the last two 
Parliamentary sessions, this task has been made all the more arduous because of the role 
it now plays in the scrutiny of proposals under the Inter- Governmental pillars. Thus 
Sub-Committee E always has a full agenda. In the next section, there will be a detailed 
examination of recent reports produced by the Sub-Committee over the last two 
Parliamentary sessions which illustrate how it approaches its important role of scrutiny. 
Sub-Committee E Reports 
Sub-Committee E publishes reports like any other Sub-Committee. The starting point 
f'or any inquiry is usually a Commission proposal. In the last two Parliamentary sessions 
(1994-95 and 1995-96) it has conducted no free standing inquiries into major issues of 
policv. In fact, this Sub-Committee because of its specific Terms of Reference has a 
predominantly leoislative character to its inquiries. Any inquiry into policy is usually 
linked to legislative proposal. However, given the role this Sub-Committee now plays 
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in the scrutiny of the Inter-Governmental Pillars, it is adopting a more policy orientated 
approach to its work. 
In the 1994-95 Parliamentary session, the Sub-Committee undertook two major 
inquiries. One was concerned with a legislative proposal under the European 
Community and the other under the Third Inter-Governmental Pillar of Justice and 
Home Affairs. 
The Right of Establishment ofLawyers Inquiry 
This Sub-Committee E inquiry was an investigation into a draft European Parliament 
and Council Directive proposal for extending the Right of Establishment of Lawyers 
within the Community. 395 The proposal read as follows: 
6293/95 (COM(94) 572) Draft European Parliament and Council Directive 
to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on 
a permanent basis in a Member State other than 
that in which the qualification was obtained. 
If one looks at the Terms of Reference for Sub-Committee E again, it will be seen 
that this inquiry was carried out because it concerned a "important development in 
Community law". In the introduction to the report, 396 the point is made that free 
movement of lawyers has proved to be a controversial issue within the European 
Community. It took the Council of Bars and Law Societies of the European Communitv 
(('CBE) seventeen years to agree a draft proposal. The above proposal departed from a 
number of principles that Nvere in the CCBE proposal and it was for this reason that 
Sub-Committee E decided to conduct the inquiry. 
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Thus the inquiry itself was verý, specific. This was reflected in the witnesses called 
by the Sub-Committee to give evidence, predominantly made up of lawyers and legal 
organisations, e. g. The General Council of the Bar and the Law Society of Scotland. 397 
The inquiry itself was a very detailed one. It centred on the practical implications of 
introducing the directive and the most appropriate manner by which to ensure that 
standards are maintained. The inquiry looked at the issue from a EuroPean perspective 
and not just from an exclusively UK one. This is a an increasing feature of Sub- 
Committee inquiries. As stated above, they now aim to influence decision making 
within the European Institutions and not just at a government level. 
The report itself was produced for "information purposes" for the House. Thus it was 
not subject of a full scale debate within the chamber. However, following a decision of 
the Court of Justice in Gebhard v. Milan Bar Association, 398 Lord Slynn, the Chairman 
of the Sub-Committee at the time raised the issue in the Chamber399 and questioned 
the government minister on the significance of this decision on the proposed directive. 
Therefore it can be seen that the report is an important way of raising the profile of an 
issue and ensures that the government does have to make some response to the Sub- 
Committee. This is effective scrutiny. 
The EUROPOL Inquiry 
The Europol inquiry4OO was the first inquiry into a proposal coming forward under 
the Inter-Governmental Justice and Home Affairs Pillar. It concerned provisions in the 
1'reaty on European Union to establish police cooperation for preventing and 
combatiiig serious forms of organised international crime and drug trafficking. Though 
the report Nvas based on two documents, they were not Community proposals. The 
doctiments N\-ci-c as follows: - 
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(P) 9757/93 Draft Convention to establish Europol 
(P) 12321/l/94 REV I Draft Decision on joint action concerning the 
Europol Drugs Unit. 
In the field of inter-governmental cooperation proposals come not from the 
Commission but from the European Council. Thus the scrutiny which takes place is 
from a different base. The end result of the proposal will not be a directive, but a 
Convention which will require enacting legislation in the UK. 
However, the aim of the scrutiny process is the same. It is an attempt to influence the 
minister , in this case the Home Secretary, before he gave his final approval to the 
Convention in the European Council. The major difference between proposals under the 
Inter-Governmental Pillars and Community Law is that the proposals are kept 
confidential until final agreement is reached among the Member States and there is no 
requirement to publish the proposals at all. As far as the EUROPOL inquiry was 
concerned, the draft Convention was made available to Parliament six days before the 
Home Office gave evidence to Sub-Committee E. From a scrutiny perspective this is 
undesirable,, a point the Select Committee made in its 1993 Report on the scrutiny 
arrangements for the Inter-Governmental Pillars. 401 
The above point was one also picked up by witnesses who gave evidence to the sub- 
Committee. "Justice" pointed out that the draft Convention was produced in November 
1993 but did not reach the public domain until mid 1994. "Liberty" voiced similar 
concerns by disagreeing with the practice of placing the draft Convention in the Librarý, 
of the House but not making it public. These comments are justified. If the Sub- 
Committee is to produce an influential and effective report, then both the witnesses and 
the Sub-Committee must ha\-c full access to the facts as early as possible. Otherwise any 
evidence Nvill be pure speculation and hearsay, giving it little or no value. Furthermore, 
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it will not be possible to influence the minister concerned if the report is produced too 
late. Without these two requirements, scrutiny is ineffective. 
The actual EUROPOL inquiry was the usual thorough and precise task which has 
become the hallmark of the House of Lords Sub-Committees. There were a variety of 
witnesses called to give evidence from both government and interest groups. The actual 
inquiry was particularly suited to Sub-Committee E. It concerned many technical and 
complex legal issues which were tailor made for a committee of lawyers to investigate. 
However, this inquiry was the first that dealt with proposals under the Inter- 
Governmental Pillars. It is thus difficult to assess the impact this inquiry had, and in 
particular one cannot say with certainty that all future inquiries will be as thorough. 
Perhaps this inquiry had an element of 'novelty value' and future inquiries will be more 
limited due to lack of time. Whatever the developments, the success of the scrutiny 
arrangements for the two new Pillars will only be judged in the light of future inquiries 
and reports. 
The Use of Ad-Hoe Sub-Committees in the House of Lords 
In addition to the two established Select Committees, the House of Lords has 
provision to set-up ad hoc Committees to conduct inquiries into issues which are 
viewed as being important. In the Report by the Select Committee on the work of the 
402 House, they described the ad hoc Committees as having a "very positive" impact on 
the work of the House. Because there are no Departmental Select Committees in the 
House of Lords, ad hoc Committees are frequently appointed to conduct inquiries into 
both narrow legislativc proposals and broader departmental inquiries. 
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The Select Committee on the European Community itself appoints ad hoc Sub- 
Committees. These are in addition to the now six existing Sub-Committees. An ad hoc 
Sub-Committee will be appointed by the main Select Committee to conduct an inquiry 
which is concemed with a suýject that in the Committee's opinion does not fall within 
the ambit of any of the existing Sub-Committees. Thus such an ad hoc Sub-Committee 
will be appointed with specific Terms of Reference for the duration of that particular 
inquiry only. 
Membership of Ad Hoc Sub-Committees 
Membership of ad hoc Sub-Committees is open to any peer. However, on the whole, 
a majority of the members are peers who already serve on one or more of the existing 
Sub-Committees. 403 The advantage of the ad hoc Sub-Committees is that it allows 
those peers who have a special interest in the given subject to be a part of that inquiry. 
Thus, in the last major ad hoc Sub-Committee inquiry into the 1996 Inter- Governmental 
Conference, 404 Lord Tebbit, a former minister with forthright views on the direction of 
the European Union, was invited to join, and Baronness Serota, a former Chairman of 
the Lords Select Committee who retired from her post in 1992, was also a member. The 
make up of the Committee tries to reflect as far as possible all shades of opinion within 
the House. The Report itself reflects this very fact. 
Terms of Reference 
Unlike the six permanent Sub-Committees which have either the same Terms of 
Reference as the main Select Committee or in the case of Sub-Committee E its own 
Terms of Reference, each ad hoc Sub-Committee is given its own particular Terms of 
Reference that are tailored for the inquiry at hand. This is sensible, in that it allows each 
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ad hoc Sub-Committee to focus in on the essential issues at the heart of the inquiry or 
address the concerns of the Select Committee and House as a whole. Once appointed the 
ad hoc Sub-Committee conducts the inquiry in the usual way and it has all the same 
powers to call witnesses and papers as the five other Sub-Committees have. In addition, 
it can,, like all other Sub-Committees appoint Specialist Advisers for the duration of the 
inquiry and travel abroad should the need arise. 
Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the 1996 Inter- Governmental Conference 
This was the last major inquiry undertaken by an ad-hoc Sub-Committee in the 
House of Lords. The Sub-Committee was appointed in January 1995 and published its 
Report in November 1995. The aim of the inquiry was to look forward to the 1996 Inter- 
Governmental Conference and consider what the likely developments in the European 
Union would be. As will be seen from the Terms of Reference below, the inquiry 
covered such a broad and diverse range of issues that it could not have been undertaken 
by any one Sub-Committee on its own. The Terms of Reference are as follows: _405 
"To consider the matters which are to be reviewed at the Inter 
Govermuental Conference which will be convened in 1996 , in particular- 
(a) The policies and forms of cooperation introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty and whether they need to be revised in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms and institutions of the Community, and the 
relationship of the institutions with the Member States. 
(b) The need for and scope of co-decision between the Council and the 
European Parliament. 
(c) The budgletary provisions of the Treaty, including the arrangements for 
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. 
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(d) The functioning of the Community institutions, given the prospect of 
future enlargement of the Community, including such questions as the 
composition of the Commission and the system of Qualified Majority 
Voting. 
(e) Review of the classification of Community acts. " 
The most evident point from the Standing Orders is that this ad hoc Sub-Committee 
was concerned exclusively with policy and not legislative proposals. The inquiry 
focussed on the burning issues within the European Union today, notably co-decision 
and enlargement. However, the aim of the inquiry was no different from any other 
conducted by a permanent Sub-Committee. The inquiry was designed to coincide with 
the government preparations for the lGC and most importantly to influence and advise 
the government. Partly due to reports published by both the House of Lords and House 
of Commons, the government published its own White Paper in response in March 
1996.406 In fact, this White Paper is testimony that the government does listen to the 
views of the Select Committees in both Houses. 
Nature of the Inquiry 
As stated above, the subject matter of the inquiry was very broad and many witnesses 
were called to give evidence. Because the inquiry covered a variety of policy areas, the 
(0 hoc Sub-Committee consulted with the other established Sub-Committees for their 
advice and opinions on some of the more complex or controversial issues. 407 
Essentially therefore, the ad hoc Sub-Committee works no differently to any of the 
other permanent Sub-Committees. However, an ad hoc Sub-Committee is primarily 
concerned with policý, and does not engage in the routine scrutiny of legislative 
proposals. Thus they are an effective means of addressing the important issues within 
FLiropean Union NN-Iii1st permitting the permanent Sub-Committees to scrutinise the 
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important legislative developments which continue to come forward. In essence, the 
House of Lords European Communities Committee has devised a division of Labour 
that ensures the limited Parliamentary time is used more effectively. 
Concluding remarks 
At the outset of this chapter, the point was made that the primary aim of the Sub- 
Committees is to influence the minister through the scrutiny activities of the sub- 
Committee. From the analysis above, it is evident that the House of Lords arrangements 
for doing this are on the whole effective. Both the quality and nature of the reports has 
made them influential with the goverm-nent and with the European Community 
institutions. However, the question that must be considered is whether the arrangements 
could be improved? 
Reforming the Sub-Committees 
One of the most common criticisms levelled at the present arrangements is that the 
Sub-Committee structure is too rigid. To be more precise, the criticism is that there are 
too many permanent Sub-Committees. In the Jelicoe Report'408 both the then Leader of 
the House of Lords, the Right Honourable Lord Waddington, and the former Foreign 
Office Minister Tristan Garel-Jones (amongst others) made the point that the a reduction 
in the number of Sub-Committees would lead to greater flexibility within the system 
and thus to more active effective scrutiny. 
409 In effect, what they were arguing for was 
an increase in the use of ad hoc Sub-Committees. This would, in their opinion, allow for 
inquiries to be more specific and remove the rather artificial nature of the subject based 
Sub-Committees. The point was quite correctly made, and is probably even more true 
Page - 270 
today, that many important general issues facing the Community now fall within the 
remit of more than one subject-related Committee. Furthermore, this authors researcli 
has also indicated that the Sub-Committees on occasion had a difficulty in finding a 
suitable subject for inquiry an would on occasion be inactive. 
Though the Sub-Committees are a great asset to the scrutiny process, there is an 
increasing need to review the work of the Sub-Committees, especially in the light of the 
increasing pressures coming as a result of the developments of the Inter-Governmental 
procedures. One possibility would be a Sub-Committee that is dedicated to the 
exclusive scrutiny of Inter- Governmental proposals with its own Terms of Reference. 
This would permit it to carry out the necessary detailed inquiries that are essential for 
effective scrutiny. The argument for this development is strengthened by the fact that 
proposals coming forward under the Inter- Governmental Pillars are not legislative 
proposals along the lines of those agreed within the Council of Ministers of the 
European Community. As the discussion of the EUROPOL inquiry above illustrates, a 
whole new process of law making based on confidential negotiations, which can be 
concluded very rapidly, has been created. For the House of Lords to assert its influence, 
there must be the appropriate machinery that will permit it to execute this task - possibly 
outside of Sub-Committee E's remit. 
The reforms outlined above reflect only the author's opinions which have developed 
during the course of his research. In addition to this though, there is still is a positive 
role for subject based Sub-Committees within the scrutiny process. However, this 
should be streamlined to three Sub-Committees at most, with a greater reliance being 
placed on ad hoc Sub-Committees to carry out the inquiries which do not fall within one 
of the Sub-Comn-iittees. Most importantly, this would allow for inquiries to be carried 
out more quickly as an (0 hoc Sub-Committee could be established for each inquiry. 
Such a development would be an improvement on the present arrangements where an 
inquiry will be delayed until the current one is concluded, or not held at all due to lack 
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of time. This would be a more balanced scrutiny arrangement because it would go a 
long way to meeting the diverse requirements of the House of Lords European 
Communities Committee which focuses on both legislation and policy. 
The work and working methods of the Sub-Committees 
Essentially, the Sub-Committees are investigative in their nature. Indeed, their 
working methods of conducting detailed and long inquiries leads to the conclusion that 
they could best be described as 'working parties'. What is most apparent about the way 
they conduct an inquiry is the consensual approach they adopt. 410 All inquiries reflect 
the views and opinions of all Sub-Committee members and evidence sessions are public 
and always published in full. This consensual approach means there is never a minority 
report produced. This is undoubtedly a strength of the Sub-committees. The fact that 
reports concentrate on contributing to the debate of the issue at hand and not on 
questions concerning the UK's continued membership of the European Union has made 
the reports as respected as they are throughout the entire European Union. 
However, within this role, it is essential that the Sub-Committees do not lose sight of 
the central pillar of their work - that of influencing the minister. Though a report 
produced by any of the Sub-Committees is not binding upon a minister, he will find it 
difficult to ignore. The high level of expertise on the Sub-Committees, which is 
continually being increased by the addition of new life peers with direct experience of 
European institutions such as the Commission, Council of Ministers and Court of 
Justice, will mean that any report will be both comprehensive and of a very high 
standard. 
Furthermore, scrutiny is only effective if the minister listens to what the Sub- 
Committee has to say. At present there are no constitutional arrangements to make the 
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minister listen, as is the case in the Danish Parliament where the Danish Folketing 
Market Committee issue the minister with a mandate from which he can only derogate 
if prior approval is received from the Committee. However, it is apparent that reports 
produced by the Sub-Committees are almost indispensable, leading to ministers taking 
account of the views within them automatically. 
This chapter has concentrated on the backbone of the scrutiny arrangements in the 
House of Lords. What has become apparent is that there is a system in existence which 
is beginning to struggle to meet the ever increasing demands placed upon it. Therefore, 
in the next chapter the evaluation will move on to how the recent developments within 
I nter- Governmental cooperation have been addressed by the House of Lords and how 
successful they have been in ensuring that government remains accountable for 
decisions taken under the Pillars. 
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CHAPTERIO 
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS FOR 
SCRUTINY OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL PILLARS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the focus is exclusively on the arrangements in the House of Lords 
for scrutinising proposals that are being brought forward under the Inter-Governmental 
Pillars. This considers the developments introduced since the Maastricht Treaty which 
are primarily concerned with extending political cooperation between the Member 
States. It is the very fact that because under this process a new and unique system of 
law-making has been established, that both the House of Lords and House of Commons 
have had difficulty in developing effective scrutiny mechanisms to meet the new 
challenge. As will be illustrated, the present arrangements for scrutiny of the pillars in 
the House of Lords are not ideal. In particular, the restricted availability of information 
(specifically draft documents) because of confidentiality severely limits the Committee's 
ability to conduct effective scrutiny. 
In the Treaty of European Union signed by all Member States in Maastricht on 7 
February 1992, the Union created consists of three distinct pillars. The first and central 
pillar is the European Community which will continue to operate as before and issue 
legislation in the form of directives, regulations and decisions. The second pillar4l 
I is 
intended to establish a "common foreign and security policy including the eventual 
establislunent of a common defence pollcy, '. 
412 The final pillar is intended to increase 
413 
co-operation between the Member States in the field of "justice and home affairs". 
Once again the cooperation between the Member States is of a political nature and thus 
totally distinct from the central pillar. 
Page - 274 
Objectives of the Inter-Govern mental Pillars 
The Second Pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
The objectives of the CFSP are: 414 
"- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of 
the Union; 
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States In all ways, 
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; 
- to promote international cooperation; 
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. " 
The Treaty on European Union provides that these two objectives are to be pursued 
in two ways: -415 
First by establishing systematic cooperation with Member States in the 
conduct of policy. This is achieved by consultation and exchange of 
information, but may be formalised whenever the Council deems it 
necessary by defining common positions. It is the resPonsibility of the 
Member States to support and uphold a common position, including 
ensuring that their national policies conform to it; and 
Second., by the Member States gradually implementing joint action in the 
areas in which they have important common interests. It is for the Council to 
decide that a matter should be the subject of joint action; and a joint action, 
once adopted, shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt 
and in the conduct of their activity. 
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The Third Pillar: Justice and Home Affairs 
The objectives under this pillar are two promote cooperation in matters of "common 
interest". Article K. I of the Treaty defines these as including inter alia asylum policy, 
external border controls, immigration policy, cooperation against terrorism and drug 
trafficking and other serious international crime. The Member States exchange 
information and then: -416 
- adopt joint positions and promote ... any cooperation contributing to the pursuit 
of the objectives of the Union; 
- adoptjoint action (subject to the test of subsidiarity), and 
- draw up conventions for adoption by the Member States under their national 
constitutional requirements. 
As is evident from the above extracts from the Treaty on European Union the 
primary objectives of both pillars is to increase political cooperation between the 
Member States in policy areas which under the central pillar of the European 
Community were traditionally viewed as being the exclusive domain of each individual 
Member State. Thus cooperation on policy of this kind is based on political agreement 
and not on a system of directives and regulations. Therefore, it is the manner in which 
the two new pillars function that is the vital factor which influences the scrutiny 
arrangements in the House of Lords. This will now be examined in more detail. 
Functioning of the Inter-Govern mental Pillars 
Thotigh the two flankino pillars, as they are called, have quite different objectives 
fliev havc in common the fact that Nvork undertaken within them will not lead to the 
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adoption of Community legislation under the procedures which are familiar to the Select 
Committee on the European Communities. As stated above, the policy areas covered by 
the pillars are legally outside Community competence. In fact, the procedures used are 
closer to classical diplomacy rather than the more formal law making procedures used in 
the central pillar of the European Community. 
Role of the European Institutions 
Under the two flanking pillars the role of the European institutions is wholly 
different to that seen under central pillar. Most notably, it is the role of the European 
Parliament that is diminished and the Council of Ministers and Commission who take 
the lead roles. Under the CFSP the European Parliament is consulted on "the main 
aspects and the basic choices" of the CSFP and its views "duly taken into 
consideration". It is also regularly kept informed of the development of the CFSP. 417 
Under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, the European Parliament is "regularly 
informed of discussions" and consulted on "the principal aspects of activities". Its views 
are then taken into consideration. However, in neither pillar, the European Parliament 
does not have the right to be consulted on the detail of the proposed actions. 
Furthermore, the European Parliament cannot insist on its views being taken into 
account. Contrast this with its role under the central pillar where the co-decision 
procedure requires close consultation with the European Parliament. 
The other major significant difference lies in the role of the Court of Justice. Because 
the procedures used are tecl-n-lically outside the European Community. the Court will 
not be the arbiter of any disputes except where the Member States agree beforehand. 
The results of any negotiation xvill instead be binding under international law. 
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As far as the Commission is concerned, the development of the two new pillars 
marks a new departure for it. For the first time the Commission is "fully associated" 
with inter-governmental work and will be able to put forward proposals. However, the 
Commission does not have exclusivity on making proposals with most in fact coming 
from the Member States and the Presidency of the Council in particular. 
Decision making under the Inter- Governmental Pillars 
It is within the realm of decision making that the biggest difference ties between 
procedures used within the inter-governmental sphere and the procedures used to make 
Community law under the Community Treaties. Under the new inter-governmental 
procedures, the discussions may be completely confidential until final agreement has 
been reached among the Members States. Furthermore, there is no requirement that 
proposals are published and if as is likely, this tradition continues, they will not be 
published. The argument behind this confidentiality is that Member States could not 
negotiate effectively if their views were in the public domain. Also, it is considered a 
courtesy to other Member States of not divulging confidential information that is the 
subject of negotiations. 
However, there is one obvious drawback with this position. From a scrutiny 
perspective it makes the job of the House of Lords Select Committee very difficult. 
Most importantly, if the Select Committee is only given details of a proposal once 
negotiations are concluded, then it can have little effective influence. 
Within the scrutiny context lies another important issue, that of the impact of the 
proposals under the pillars on domestic law. The largest impact will come from 
proposals under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, where changes may be needed in 
areas such as asyluni and inimigration law. The proposals may come forward as a treaty 
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which will then require ratification by every Member State including the United 
Kingdom. In such circumstances, Parliament will be informed and could object. 
However, this could only be done ij- domestic legislation was required. Only in such 
circumstances could Parliament have a veto. However, the text of the treaty could not be 
amended, unless the government wished to re-open negotiations. This is an unlikely 
prospect given that the original negotiations would already have been a very lengthy 
exercise, and other Member States would be reluctant to re-negotiate. 
In other situations, work under the inter-governmental pillars may not lead to a treaty 
that requires ratification or any amendment in domestic law. However, the common 
positions adopted as a result of these negotiations could place significant constraints on 
the UK's ability of individual action. This potentially causes major problems for 
Parliament. There are no existing constitutional procedures that require Parliament to be 
consulted in such circumstances. Thus, in either of the above instances, major 
developments in UK law may take place and Parliament is only a bystander. The 
Executive has in effect taken on the role of law maker. How has the Lords tried to 
redress this balance? 
Proposals to Scrutinise the Inter-Govern mental Pillars 
In the 1993 report House qf Lords Scrutiny of the Inter-Governmental Pillars of the 
418 Eiirolvan Union, the Select Committee on European Legislation made the 
following observation: 
419 
"We think that it is essential that work under the inter- governmental 
pillars of the European Union should be supervised by national 
parliaments. " 
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This observation was in line with the Declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty 
which stated: - 
"The Conference considers that it is important to encourage greater 
involvement of national Parliaments in the activities of the European 
Union". 
As far as the British government are concerned, it is Parliament and not any other 
institution which should perform this important task of scrutiny. In evidence given to 
the Select Committee both the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary were strongly of 
the opinion that this should be the case. In particular, they both argued against any 
delegation of the scrutiny function to the European Parliament, which only has a 
peripheral role in the Inter-Governmental Pillars. The Right Honourable Michael 
Howard MR) the Home Secretary, articulated this view in his typically robust manner: - 
420 
"On accountability, it is clearly extremely important. I think that the 
appropriate way of establishing Parliamentary accountability in relation to 
the third pillar is to national parliaments. The European Parliament has to be 
informed of activity in this area but accountability is to be to national 
parliaments. " 
Michael Howard went on to justify this statement by stressing the main difference 
between decision making under the two flanking pillars and that of the central pillars. 
Under the flanking pillars there is no Qualified Majority Voting, all decisions are taken 
by unanimity. The European Parliament itself has not input into the proposal with there 
being no equivalent to the co-decision procedure under the pillars. Therefore, under 
these circumstances the minister can always be held accountable to Parliarnent for any 
decision taken in the Council. 
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In addition to the above reason, he also stressed the importance of maintaining a 
productive dialogue with the Select Committees in both the House of Lords and House 
of Commons. This he viewed as an integral aspect of the scrutiny function of the Select 
Committees. In essence, what Michael Howard is accepting is the assertion that only bv 
influencing the minister can effective scrutiny be exercised by the Select Committees. 
In his evidence to the Select Committee inquiry, the then Foreign Secretary, the 
Right Honourable Douglas Hurd MP, made a similar observation recognising the 
importance of the work of the Select Committees. He said: _421 
"Our aim would be to let you as soon as the negotiating mandate has 
been approved and to keep you informed as much as possible about how it 
progresses, the negotiations that go on and their scope, and alwa s to seek y 
your views before conclusion of an agreement (my italics)". 
The Foreign Secretary like the Home Secretary has appreciated the constitutional 
significance of ministerial accountability at the despatch box and to the respective 
Select Committees. In a Parliamentary democracy such as the United Kingdom, 
ministerial accountability for decisions taken by govermuent must be at the core of 
Parliamentary activity. In its response to the Select Committee Report, the government 
accepted this important constitutional proposition: 422 
"The Government fully support the Committees conclusion that 
accountability for work under the inter- governmental pillars of the European 
Union should be to national parliaments .... The Government 
believe that it is 
an important feature of the inter-govermnental process that national 
governments of member states should be accountable to national 
parliaments, not to the European Parliament, on business under these pillars. 
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The Government have consistently defended the role of national 
parliaments in this respect and will continue to do so. " 
From the above discussion it would seem that scrutiny of proposals under the inter- 
governmental pillars is an easier task for the Select Committee. All decisions are taken 
by unanimous approval and the government appear to be enthusiastic on the role of 
Parliament in the process. However, a closer examination of the detailed proposals 
under which the Select Committee work will dispel this view. 
Arrangements for Scrutiny Under the Inter-Govern mental Pillars 
Provision of documents to Parliament 
In the course of their inquirY423 the Select Committee on EuroPean Legislation 
suggested three possible (though not exhaustive) criteria on which a document should 
be supplied to Parliament for further investigation to take place. These are: 424 
(i) significance - particularly where the rights or duties of individuals may 
be affected; 
(ii) the eventual need for United Kingdom legislation; 
(iii) the imposition of legally binding commitments on the United Kingdom. 
These criteria went further than what the Home Secretary offered in his evidence to 
the Select Committee. Mr Howard agreed to provide Parliament with a full text of any 
proposals or convention onlýý if it necessitated subsequent primary legislation. The 
Select Committee in the criteria outlined above suggests that documents which require 
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secondary legislation or impose legal commitments should also be deposited in 
Parliament. 
In their reply, the government in principle agreed to the Select Committees proposals 
but with one important proviso. The government stressed that if a document was of a 
confidential nature or that its disclosure could weaken the governments negotiating 
position, then it would not release such a document in to the public domain. This 
confidentiality exception is one which both the Home and Foreign Secretary stressed in 
their oral evidence to the Select Committee and which the government also emphasised 
in its response to the Select Committees report. In the light of this, the question which 
must be asked is whether this confidentiality will always be justified, especially with 
regards to the effect this will have on effective scrutiny. 
In their report, the Select Committee argued quite strongly that the three criteria 
outlined above, should be applied equally to both the second and third pillar. 425 
Though they accepted that each pillar would produce different results in terms of the 
action to be taken by Parliament at the end of negotiations, they argued that the process 
of the Council reaching a common position through the negotiations would be the same 
in either case. However, the govermuent did not share this view and its response to the 
Select Committee put forward the proposals for scrutiny of the pillars. In particular, the 
government felt that under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar there would be a greater 
need for primary domestic legislation to implement the results of any negotiations. In 
their response to the Select Committee the government pointed out that proposals under 
the Justice and Home Affairs pillar will lead to: -426 
11 ... conventions 
joint positions and guidelines which are of a longer-term 
and legislative character and may need to be implemented by primary 
legislation in the United Kingdom. The Government envisage that CFSP 
documents. on the other hand, will usually be non-legislative and short- 
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term, and that a need for UK implementing legislation is very unlikely to 
arise. The vast majority will also have to remain confidential until agreed 
and published, for diplomatic and security reasons. " 
This reply does, in this author's opinion, call into question the governments 
commitment to the role of Parliament in the scrutiny of inter-governmental affairs. The 
actual proposals put forward by the government and now practised in the House of 
Lords place the government's negotiating position above any other consideration. The 
confidentiality argument appears to be put forward at every juncture by the government 
and may be viewed as being more important than effective scrutiny by Parliament. This 
inevitably leads one to question the value of the Declaration in the Maastricht Treaty 
which was supposed to strengthen the role of national parliaments in the European 
Union. This Declaration can only carry weight if the govermnent which insisted on its 
inclusion is totally committed to both the principle and spirit of it. Otherwise the 
Declaration is merely empty words. The next point to consider is how effective the 
arrangements in the House of Lords are in meeting the 'requirements' of the Maastricht 
Treaty Declaration. 
Scrutiny of the Common Foreign and Security Pillar 
As stated above, the Select Committee were of the opinion that documents which 
fell within one of three criteria should automatically be provided to Parliament. 
427 
However, the actual position today is considerably more limited than this. In particular, 
the government's argument of the need for confidentiality in these negotiations 
dominates the scrutiny arrangements. 
The scrutiny arrangements are built upon the existing procedures in the House of 
Lords. The government provide the Lords with texts of CFSP statements. declarations, 
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common positions and joint actions only once they have been agreed The government 
refuse to provide the Lords with any drafts of CFSP documents. This position is in 
keeping with other areas of foreign policy and covers the vast majority of texts. 
However, the government do provide Parliament with certain CFSP documents if they 
fall within existing scrutiny guidelines or if the documents are not subject to 
confidentiality requirements and meet one of the three criteria put forward by the Select 
Committee. In practice both these situations are extremely rare. 
Thus,, it is immediately apparent that scrutiny of the CFSP pillar is an extremely 
difficult task, made all the more difficult by the governments commitment to 
confidentiality. Scrutiny is for all purposes pointless once the common position has 
been agreed. If we accept that the purpose of scrutiny is to influence the government, 
then under these arrangements this is not possible. There needs to be a clear 
commitment by the government to providing texts in good time to allow for scrutiny. In 
essence similar (if not exactly the same) procedures should apply as they do under the 
central pillar of the European Community. However, given the government's position, 
this is extremely unlikely to happen. 
Why is there a needfor confidentiality? 
The CFSP is a development of European Political Cooperation (EPC) which like 
CFSP was always outside structures of the European Community. Thus the procedures 
have always been of a confidential nature. This is primarily for three reasons. First, 
because of the need by the government to keep its own negotiating position secret from 
other Member States. Second. because of the delicate and sensitive nature of matters 
wider discussion. And third, to respect the position of other Member States who also 
require secrecy for similar reasons. The Select Committee recognised these important 
points and was prepared to adjust its scrutiny procedures to accommodate the 
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government. They stated in their report that the early provision of documents was 
essential for effective scrutiny but that they also recognised the special requirements of 
the Inter- Goverrunental pillars and the CFSP pillar in particular: -428 
"It is a corollary of our requests for extensive infonnation that we should 
exercise our scrutiny function actively and with some degree of sensi II 
The government rejected this compromise in its response to the Select Committee. 
As stated above it was not prepared to provide draft texts except in very limited 
circumstances. The reasoning is not made clear in the government response but one may 
speculate (perhaps cynically) that it is probably connected with a concern of confidential 
information being leaked to the media or perhaps more significantly to sceptical 
backbenchers. 
Therefore, from the above discussion it is plainly evident that different procedures 
and different objectives apply to the CFSP pillar than to the European Community. To 
that extent a comparison between the two is not always appropriate. However, both have 
one crucial aspect in common, that of the executive (i. e. ministers) taking decisions 
outside of the UK's Parliament. There must be effective control of this by Parliament. In 
the author's view, it is not enough for a minister to justify his position once it is too late 
to influence. 
Scrutiny of the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar 
In a memorandum to the Select Committee, the Home Secretary proposed the 
arrangements for scrutiny of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. 
429 Under this pillar 
the Council of Ministers adopt common positions in the same way as under the CFSP 
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pillar. They do not adopt Community legislation. The Home Secretary pledged to 
provide the following information: 43 0 
- the first full text that is tabled of any Convention or proposals which will, 
if agreed, require later primary legislation in the United Kingdom, except 
where the proposal relates to security arrangements or operational matters 
and publication could prejudice the effectiveness of the intended action; and 
- substantial changes which subsequently occur during the negotiation of the 
final text. 
There is a definite distinction between the arrangements under these two pillars. In 
particular the secrecy aspect is not as prominent under the third pillar. As is plainly 
evident from the Home Secretary's own memorandum, he will issue the "first full text of 
any Convention". Thus scrutiny for the Select Committee is a much easier task. They 
have the opportunity to discuss the proposals before the final text is agreed. 
Furthermore, if following this scrutiny there are "substantial changes" to the final text, 
the minister will provide the relevant documents to Parliament. There is a secrecy 
exception but it is not central to the govermuents approach. 
There are essentially two reasons for this. Firstly, the subject matter under discussion 
is not as sensitive as under the CFSP pillar. e. g. immigration and asylum policy or 
judicial cooperation. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, proposals under the 
Justice and Home Affairs pillar will almost always require primary legislation to 
implement the Convention or Treaty subsequently agreed. Thus, Parliament must know 
as early as possible what effect any Convention or Treaty will have on existing domestic 
legislation and be allowed to debate it fully. 
The first House of Lords Select Committee Report431 on a Justice and Home Affairs 
proposal came in 1995 and concerned the EUROPOL Convention to establish closer 
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police cooperation within the European Union. The inquiry itself took the form of an), 
other Select Committee inquiry and was carried out by Sub-Committee E, the Law and 
Institutions Sub-Committee. The Home Secretary himself gave evidence to the inquiry 
and talked about the progress in setting up EUROPOL. This evidence was in fact given 
prior to the final approval of the Convention in the Council of Ministers. Thus, the 
minister will under this pillar keep Parliament informed as far as possible where security 
concerns are not compromised. 
However, the Home Secretary's proposals for disclosure of documents are short of 
what the Select Committee wanted. In his memorandum, the Home Secretary was only 
prepared to release documents where primary legislation was required. Thus, he 
apparently excluded from the Justice and Home Affairs arrangements documents that 
would need to be implemented by secondary legislation. This is disappointing and it is a 
little difficult to understand the reasoning behind this decision. Surely, any document 
requiring domestic legislation would be of interest to Parliament and not merely those 
which require primary legislation. Once again therefore, the commitment of the 
government to the Declaration in the Maastricht Treaty intended to enhance the role of 
national Parliaments in the European Union must be questioned. 
The primary criticism of the government concerns its rather indifferent approach to 
scrutiny. At the European level , it champions vociferously the national Parliaments of 
the Union. In practice however, the situation is different. Obviously, there are legitimate 
concerns of security and confidentiality and these are respected. But the development of 
the pillars has made formal a procedure for inter-governmental negotiation, where 
previously they were conducted on an ad hoc basis. In the past if two or more 
governments shared a common policy they would meet to discuss their approach or 
simply telephone each other Lind adopt a common stance. Now under the pillars, fifteen 
Member States are involved, leading to a much more concerted action. It is the 
introduction of this formal procedure under the pillars, as a forum for inter- 
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governmental negotiation that makes scrutiny essential. Thus in essence it is not just the 
subject matter that needs to be scrutinised, but also the procedures involved in making 
the decisions. 
The Use of Explanatory Memorandum 
If we cast our minds back to chapter 3 detailing the work of the Scrutiny Committee 
in the Commons and chapter 8 on the Select Committee on the European Communities 
in the Lords, we will remember that central to those scrutiny arrangements was the 
provision of an Explanatory Memorandum (EM) by the lead government department. 
The aim of this EM is to provide both Select Committees with the governments opinion 
on the document under scrutiny. 
The Common Foreign and Security Pillar 
However, from the discussion above,, it is clearly evident that the provision of EM's 
by the government is not entirely appropriate when either Select Committee is 
considering a document under the CFSP Pillar. The primary reason for this relates to the 
issues of confidentiality which dominate negotiations under this pillar. The more limited 
disclosure requirements that the Select Committee was prepared to accept have already 
been outlined, but these were turned down by the government. Thus, the Select 
Committee has no prior knowledge of what proposals a particular document may 
contain. All the Select Committee can hope for is that the minister will come to the 
House and explain the need for secrecy once the matter is in the public domain -a 
classic case of closing the stable door once the horse has bolted. 
Page - 289 
The Justice and Home Affairs Pillar 
The position here with regard to the provision of EM's is slightly different because 
under this pillar, there is not such a dependency upon confidentiality. In their reply to 
the Select Committees report, the government432 intimated that It would M principle be 
prepared to supply an EM to Parliament provided that it came within one of the three 
established criteria. Thus the government went part of the way in meeting the Select 
Committees proposals. 433 
In their response to the Select Committee the government proposed that provision of 
EM's would be on the same timescale as for EC documents - ten working days. This 
may be subject to delay if the government needs to consider more closely whether the 
EM should be issued, for example if there are issues of confidentiality. Thus, the Select 
Committee itself has no input in this decision. It is left purely to the government to 
make a value judgment about the nature of the subject matter in the proposal. There is 
little experience of scrutiny of the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar in the House of 
Lords. To date, only the EUROPOL proposals have been the subject of a major inquiry. 
If this inquiry is a precedent for future ones then there is cause for optimism. Not only 
did the Home Secretary provide a full Explanatory Memorandum to the Select 
Committee, but he also attended an oral evidence session in front of Sub-Committee E. 
It is too early to make any firm conclusions from this one inquiry, but it is encouraging 
that the government did not invoke confidentiality arguments merely for the sake of it. 
Page - 290 
The Scrutiny Reserve 
The scrutiny reserve is embodied in the Resolution of The House of 24 October 
1990.434 As mentioned in previous chapters, this Resolution is the cornerstone of the 
scrutiny process by preventing the minister from giving final agreement to a proposal in 
Council before scrutiny has been concluded by the Select Committees. The Select 
Committee in their 1993 report argued very forcefully (and quite correctly) for the 
extension of the scrutiny reserve to cover proposals coming forward under the pillars. 
The following extract from this report illustrates both the Committee's arguments for 
extending the scrutiny reserve and its concern about a failure to do this: -435 
"We believe that the objective should be a system under which the 
Government undertake, wherever possible, not to agree to a proposal in the 
Council until Parliamentary scrutiny has been completed. Since the Single 
European Act opened the way for greater use of majority voting in the 
Council and thus speeded up generally the process of reaching agreement, it 
has been necessary for this Committee to work more flexibly, and there have 
also been occasions when the Goverm-nent was outvoted or found it 
necessary to override the scrutiny reserve. We are not convinced that the 
speed or pressures are any greater at least under the Justice and Home 
Affairs pillar. The scrutiny reserve has been of great value in concentrating 
minds both of those in Government and those in Parliament on the need for 
timely expression of views, and while we accept that there may be a higher 
proportion of cases where Ministers - in particular the Foreign Secretary - 
will find it necessary to override the scrutiny reserve, we are not persuaded 
that it should not apply at all to decision making on justice and home affairs 
and foreign affairs. " 
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The government flatly rejected any extension of the scrutiny reserve. Their reasoning 
was based upon the fact that they will provide all documents to the Committee in good 
time to allow for effective scrutiny and that decision making in the Council will often be 
a quick process and therefore there will be no time for a reserve. The government 
concluded its reply by stating that: -436 
"... the Government do not think it appropriate that outstanding scrLitiny 
requirements should prevent the United Kingdoms agreement. " 
The above statement raises many questions. Most important is the one which has 
been referred to a number of times previously. This relates to the governments 
commitment to the role of national parliaments in the EU. The Declaration in the 
Maastricht Treaty safeguarding the role of national parliaments is meaningless in the 
light of this statement. Parliament must in the absence of any other effective scrutiny 
continue to have some control over the activities of the minister in the Council. 
Statements such as the one above do nothing except undermine this need. 
Given the above scenario, one is naturally led to ask the question why the 
government has committed itself to provide EM's on proposals under the Justice and 
Home Affairs pillar? It seems logical that once you accept that EM's will be provided 
then you must accept the limitations of the Scrutiny Reserve. The scrutiny reserve is 
designed to allow the Committee to investigate the proposal, and the EM is the starting 
point of this investigation. There is no point in the Committee spending valuable time 
and resources on conducting an inquiry only for the govermnent to approve the 
document prior to the conclusion of the Committee's deliberation. Thus unless the 
reserve is incorporated into the scrutiny procedure, the present arrangements are not 
fully effective. 
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Furthermore, the scrutiny reserve as presently worded would in fact meet the 
concerns of the government. Firstly, as far as confidential matters are concerned, the 
1990 Resolution states unequivocally, that confidential matters are not subject to the 
scrutiny reserve. 437 Secondly, when a quick decision is needed, the Resolution allows 
the minister to give approval and then report to the House as to why this was done. 438 
Both of these cases are already common under the EC pillar and work reasonably well. 
Thus there is no reason why the Reserve should not apply to documents which do not 
come within either of the two exceptions above. Therefore, if the requirements of speed 
or confidentiality are genuine they will be covered by the 1990 Resolution. 
In the light of what has been said above, there is strong evidence for the extension of 
the scrutiny reserve to at least the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. In fact the Home 
Secretary himself has imposed something akin to a reserve in the Council of Ministers. 
On 23 November 1995, Michael Howard stopped negotiations on the draft corruption 
protocol to the fraud convention and the draft joint action on racism and xenophobia 
proposal, to allow Parliament to conclude its inquiry. These proposals were seen as 
important enough to warrant this action. Surely, once the government has accepted that 
some proposals need further inquiry, the case for a formal extension of the scrutiny 
reserve is irresistible. This change is now long overdue. 
The Role of the Sub-Committees in the Scrutiny of the Pillars 
The House of Lords developed no new procedures or vehicle for scrutiny of the Inter- 
Governmental pillars. In its 199-33 Report, the Select Committee on European Legislation 
recognised that scrutiny of the pillars would place increased burdens on the already busy 
SLib-Committees. However, in 19933, the Select Committee were not in a position to say 
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what the exact effect of this increased workload would be and that the matter would 
need to be reviewed after an initial period of operation. 
However,, the Select Committee made the observation that the activity of the Sub- 
Committees in scrutinising proposals under the Inter-Governmental pillars will be 
dependant upon the extent with which ministers supply Parliament with documents and 
give them the time engage in a meaningful debate. 439 Thus it is not appropriate to make 
any assessment of this given that many of the documents will be of a confidential nature 
and will not therefore be provided to Parliament in time to allow for an in-depth inquiry. 
Thus each document will be taken on its own merits. 
The burden of scrutiny initially fell on Sub-Committee E, the Law and Institutions 
I_ Sub-Committee. In an interview a former Clerk to the Select Committee on the 
European Communities, 440 stated that the Inter-Governmental pillars had placed a 
"quite substantially increased burden on Sub-Committee E". However, he continued by 
stressing that as Sub-Committee E was chaired by a Law Lord, the scrutiny work of the 
Inter-Governmental pillars was "tailor made" for it. 
A closer look at the EUROPOL inquiry will illustrate this very point. In particular, it 
is the very complex nature of this inquiry, focussing as it does on the legal 
consequences of the Convention, and how it will be implemented into UK law which 
demonstrates that a Committee of lawyers have the necessary expertise to execute this 
task. Though there has only been the one inquiry to date, the former Clerk suggested 
that these arrangements would work well, primarily because of the personnel involved. 
How-ever, at the start of the 1996-97 Parliamentary session, the Select Committee on 
the European Communities appointed a sixth Sub-Committee (Sub-Committee F) which 
on and Home Affairs. is charged with scrutinisino Social Affairs, Educati I It is the Home 
Affairs aspect of the Sub-Committees work which covers proposals under the third 
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pillar. In conversation with a legal adviser to the Select Committee, he pointed out the 
importance of this task as being the primary motive for establishing this Sub- 
Committee. Furthermore 
, it will also relieve much of the pressure on Sub-CommIttee E 
which has an ever increasing workload. 
By December 1996, Sub-Committee F had not yet undertaken any inquiry and thus it 
is not possible to assess what impact it will have on the scrutiny process. There are 
mixed views to be taken about the creation of this Sub-Committee. On a positive note it 
is undoubtedly beneficial that a Sub-Committee now focuses on the third pillar. It 
should quickly develop an expertise which will be beneficial. It may eventually lead to 
similar arrangements being established for the CFSP pillar. 
However, on the debit side, the appointment of another Sub-Committee reinforces 
the already over rigid structure of scrutiny in the Lords. In particular it goes against the 
recommendations of the Jelicoe Committee in 1991 which envisaged fewer permanent 
Sub-Committees and more ad hoc ones. Until the Sub-Committee has been active no 
tinal judgment can be made on this point. Although it is worth bearing in mind that 
given the limited number of documents coming forward even under the third pillar, it is 
questionable as to how much of the Sub-Committees time will be taken with examining 
proposals under the JHA pillar. 
The Select Committee's Terms of Reference 
In its report "The House of Lord's Scrutiny of the Inter-Governmental Pillar of the 
European Union", the Select Committee reviewed its Terms of Reference in the light of 
the nexv role it , vould take on in scrutinising proposals coming forward under the 
Inter- 
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Govenunental pillars. It concluded that the Terms of Reference as they stood permitted 
the Committee to carry out such inquiries. 
The Terms of Reference themselves order the Select Committee to consider 
"Community proposals". In 1973, this could only have meant for the Committee to 
consider proposals for Community legislation. However, the Committee rightly felt that 
the phrase "Community proposals" is capable of. -441 
"bearing a wider construction, and proposals for the Community to 
participate in or negotiate international agreements have been considered in 
several enquiries" 
Furthermore, the Terms of Reference also permit the Select Committee to consider 
"other questions". As has already been seen in the preceding chapters, this gives the 
Committee licence to inquire into more general issues, such as policy developments, 
consultative documents and non-legislative Council acts (e. g. Recommendations and 
Opinions). 442 
Notwithstanding the flexibility of these Terms of Reference and in particular their 
wide applicability, the Select Committee feel that because of their increased role, their 
Terms of Reference, should reflect more accurately the task they now perform. This is 
sensible as it will set in stone the activities of the Select Committee and remove any 
lingering doubt as to whether the Select Committee is competent to carry out such 
inquiries. For the Committee itself, the change is viewed as being necessary to bring its 
role into line with the Declaration in the Maastricht Treaty which encourages the 
participation of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union. The Select 
Committee proposed the following new Terms of Reference: 
443 
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"to consider Community proposals, whether in draft or otherwise, to 
obtain all necessary information about them and to make reports on those 
which, in the opinion of the Committee, raise important questions of policy 
or principle and on other questions, including the development of other 
elements of Ihe European Union, namely inter-governmental work on 
foreign and security policy and on justice and home affairs (my italics) to 
which the Committee consider that the special attention of the House should 
be drawn" 
The obvious amendment relates specifically to the work of scrutinising proposals 
under the pillars. However, it is unlikely that an explicit statement allowing the 
Committee to carry out such inquiries will make the government more generous in its 
supply of documents and other information. Thus any change to the Terms of Reference 
will be purely of benefit to the Select Committee itself. This was a view held by the 
government who in their response to the Select Committee report stated that any 
amendment to the Terms of Reference was purely a matter for the Select Committee and 
the House of Lords. 444 
Concluding remarks 
The introduction of the inter- govermnental pillars has provided a new challenge for 
the Select Committee. In particular the need to scrutinise legislative proposals which are 
decided upon in secret will continue to prove problematical. In fact it is the whole 
confidentiality issue which undermines the work of the Select Committee in this area. 
The reluctance by the government to provide draft texts to Parliament is not in keeping 
with the spirit of the Declaration in the Maastricht Treaty. The government must realise 
that Parliament can only carry out its scrutiny function if the government itself displays 
the necessary goodwill. 
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Above,, the need for confidentiality in this area was discussed. In the authors opinion, 
it appears that the government is a little preoccupied with this argument. The Select 
Committee put forward constructive and workable solutions to deal with these 
problems. In particular their pledge to act in a "sensitive" manner underlines their 
seriousness. The Committee are prepared to conduct evidence sessions in private and 
not publish their findings until the actual text itself is published. This solution would 
allow both sides to fulfil their commitments. Unfortunately, the government rejected it. 
This now means that proposals will be brought forward that have not been subject to 
adequate democratic accountability. Under these circumstances, Parliament is without 
any effective influence in this important area. 
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CHAPTER]] 
THE SCRUTINY OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION BY A 
REFORMED SECOND CHAMBER - SOME VIEWS AND 
EVALUATIONS OF A REFORMED HOUSE OF LORDS 
Introduction 
The general election of 1997, for the first time in eighteen years looks likely to 
produce a change of government. Whatever colour of government is elected, the issue of 
reforming the House of Lords will certainly be on the agenda. Both the opposition 
parties have put forward proposals for reforming the Lords. The question which this 
chapter will be concerned with is, how these changes could affect the scrutiny function 
of the House of Lords. Specifically, the evaluation will focus on how these proposals 
will affect the daily activities of the House of Lords e. g. the meeting of the Select 
Committee and the Sub-Committees as well as considering whether any proposed 
reforms would actually be workable in terms of preserving the scrutiny function. 
At far as this author is concerned, the scrutiny process in the House of Lords is one 
of the most effective. ) comprehensive and 
developed processes of any in the European 
Union. This includes the House of Commons procedures. This argument is based on 
three primary reasons: - 
1. The personnel involved in the scrutiny procedures; 
2. The inquisitorial nature of the scrutiny process; and 
3. The fact that the House of Lords is unelected. 
These factors will iioxv be examined in more detail. 
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The personnel involved in the scrutiny process 
At the end of the 1995-96 Session, the membership of the Select Committee on the 
European Communities was 20. Out of the 20 members 14 were Life Peers and 6 
Hereditary Peers. 445 Included in the 14 Life Peers was one Life Peer created under the 
Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 - Lord Slynn. As well as being a member of the full 
Select Committee, each Peer also sits on one or more of the five Sub-CommIttees. As 
the main Select Committee meets only every two weeks, the majority of a Peers time is 
taken up with attending Sub-Committee meetings. 
Party Affiliation 
Though there is party affiliation amongst the Peers on the Select Committee, it also is 
true to say that party political influences are less pronounced in the House of Lords. In 
particular, the significant presence of Cross-Benchers dilutes the influence of party 
pressure. The following figures show the current party make-up of the Select Committee 
on the European Communities: 446 
Conservative Members 7 
Labour Members 4 
Lib. Dem Members 3 
Cross-Benchers 6 
As can be seen from the above figures, the government has no inbuilt majority. 
unlike Select Committees in the House of Commons which are composed in proportion 
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to the number of MPs elected. Thus, the balance of power on this Select Committee lies 
to a great extent with the Cross-Benchers. 
However, one important point must be stressed. Evidence obtained by the author, 
especially through conversations with Peers and Officials in the House of Lords, 
suggests strongly that the Select Committee and indeed the Sub-Committees do not 
work on party lines. There are no minority reports produced and the Committee alwavs 
speaks with one voice (This issue is returned to in the next section). This is one of the 
strengths of the scrutiny process in the Lords. The non-confrontational approach and 
concentration on the issues before it. This is in contrast to the Commons where debate 
of any European issues regularly leads to a discussion of tired old arguments relating to 
our continued membership of the European Union. In 1982, a Report of a Study Group 
of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association on The Role of Second Chambers 
made the following observation about scrutiny of European legislation in the House of 
Lords: - 
"... the only really deep analysis of the issues that is available for the 
parliamentary representatives of the ten countries in the Community. The 
Lords reports are far more informative and comprehensive than those 
produced by the Commons committee on European legislation. That is 
because the Lords Committee Members are more objective and often have 
close knowledge of the subject under scrutiny. In the Commons party 
allegiances can come to the fore. " 
Thus the quality of the debate in the Lords is undoubtedly superior to that in the 
Commons. However, there is some evidence which shows that over the last five years 
there has been some drift towards a more politically charged atmosphere in the Select 
Committee. The reason for this is based upon the intake of Peers following the 1992 
i)eneral election. This included many members of Margaret Thatcher's administration 
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during the 1980's, some of whom have very strong opinions on the European Union. For 
example. the ad-hoc Sub-Committee on the 1996 Inter-Govemmental Conference 
included Lord Tebbit, whose Eurosceptic views are well known. A former Clerk to the 
Select Committee said during the course of an interview447 that the questioning debate 
and discussion during the course of this inquiry was more political than he had 
previously witnessed. 
It would be a great loss if the scrutiny process in the Lords were to take on a more 
political character. As already said, its strength lies in the conciliatory approach taken 
by the Peers and the concentration on the issues at hand. The ad hoc Sub-Committee on 
the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference was primarily concerned with future policy of 
the European Union which provokes emotive reactions from all sides of the debate. As 
yet, this has not been translated to the everyday scrutiny work of the other Sub- 
Committees. One hopes it remains this way. 
Attendance ofPeers 
Peers are not paid any salary for the work they do. They merely receive a small 
allowance for attending the House. Thus this suggests very strongly, that the peers who 
take a regular active part in the scrutiny process do so because they have something to 
offer and not for any financial reward. This point is not regularly appreciated by those 
who criticise the House of Lords. If nothing else, the so called "working peers" who 
carry out extremely important functions at a very high standard represent good value for 
money for the taxpayer. 448 Any increase in pay would have to be accompanied with an 
appropriate increase in activity. The net result being that scrutiny would no longer be as 
prominent in a reformed chamber as it is today. 
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However, the benefit of having these peers involved in the scrutiny process is more 
than just mere cost-effectiveness. The single most valuable contribution they make to 
the scrutiny process is the knowledge and expertise that they can bring to it. Many of 
the members of the Committee have former experience either in government. working 
for the European Community or in some other field such as trade unions or business. 
This makes them invaluable members of the five varied subject related Sub- 
Committees. In his article Leave us Lords well alone, The Times 17 January 1995 
Woodrow Wyatt gave the following example of how effective the Select Committee is: - 
"The Lords European Communities Committee (to which there is no 
plausible Commons equivalent) led the whole EC in exposing fraud, 
providing our government with irrefutable evidence with which to force our 
partners to curtail or extinguish colossal frauds on European taxpayers. " 
Thus together with co-opted members who are brought in to a particular inquiry 
because of their specialist knowledge, a Committee of vast resources is assembled. This 
is unparalleled in either House. Any plans for reconstitution of the Lords such as those 
in the current Labour Party manifesto which will affect the make-up of the Lords may 
well serve as operating to the detriment of the Parliamentary process. 
Let's return to the attendance of peers again. In the 1994-95 Session449 there were 
142 sitting days in the session. Unfortunately there are no separate figures for 
attendance of the Select Committee. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that if a 
peer is in attendance on the day of a Select Committee meeting, he or she will attend 
that meeting. Of the 142 sitting days, the average attendance of all peers of the Select 
Committee is 76 - over 50%. Some peers such as Lord Bruce of Donnington attended 
140 days and Lord Barnett 126 days. Others such as Lord Slynn of Hadley attended 
only 29 days, but he N\, 'as also an active member of the judiciary at the time. However, as 
Chairman of Sub-Committee E- the Law and Institutions Sub-Committee - the 29 days 
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he did attend were primarily taken up with attending meetings involved with his 
position as Chairman. 
Therefore attendance by members of the Select Committee is very good. They take 
their work seriously and make a worthwhile contribution in the area of scrutiny of 
European legislation and policy. The working peers must therefore be commended for 
the work they do. This section will be concluded by illustrating that peers who do attend 
the House regularly, are making a positive contribution. The recent House of Lords 
inquiry into Fraud and Mismanagement in the Community450 is better than anything 
inounted in the Commons. The inquiry was based on an in-depth investigation into all 
aspects of Community administration and its conclusions gave both the government and 
Commission much important evidence to combat this problem. In fact the issue is on the 
agenda at the 1996-97 lGC. The House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities was undoubtedly pivotal in this development. 
Judicial participation in the scrutiny process and the Separation of 
Powers 
As members of the House of Lords, the judiciary can and do play an active part in the 
daily functioning of the Lords. No more so is this seen than in the European 
Communities Select Committee and in particular Sub-Committee E- the Law and 
Institutions Sub- Committee. This Sub-Committee is always chaired by a Lord of 
Appeal, e. g. Lord Slynn of Hadley who was Chairman up to the end of the 1995-96 
session. His suitability for the task was that he had previously been Advocate-General to 
the European Court of Justice. 
Sub-Committee FI could not function as effectively as it does unless it was staffed 
primarily by lawyers. Its Terms of Reference require it to consider, inter alia, the impact 
Page - 304 
EC legislative proposals liave on existing UK law and the vires of any legislative 
proposal. Both these activities involve a highly complex process of evaluating proposed 
legal developments. Who better to do this than a Committee of lawyers chaired by a 
highly experienced Lord of Appeal? If these people are the best individuals to do the job 
why should their membership of the judiciary prevent them from doing it? 
One argument put against their participation is that there is potential for a conflict of 
interest. That is to say a judge is scrutinising legislation which he can in the future be 
asked to be the arbiter of. However, the author has found no evidence of this at all. In 
conversation Lord Slynn451 argued that there is no reason to suggest this. A judge in 
the House of Lords sits with four others, and their approach is objective and based on 
the facts before them and not based on deliberations taken in a Select Committee years 
before. Furthermore, he pointed out that the actual chances of this happening are very 
remote and research undertaken confirms this. 
One aspect of this arrangement that has caused more concern is the point that the 
judiciary being involved in the legislative process is in conflict with the doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers. This is quite true. According to this doctrine, judiciary and 
legislature should be separate to prevent a concentration of power. 
However, on closer examination it is quite clear that any infringement of this 
doctrine is minor. The judiciary, as Lord Slynn pointed out, are careful not to become 
too involved in the politics of the legislative proposal. They limit their role to scrutiny 
and are objective in their operation. Though still at the heart of democratic government 
in this country, the Separation of Powers has undoubtedly been redefined in recent 
years. One only needs to look at the way in which the Executive has dominated the 
legislature in recent times as evidence of this fact. A minor infringement by a Sub- 
Committee in the House of Lords is not sufficient to justify a change in its composition. 
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The fact that there is a mere potential for conflict is a small price to pay for the 
undoubtedly positive contribution this Sub-Committee makes. 
The inquisitorial nature of the scrutiny process in the Lords 
Based upon the fact that party politics do not play such a major part in the House of 
Lords generally, it is possible to identify this as the primary reason for the more 
inquisitorial approach adopted by the Select Committee on the European Communities. 
Together with the fact that the House of Lords has more time to consider the issues than 
its House of Commons counterpart, there is the basis for a very influential Select 
Committee. The Committee can readily move between conducting a broad ranging and 
highly focussed inquiry with relative ease. 
At the heart of this inquisitorial approach is the Sub-Committee structure. They are 
subject related and have the relevant documents delegated to them, which they are to 
consider. The Sub-Committee size is particularly suited to conducting inquiries in a 
more inquisitorial fashion. They are small, with usually no more than six permanent 
members and five co-opted members. This makes them ideal for discussion. In fact it 
could be more appropriate to describe the Sub-Committees as working parties. 
Furthermore, with the assistance of specialist advisers or legal staff they have the 
potential to get to the core of the issues before them. 
Hearing of evidence 
Wienever a Sub-Committee conducts a detailed inquiry it will obtain evidence from 
as niam, sources as possible. Thus evidence taking may last up to three months. 
Together Nvith any further deliberation and the inquiry has taken a full six months y its 
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conclusion. Such an inquiry cannot be ignored by government. The evidence as 
presented452 suggests strongly that such inquiries have the desired effect - namely to 
influence the minister before giving agreement in the Council. In addition, and perhaps 
more significantly, it was stated during the course of an interview with a former 
Clerk453 of the Select Committee, that the House of Lords reports are read by the 
Commission with great interest. He cited the undoubted quality of the reports as the 
primary reason for their being read by the Commission. The Hansard Society 
Commission in its 1992 document Making the Law made similar observations. In this 
respect the House of Lords is unparalleled by any other Chamber in the European 
Union. Perhaps most importantly, these reports give the United Kingdom Parliament a 
degree of influence in the Commission. This should not be sacrificed. 
Sub-Committee reports 
Following evidence taking and deliberation the Sub-Committee publishes its report. 
This report speaks for the whole Select Committee. There is no minority report. This is 
one of the main distinguishing features of the Select Committee in the Lords. 454 The 
fact that there is no minority report is a testament to this inquisitorial approach and the 
lack of any significant party political influence on the Select Committee. 
In its deliberations the Select Committee has debated the issues raised by the 
witnesses and used the evidence it has received to fulfil the task its Terms of Reference 
require - to produce a report which influences the minister prior to giving agreement in 
the Council. A report behind which the whole Select Committee can unite is a report 
that cannot be ignored. 
Thus the inquisitorial approach of the Select Committee is the key factor to its 
unrivalled success. It (., iN, cs the Committee the influence and respect which is essential 
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for it to be effective. This however can only be continued within the present 
Parliamentary framework. In the next section the unelected character of the House of 
Lords will be evaluated and how it strengthens the scrutiny function. 
The unelected House of Lords and the scrutiny function 
When critics of the House of Lords call for reform of this institution, they focus their 
argument on the fact that the Lords is unelected. In particular, they contend that the 
Lords is both undemocratic and unaccountable. Today, these arguments are at the centre 
of both opposition parties who have put forward proposals for reforming the Lords, and 
these will be examined in the next section to assess their potential impact on the 
scrutiny process. At this juncture however, the focus is on examining and explaining the 
argument that effective scrutiny, of the type we see today in the Lords, can only be 
carried out by an unelected second chamber. 
The lack of constituency duties 
At the heart of this argument is the fact that peers are not burdened by the 
requirements of representing a particular constituency. This relieves them of a vast 
amount of work. In turn this permits them the opportunity to devote the necessary time 
required to carry out their scrutiny task as effectively as they do. If the second chamber 
was to be fully or even partially elected those members who were subject to the 
electorate would not have the time to be involved in scrutiny. Constituency and related 
business would inevitably and understandably take priority. This would be damaging for 
scrutiny as perhaps some of the more experienced and able representatives could not 
take as active a part as the\, do under the present system. In addition this pre-supposes 
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that any elected chamber would continue to have existing peers sitting in it. A point that 
will be subsequently returned to. 
Questions of democratic legitimacy 
The second argument relates to the fact that any elected body will always claim a 
democratic legitimacy. An elected second chamber would undoubtedly have a change of 
horizons. It would view itself an equal to the House of Commons and would wish to 
play a more active role in daily Parliamentary activity. Thus the focus would shift from 
the present one of being primarily a sub-ordinate revising chamber, with the time to 
review legislation both European, and domestic, to a chamber which takes a greater 
initiative in legislative activity. Thus the unique function the Lords has today, and one 
no better illustrated than by the work of the Select Committee, would be lost and 
replaced by a Chamber whose activity was influenced primarily by the Commons. In 
particular, if elected it may wish to challenge the Commons more so than it does today. 
The lack ofparty political influence 
Electing the second chamber would inevitably make this second chamber more 
political. In the previous section it was argued that party politics is at a minimum in the 
Select Committee and this is a great plus. For a candidate to have a chance of being 
elected, he would have to stand under a party banner. Translate this to any Select 
Committee charged with reviewing European legislation in this new second chamber 
and it will undoubtedly be influenced by party politics. To what degree it is difficult to 
say, and experience in the Commons does suggest that the Select Committee there is not 
overtly divided on political lines. However, the risk of this is greater and is already 
witnessed in other Commons Select Committees. Any movement to a more party 
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political approach in a second chamber will be to the detriment of scrutiny and should 
be avoided. 
The informal nature of the Lords 
The final aspect of this argument relates to the more informal procedures prevalent in 
the Lords. The unelected nature of it means that there are no career minded professional 
politicians who are interested in scaling the party ladder. In fact it is quite the reverse. It 
consists primarily of retired MPs and individuals who have made a variety of 
contributions to public life. This valuable skill and expertise is harnessed by the Select 
Committee and put to excellent use in the scrutiny process. The peers are involved 
because they want to be involved and not because of some financial or other reward. 
This in fact leads to a related issue. If we elected our second chamber we would 
expect it to carry out more than its present functions. There would now be professional 
politicians who would expect to be paid. In return the electorate would expect more than 
merely continuing with the current tasks. These two factors together would mean an end 
to scrutiny in its present form. Other considerations, namely constituency and party 
affairs, would take precedent. At best a scrutiny system similar to the Commons would 
survive. This is undesirable. 
Is the House ofLords undemocratic? 
The answer to this question depends to a great extent of how one views democracy. 
Though this issue NN-111 not be examined here, as time and space do not permit. one 
assertion needs to be made. Derriocracy is often linked with accountability. Indeed this 
very point has been articulated at a number of stages in the course of this work. But 
Page - 310 
does accountability necessary mean being elected? For example the Council of 
Ministers is not elected as a body but each minister is accountable to his Parliament. 
Similarly, the Commission is appointed but is subject to some accountability by the 
European Parliament. Thus, though desirable and preferable being elected is not central 
to an organisation such as the European Unlon. In many cases, such as that of the 
Commission, appointment is the only viable option. This however needs to be counter- 
balanced by effective accountability and this issue requires further consideration. 
If we take the unelected House of Lords, it fails the test of democratic legitimacy 
because it is not subject to popular control. Also under criticism is the fact that its 
members consist of peers who take their place because of their birthright. In the authors 
opinion, this is focusing on the issue from the wrong perspective. If a hereditary peer is 
making a valuable contribution to the scrutiny process (as indeed the six current ones 
do) is it justified to remove them merely because they are not elected? The House of 
Lords in its present form, and in particular the working peers as seen on the Select 
Committee, are making a vital contribution to democracy through their involvement in 
the scrutiny of European legislation. What in fact is being argued, is that democracy 
stems from the functions an institution performs as well as the personnel involved in it. 
This is illustrated no better than by the composition of the House of Commons itself. 
Despite universal suffrage for over seventy years, the Commons has never reflected the 
make-up of the United Kingdom in terms of the ethnic population or the number of 
Nvomen who make up the electorate. Yet we would not question its democratic 
legitimacy. Thus concentrating ones criticism on personnel and using this as the central 
pillar for arguing the Lords is unrepresentative and therefore undemocratic misses the 
point and is a mistake. 
Today the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 limit the power of the Lords. Most 
sigiiificantly this deals with the Lords ability to delay legislation from the Commons. 
I'liese Acts set the parameters for the Lords activity today. Most importantly they 
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prevent the Lords being a rival to the Commons, leaving it to concentrate on important 
reviewing tasks such as scrutiny of European Union legislation. In this situation one is 
left with two Chambers that compliment each other and scrutiny is an example of one 
such activity where this occurs. This could be even more effective if, as already 
suggested, the scrutiny procedures in both Houses were reviewed to have a formal 
division of labour between them. 
Some recent proposals for reforming the House of Lords 
In this section there will be a brief evaluation of some of the more recent proposals 
that have been put forward to reform the Lords. The primary objective of this analysis 
will be to evaluate how these proposals may, if implemented, affect the specific task of 
scrutiny. Time and space will therefore not permit any other observations about these 
proposals. 
The Institutefor Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
The IPPR was established in 1988 and describes itself as "an alternative to the free 
market think tanks". 455 In essence it is a centre-left research organisation which has put 
forward a variety of proposals for reforming the United Kingdom constitution. Its 
proposals for reforming the House of Lords were presented in its 1993 document 
Rcfbrming the Lords. 456 
The basic elements of the proposals in this document have at their core an elected 
second chamber. which they call the Senate. Its elected members would represent 
regional rather than local constituencies and be elected by Proportional 
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Representation. 457 As far as scrutiny is concerned the document addressed this issue 
specifically. It recognised the value and quality of this work and realised that this should 
be preserved. In fact it viewed this Select Committee as a model for other Committees 
which would be prominent in the Senate. 
It recommended a "smaller and more sharply focussed committee". 458 Ho,, N-e,,, er. no 
further detail is given. The present Committee consists of twenty members who also sit 
on one or more of the Sub-Committees. Given the workload of the Committee today. 
and one which is rapidly increasing, it would be difficult to reduce the size of the 
Committee significantly without any comparable loss in performance. As to the iiew 
committee being more sharply focussed, it is difficult to imagine how this could be so. 
The present arrangement of six subject related Sub-Committees, each one representing a 
major policy area of the EU could not be more focussed. The reduction of Sub- 
Committees from six to five post the Jelicoe Report459 illustrates this fact (even with 
the new Sub-Committee F the focus still remains). Furthermore, that Committee's 
recommendation to make greater use of ad hoc Sub-Committees allows the Select 
Committee to focus on important issues as and when they arise. The ad hoc Sub- 
Committee report on the 1996 1 nter- Governmental Conference460 illustrates this point 
clearly. 
Another recommendation of the IPPR is that the Select Committee should not 
engage in detailed scrutiny of Community legislation. The authors contend its time 
could be best served by monitoring major developments in the structure of the 
Community and Community strategy. This is a little perplexing because a closer 
examination of the work of the Committee reveals that this is exactly what is done. The 
report in to the 1996 IGC is one such case. Each of the Sub-Committees itself considers 
legislative developments and will often carry out an inquiry in anticipation of a 
Community proposal. In effect the Committee moves up stream and tries to influence 
the Commission c. g. the inquiry into Relations between the EU and the Maghreb 
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Countries. 461 The authors of this document have thus missed the point. They make no 
mention of the work of the Sub-Committees specifically in this context. It is unclear 
therefore whether this would continue. The present quality of scrutiny could not be 
maintained unless it was. 
One concrete proposal of the document is to remove the presence of the Law Lords 
in the Senate. 462 The impact of this would be devastating upon the quality of work in 
Sub-Committee E. In fact it is difficult to see it continuing this work without their 
presence. This would be a great loss. It is the presence and experience of the Law Lords, 
such as Lord Slynn, which have made Sub-Committee E the undoubted success it is. 
They do propose a Sub-Committee which could co-opt legal expertise but it is unclear 
how this would work and whether Law Lords could be involved. Clarity on this point is 
needed. 
The authors conclude the section on scrutiny of European legislation with the 
following passage: -463 
"A reformed committee needs to be concerned more with fundamental 
issues,, for example an examination of the treaty base of proposed 
legislation. Detailed scrutiny would be best carried out in a sub-committee 
which would co-opt any necessary legal expertise. " 
With respect to the authors it appears as if they are devising some new scrutiny 
function. This plainly not the case. For the last twenty three years Sub-Committee E has 
been engaged in this very activity. Its specific Terms of Reference require it to do this. 
In particular its consideration of the "vires" of a proposal and to consider and report on 
"any important developments that take place in Community law" illustrate this. This 
inevitably requires consideration of the treaty base, the very thing the authors call for. 
Page -3 14 
The proposals for scrutiny in a reformed second chamber outlined above do not 
address adequately the issues that have been highlighted in the previous chapters. In 
particular they do not appreciate the fact that many of the functions they propose are 
already carried out very effectively. 
To the authors credit, they do however recognise the experience and expertise man),, 
peers contribute to the scrutiny process and to the only other permanent Select 
Committee - the Science and Technology Select Committee. They also recognise this 
must be protected. In the event of reform they suggest that this expertise should be 
maintained by the continuation of co-opting members on to the Select Committees. 
However, the strength of the present scrutiny system is that co-opted members work 
together as a partnership with already highly experienced peers. For the reasons outlined 
above it is difficult to see this continuing in an elected chamber because the elected 
members will potentially not posses the same level of experience as the peers or 
necessarily be as interested in scrutiny to the same degree. They will have other 
priorities. Under these circumstances the burden will fall on the co-opted members 
leading to less effective scrutiny. 
The Labour Party 
Traditionally, the Labour Party has been antagonistic to the House of Lords and 
outright abolition has been its policy for most of the Labour Party's existence. 
464 In 
1968 , it proposed the 
Parliament (No. 2) Bill which was intended to substantially reduce 
the powers of the Lords. The Bill failed, primarily due to the fact that the House of 
Commons did not have the political will to reform the Lords which could then challenge 
the political authority of the Commons. Since 1968, the Labour Party has spent most of 
this time in opposition and despite being consistently opposed to the Lords in its present 
form never was oiven the opportunity to implement its proposals. 
Page - 3115 
However, today in 1997 it is as probable as at any time in the last eighteen years that 
there will be a change of government. Labour has changed into New Labour and with it 
so has its policy with regard to the Lords. At the core of the present policy is the 
removal of the hereditary element in the Lords. In its policy document Ne-") Labour A"elf, 
Lýfýjbr Britain465 it makes the following observation: - 
"We will remove the right hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of 
Lords as a first step towards a more democratic and representative 
chamber ... One proposal we can consider is that the House of Lords has 
some places reserved by appointment for those who have an outstanding 
contribution to make. The legislative powers of the House of Lords will 
remain unaltered. Its function will remain that of a revising chamber. " 
So, what does this mean for scrutiny? At first sight the proposals do not appear to 
radical. Initially at least there will not be any significant reforms. However, the removal 
of hereditary peers may have some effect. The hereditary peers on the Select Committee 
make an extremely positive contribution. If they are the best people for the job, and 
undoubtedly they are because they have been appointed to the Committee, why should 
their experience be discarded because they have inherited their position? Today there 
are six hereditary peers, all of whom had a very good attendance record during the 
1994-95 Session. The average attendance was 62.5 days (slightly lower than the average 
76 for all peers on the Committee) but some such as Lord Geddes attended 105 days and 
Lord Bridges 77 days. Hereditary peers are not traditionally viewed as working peers 
and thus it is fair to assume that when these peers did attend it was primarily to attend 
the Select Committee (as stated above, there are no separate statistics for Committee 
attendance). Thus, any decision to remove hereditary peers needs careful consideration 
especially if the high quality scrutiny wants to be maintained as the document indicates. 
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People may point to the fact that the document also states (and this is in the quote 
above) that the proposal for reform will reserve places for the appointment of those 
individuals who have an outstanding contribution to make. Will this include hereditary 
peers? The document is unclear on this point. If it does then all the Labour government 
would have done is to merely change the titles of individuals from hereditary peers to 
life peers and not addressed the issue of composition in any significant way. This is not 
an effective use of Parliamentary time. Why go through this difficult and time- 
consuming process change but leave the composition largely unaltered? 
Thus the policy requires clarification as to how these changes will affect the scrutiny 
process. In particular, it can be criticised for concentrating on personnel in the Lords 
rather than its functions. At no stage is the work of the Select Committee on the 
European Communities mentioned, giving the impression that this crucial task of 
scrutiny carried out by the Select Committee has not been fully considered. Though the 
document does state that the House will remain a revising Chamber it is difficult to see 
how this would continue as effectively when over one quarter of the present 
membership of the Select Committee on the European Communities will be prevented 
from participating. There is no guarantee that their replacements would be as competent. 
The policy document suggests that the eventual aim of New Labour is to have an 
elected second chamber. The arguments as to why this will not be to the benefit of 
scrutiny have already been given and will not be repeated again. However, this analysis 
will be concluded with one further observation. History suggests that reform of the 
Lords is a difficult task. The experience of the Parliament (No. 2) Bill shows this. 
Between 1974 and 1979 the Labour government made no attempt to reform the Lords. If 
a future Labour government, with many legislative priorities, is to have more success in 
reform, it needs to have workable proposals. The starting point should therefore be 
pi-cs, et-N'Ing and enhancing the present functions of the Lords. In particular this means 
deN'elopiiio scrutiiiy. This is too important an issue to be marginalised by unconvincing 
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arguments that only by reforming the membership can the House of Lords be 
democratic and representative. Democracy is seen in the Lords when peers hold the 
minister to account for actions taken in Council and arguably it is done more effectively 
than in the Commons. 
The Liberal Democrats 
Ever since the days of the SDP/Liberal Alliance, reform of the House of Lords has 
been a major part of their policy for constitutional reform. Present Liberal Democrat 
policy, which they outlined in their alternative Queen's Speech in November 1995, is 
based on introducing an elected Senate whose primary function would be to provide 
regional representation and to act as a sort of guardian of the constitution and upholder 
of civil liberties. 
In an interview with James Cornford, 466 a former director of the Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR) he expressed similar views. He justified these arguments in the 
following way. He viewed the role of the second chamber as being essentially a revising 
chamber which kept an effective check on the House of Commons. He felt that on 
balance these functions were more important than preserving the scrutiny process in its 
current form. Though he accepted the value of the Lords work in this area and also on 
the Science and Technology Select Committee, these were probably the only two areas 
where the Lords made an effective contribution: - 
when it comes to balancing the two things up, using the second 
chamber as a control over the House of Commons and probably using it as a 
means of regional representation are more important things to do than 
preserving its present character and virtues. " 
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These views along with the policies of the Liberal Democrats do cause a number of 
difficulties for the scrutiny process. In particular, the argument must be made that 
scrutiny in its present form could not continue. An elected Senate focussed on 
constitutional and regional issues would simply not have the time to continue ýý-Ith the 
in-depth scrutiny that is presently carried out by the Lords. Its horizon will change and 
be more concerned with the work of the Commons. 
Thus the question must be asked. Which body will do the detailed scrutiny that is 
presently the domain of the Lords? The House of Commons? Very unlikely because it 
will continue to have an ever increasing workload. Perhaps the European Parliament? 
This is almost unthinkable in the sense that such a development would mean that the 
UK Parliament has lost all its influence in the European legislative process. Political 
opinion on all sides of the House of Commons would not countenance such a 
development. This leaves only one option - the detailed investigative scrutiny now seen 
in the House of Lords will be sacrificed to introduce an elected chamber whose 
II unctions though they are to include acting as a revising chamber, will not be placing as 
strong an emphasis on the scrutiny of European issues. 
Concluding remarks 
Scrutiny in the House of Lords works because this institution follows its own agenda. 
It recognises the limitations of the scrutiny process in the Commons and acts 
accordingly in a complimentary fashion. Thus together both Houses have undoubtedly 
created the most effective and influential scrutiny process in the European Union. This 
is notwithstanding the many limitations that been have identified in the course of this 
work. 
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In nearing the twenty-first century, principles of hereditary entitlement and unelected 
Parliaments are rapidly becoming unacceptable. Even Lord Hallsham in The Dilenima 
of Democracy accepts that the Lords in its present form will not survive. Thus if it is to 
be reformed, the reform should have as its starting point an acceptance that some of the 
features of todays House of Lords are worth preserving. This is a prime case of not 
throwing the baby out with the bath water! 
This is what has been attempted in this chapter. It is as an exercise in evaluating and 
explaining that change does not always have to be revolutionary. In particular, the 
concentration on personnel in the Lords is looking at the issue from the wrong 
perspective. This is a criticism that can also be levelled at the recent report by the 
Constitution Unit467 entitled Rqform of the House of Lords. Though this report 
conceded that in an elected second chamber the current functions of the Lords will 
persist, it also states that the principal additional function will be to provide "an 
additional voice for the regions at the centre of the political system". As already stated, 
in an elected environment, these two functions are not readily compatible. The opinion 
of this author is that scrutiny will be the loser because the elected second chamber will 
create its own agenda, and one based predominantly on shadowing closely the work of 
the Commons. 
To conclude, in this chapter the main thrust of the argument has been that only by 
preserving many of the features of the House of Lords can scrutiny of the current high 
standard be preserved. One must accept that in this chapter, the scrutiny function has 
been somewhat isolated from the rest of the Lords functions and that there are other 
aspects to the Lords work. However this has been done to emphasise the arguments and 
stress the importance of scrutiny which has been marginalised or overlooked by 
political parties and organisations NN-ho propose reform of the Lords. Thus in this chapter 
the aim has been to redress the balance by placing scrutiiiy at the heart of any proposals 
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for reform and increasing awareness of the undoubted high quality work carried out by 
the Lord's Select Committee on the European Communities. 
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PART IV - ARE THE SCRUTINY ARRANGEMENTS 
EFFECTIVE? 
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CHAPTER12 
CONCLUSIONS AND EVALUATIONS 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis has been to follow the legislative process of the European 
Union, beginning with the consultation and lobbying of the Commission and concluding 
with approval of the legislative proposals by the Council of Ministers. The endeavour 
has been to explain and analyse each stage of this process and evaluate its constitutional 
significance as far as the UK Parliament is concerned. In addition, the intention has been 
to produce a comprehensive study of an extremely important yet relatively unknown 
part of the UK legislative process. In this final chapter, the evaluation will begin by 
assessing the role of the UK Parliament in the legislative process of the European Union 
and how it could be improved. 
Parliament and the European Union 
No constitutional relationship 
The primary point to note is the lack of any formal constitutional relationship 
between both Houses and the Institutions of the EU. In Chapter 2 above an explanation 
for this position was given. Essentially it is based on the threat as perceived by many 
Parliamentarians (predominantly in the Commons) that the aim of the European 
Institutions, and in particular the European Parliament, is to supplant Westminster as the 
sovereiOn legislativc body. 
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The absence of any established contact is undoubtedly detrimental to the scrutiny 
process. In particular, it means that Parliament has no effective influence over the 
Commission and the European Parliament. The latter now being central to the 
legislative process through its input via the co-decision procedure. In an atmosphere of 
increasing European integration developing such contacts is essential. MPs cannot argue 
that European Institutions are marginalising Westminster but yet sit back and not 
redress the balance by developing such contacts. 
The House of Lords on the other hand has long since seen the benefit of such 
contacts and,, though only informal, they are undoubtedly constructive. MPs therefore 
should take notice of this. In particular, the acceptance by the Lords that the only way to 
effectively influence is to be at the centre of the debate and policy formulation process 
would be a good starting point for many MPs. In 1997, twenty-four years after joining 
the Community it is time to move the debate on from irrelevant arguments of our 
continued membership of the Community. Practical politics, as all the major parties 
realise,, dictates that the UK should be a member of the EU. As this is the case , it 
is 
therefore essential to ensure that their is effective scrutiny. 
Scrutiny arrangements within Parliament 
In Chapters 3 and 8 above, the work and impact of the Select Committees in both 
Houses was explained and analysed. In this chapter, the aim is to briefly examine 
Nvhether these two independent procedures provide the most effective use of valuable 
Parliamentary time. More specifically, the concern lies with both the duplication of 
certain tasks and the lack of any formal cooperation between the two Houses on scrutiný- 
generally. 
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As far as the duplication of tasks is concerned, the central point is that both Hotises 
examine every document. That is to say both Committees sift through each legislative 
proposal broadly on the same basis. Though the Terms of Reference are different ('ý, vith 
the Lords having a wider brief) this initial sift has the same net result in both Houses. It 
determines which documents will require in-depth scrutiny. With approximately 1000 
documents per year, this is a time consuming process. The inevitable question is 
whether both Houses need to do this task? For example, could it not be done bv the 
Commons with their results being used by both Houses? 
Under present arrangements, the answer is obviously no. The primary reason is that 
though both Commons and Lords sift through documents to decide which require 
further scrutiny, the reports they produce rarely focus on the same legislative proposals. 
Thus each Committee has its own agenda which is essentially decided by its Terms of 
Reference. Furthermore, subjects chosen for scrutiny in the Lords will often reflect the 
personal interest and expertise of members of the subject related Sub-Committees, 
whereas, scrutiny by Standing Committee in the Commons reflects the political and 
policy considerations of the government. 
A Joint Select Committee 
One possible solution to the above difficulty is to establish a Joint Select Committee 
of both Houses. There is precedent for this within Parliament. In particular. there is an 
activc Statutory Instruments Joint Committee, a Consolidation Bills Joint Committee 
and the Ecclesiastical Committee. 
As far as the Statutory Instruments Committee is concerned, it is a Joint Committee 
because it is a resource saving exercise. The ever increasing number of Statutory 
Instruments means this is a more effective way of conducting scrutiny of them. A 
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similar principle could apply to the scrutiny of European legislative proposals. A Joint 
Committee would remove the problem of duplication and promote co-ordination of 
inquiries. 
However, establishing a Joint Committee would not necessarily mean the end of the 
present arrangements whereby both Houses contribute their own unique qualities to the 
scrutiny process. Each House could then scrutinise the documents it wishes within its 
current arrangements (i. e. Standing or Sub-Committee). It is just the initial sift which 
could be performed jointly. This would also have the added advantage of there being co- 
ordination of inquiries between the Committees. Thus greater use could be made of 
reports completed by the other House. 
Currently there are no plans to establish a Joint Committee. In fact the evidence 
presented suggests that both Committees wish to have as wide Terms of Reference as 
possible to maximise their input into the legislative process. A strict division of labour 
between them is unfortunately not welcomed by either Committee (see Chapter 8). In 
particular the suggestion that the Commons carries out the Sift and the Lords the in- 
depth investigation is a proposal that has been rejected by both Houses. In short the 
scrutiny process will remain fundamentally unchanged for the next Parliamentary term. 
This however must be kept under review especially if the Inter- Governmental 
conference produces significant constitutional developments. 
The House of Lords 
Given the fact that any significant change is unlikely to the scrutiny process, the need 
to preserve the current arrangements is all the more important. In particular this means 
the positive contribution made by the Lords. The quality of scrutiny that takes place 
within the Lords raises important questions for any future government that proposes a 
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reconstitution of Parliament and is thus one which they should consider carefully before 
making any changes. That is to say, changes to the Lords will not be in isolation. More 
specifically removing the current scrutiny function from the Lords without an), 
corresponding amendments to other parts of the process will have a detrimental effect 
on ministerial accountability to Parliament. 
Thus the most important issue here is that in any reform of the Lords the current 
scrutiny function must be preserved. As was highlighted in chapter 11, reform of the 
Lords should begin with an acceptance that its role in this process is an indispensable 
one and any reforms should aim to build upon this undoubted success. 
The case for a Department of European Affairs 
In Chapter 5, arguments for a Department of European Affairs were presented. In 
particular, the most desirable aspect of such a development would be a greater co- 
ordination and evaluation of European policy within Parliament. Of most value would 
be the fact that such a Department would be scrutinised by a Departmentally Related 
Select Committee. 
The primary function of such a Select Committee would undoubtedly be longer term 
policy developments e. g. enlargement of the EU. It would probably share the same 
reluctance for scrutiny of legislative proposals as the current Departmentally Related 
Select Committees do. In this respect the present Select Committee for the European 
Communities would continue with its important task. However, this task would now be 
aided by reports and inquiries into policy carried out by not just the new European 
Affairs Select Committee, but by any relevant Departmentally Related Select 
Committee. 
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Thus,, all Departmental Committees need to be encouraged to participate more in 
European issues where they affect their brief This is the increased co-ordination which 
is proposed. It will benefit not only the scrutiny process, but add to the influence the 
minister has at the negotiating table. A formulated and thoroughly investigated 
European policy will strengthen the UK's position in the Council of Ministers. 
From the discussion above it is evident that there are currently several areas in which 
Parliamentary scrutiny could be improved. The specific proposals outlined above and 
those discussed throughout the course of this work have at their heart the aim of not 
only making scrutiny more effective but also increasing democratic accountability of the 
executive in the field of European Affairs (i. e. in the Council of Ministers). It is the 
establishment of effective control over executive actions that will address the issue of 
the democratic deficit within the EU. The Select Committee system in both Houses of 
Parliament is central to this task and for this reason above all must be enhanced. 
National Parliaments in the European Union - what next? 
Parliamentarian ism at a European level 
Within the thesis, the discussion has focussed on the existing arrangements for 
scrutiny of European legislation. However, in this final part, the discussion will proceed 
to examine (potentially at least) how the final outcome of the 1996-97 Inter- 
Governmental conference will affect Westminster's role in the EU. 
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In its 1995 Report, The 1996 Inter- Governmental Conference: The Agenda 
468 Democracy Efficiency and the Role of National Parliaments, the Select Committee 
on European Legislation made the following observation: 469 
"The question is, will the IGC strengthen the role of National Parliaments 
in practice or will it simply produce empty rhetoric? The last lGC is not an 
encouraging precedent. " 
The Select Committee's scepticism is quite understandable if the developments post 
Maastricht are examined. The Maastricht Declaration on the role of national parliaments 
was intended to be the guardian of domestic parliaments to ensure their participation in 
the European legislative process. However as the evidence in both Chapter 6 and 10 
suggests the government has not kept to the spirit of the Declaration. In particular, its 
refusal to extend the Resolution of the House to cover the final stage of the co-decision 
procedure leads one to question its commitment to the Resolution. 
Thus, the issue to consider is whether the balance can be redressed in the 1996-97 
Inter- Govermnental Conference. Let us first consider what the govermnent's attitude to 
the role of national parliaments currently is. In the White Paper A Partnership of 
Nations, 470 the government outlined its position with regard to the IGC. It made the 
following observation about the role of national parliaments: 
471 
"National parliaments remain the primary focus of democratic legitimacy 
in the European Union, holding national Ministers in the Council to account. 
The Government is keen to develop this role and is considering a range of 
ideas, some of which have been suggested by Parliamentary Committees. 
These include making the main elements of the Maastricht Declaration 13 
(on the role of national parliaments) legally binding by entrenching them in 
the Treatv; includnio a minimum period for parliaments to scrutinise 
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Community documents and notably draft legislation (with exceptions for 
urgent cases); and a greater role for national parliaments in the Justice and 
Home Affairs Pillar. " 
From the extract above it would appear that the goverriment is committed to 
enhancing the participation of national parliaments and indeed making them the focus of 
democratic accountability in the Union. Indeed, in the next paragraph, the government 
seem to underline this pledge by make the following observation about the role of the 
European Parliament: -472 
"The Government does not feel, however, that the European Parliament 
needs new powers. Nor do we accept, in a Union of nation states that the 
European Parliament can displace the primary role of national parliaments. " 
Is this just empty rhetoric? A firm answer to this question will not be possible until 
the lGC concludes its negotiation and the European Council meets in Amsterdam in 
June 1997. However, history suggests an unfavourable outcome. In particular the 
sentiments held by the government regarding the future role of the European Parliament 
are not shared by all other Member States. Those who favour closer integration and the 
ultimate creation of a United States of Europe view the enhancement of the European 
Parliament as an essential step forward. In particular, exercising scrutiny and control 
over the Council of Ministers is at the heart of their aspirations. Thus their aim is to 
supplant the task currently carried out by national parliaments. In the White Paper, the 
UK government unreservedly reject such a development. It is difficult to see how these 
two opposing positions can-be reconciled. 
In the present political climate, especially with the difficulties over Economic and 
Monetary Union and enlargement, it is unlikely that any proposals for a European 
scrutiny system to be agreed at the IGC. The current UK government would Z-71 
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undoubtedly veto such a proposal. Thus what positive development can the IGC bring 
for national parliaments? Perhaps cynically, one needs to question the importance of this 
issue for many Member States. It would not be inaccurate to suggest that this is not at 
the top of the agenda. The obvious difference of opinion concerning how the role of 
national parliaments is to be developed cannot be easily reconciled. In this authors 
opinion, the European Union is not ready to employ a scrutiny system that is not centred 
on national parliaments. This is based primarily on the fact that currently, the EU does 
not speak with one voice on many important policy issues. Unless such cooperation 
could be achieved, scrutiny would be a near impossible task. From this perspective, the 
government is right, for the time being at least, to encourage all national parliaments to 
participate more fully in European affairs. Only this way can all Member States 
contribute to the debate. But the words of the UK government must also be matched by 
deeds. 
How can national parliaments have a greater impact? 
As has been stressed at many occasions during the course of the thesis, the aim of 
scrutiny is to influence the minister. Thus detailed and timely scrutiny would have a 
salutary effect on the Council of Ministers and perhaps most importantly would ensure 
accountability of the executive which has an ever growing disproportionate power in the 
European legislative process. 
In the quote given above from the White Paper the government quite correctly makes 
the point that there should be a minimum period for parliaments to scrutinise legislative 
proposals. This is one of many practical points which the lGC should be considering. 
Others include the need to ensure texts are promptly provided by the Commission 
(perhaps setting maximum time limits for this which are enforceable), national 
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parliaments holding hearings with Commissioners on a regular basis and providing for a 
closer system of cooperation between the national parliaments. 
Currently the Conference of European Affairs Committees (CEAC) is the forum for 
such cooperation. It meets every six months and discusses scrutiny developments in the 
national parliaments. However, its role is only consultative and it has no mandate from 
the national parliament. Such a Committee has great potential because to some extent it 
mirrors the Council of Ministers. It could therefore develop into a body which 
collectively scrutinises the Council. Something which is currently lacking. Most 
importantly however, this scrutiny would be under the control of the national 
parliaments leaving accountability of the minister in their hands. 
If any of the above proposals are to be implemented there needs to the political will 
among the Member States. As already stated, this appears to be lacking. Currently the 
EU is pre-occupied with much bigger issues that politically are more important. 
Furthermore, why should governments put at the top of the agenda the debate and 
discussion of a process which undoubtedly limits their freedom to act and attempts to 
make their actions more transparent? 
From the above discussion , it is clearly visible that the aims of the 
UK government at 
least, do not represent the true picture within the Community. In fact the rhetoric about 
the desirability of increasing the role played by national parliaments could not be further 
from the reality of their exclusion in the legislative process. Herein lies the conflict. The 
argument that increasing participation by national parliaments will address the issue of 
the democratic deficit within the EU is a strong one. However, such a development 
would also have an adverse effect on the efficiency of the decision making process. 
Thus a value judgement needs to be made as to which of these is the more desirable. 
473 
For this author, the need for effective scrutiny and accountability should be the 
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paramount consideration and not the meeting of arbitrary time limits. There is no point 
in agreeing legislation quickly merely for it to be unworkable or irrelevant. 
This very point should be the focus of the lGC when considering the future role of 
national parliaments. Decision making at a lower level with a positive input from the 
national parliaments would aid the breaking down of the barriers many people have with 
regards to the EU. Legislation is often viewed as unnecessary and intrusive. A greater 
input from national parliaments would undoubtedly go some way to addressing these 
criticisms. Most importantly the process would promote transparency and thus 
accountability. 
What developments? 
It would be extremely unwise to make any firm predictions about what conclusions 
(if any) the IGC may come to. With threats of vetoes and non-cooperation the lack of 
any firm agreement is a distinct possibility. However, as has already been stated, given 
the lack of priority to the issue of Parliamentary scrutiny there are unlikely to be any 
radical reforms in this area. The limits to this debate were drawn long before the actual 
conference began. In its White Paper the UK government was clear that no power in this 
field would be yielded to the European Parliament. At best the UK is prepared to accept 
cooperation in the exchange of information and ideas but not in any change to the 
constitutional position. 
The question therefore to consider is whether there will be anything more significant 
than the current Declaration in the Maastricht Treaty arising from the IGC? The 
Declaration is not legally binding, thus any attempt by the lGC to show it is serious 
about this issue Nvill requirc nothing less than inclusion of the aims of the Declaration in 
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the actual Treaty itself - that is making it a legal requirement. Currently, the political 
will for this does not exist amongst all Member States of the EU. 
Concluding remarks 
In the course of his research the author received correspondence from Tony Benn 
MP. He made the following observation: 474 
"There is no real Parliamentary scrutiny because once a law has been 
agreed to by ministers in Brussels, Parliament can do nothing about it. " 
With respect to Mr Benn his view is (currently at least) unduly apocalyptic. His 
assertion that Parliament can do nothing once the measure has been approved by the 
Council of Ministers is correct. However, he has missed the point that the influence and 
input by Parliament comes bqfore this approval is given. It is this Influence which needs 
to be protected and nurtured and thus addressed by the IGC. Unless the role of national 
parliaments is placed on a formal footing Mr Benn's view will sadly become a reality. 
Thus what is needed is a framework to maintain and develop the scrutiny procedures 
which are seen in this country. The UK is undoubtedly the leader in scrutiny matters 
within the EU. Two Chambers scrutinising every proposal is an immense achievement 
in circumstances which could not be described as conducive to effective scrutiny. Both 
Houses work very hard to ensure the executive is held to account and the constitutional 
function of Parliament is preserved. 
In twenty-four years Parliament has developed the most advanced scrutiny 
procedures in the EU. The challenge facing it today is to preserve and ulti 
cnhance this process. However, paradoxically, this is not within Parliament's domain. 
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The future of the scrutiny process will be decided, if not at this IGC, then at the one in 
the year 2000. If development of the EU continues apace then it is undoubtedly true that 
national parliaments will become peripheral to EU activity. For the UK with its tradition 
of Parliamentary democracy this will be unacceptable. Thus the UK's continued 
participation at the heart of the EU is intrinsically linked to Parliament maintaining and 
enhancing its role in the legislative process. In essence national parliaments must be 
central to addressing the democratic deficit in the EU and thus the government has a 
duty to do everything within its power to ensure that not only do national parliaments 
remain central to the development of the EU but that their scrutiny function is 
preserved. 
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APPENDIX 2 
STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Introduction 
In 195 1, the Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSQ with six members - Belgium, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Germany and the 
Netherlands. In 1957 the same six nations signed the Treaty of Rome which established 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM). In 1968 the institutions of these three organisations merged 
but to this day their powers and functions are wholly separate. 
The original membership of six has by 1997 grown to 15 Member States with twelve 
official languages being spoken. Today, the European Community (as it has been 
known since the Single European Act 1986) has extensive law making powers which 
operate independently of the Parliaments in Member States but does not operate as a 
federal government, having legislative competence only in the areas prescribed by the 
Treaty. 
However,, the emphasis in recent years has shifted in favour of the European 
Community acting as a single cohesive block when dealing with third countries. For 
example, the European Community is now a member of the G7 group of countries and 
in areas such as customs duties has the exclusive power to make agreements with third 
States. For many, this is viewed as the initial steps to the formation of a United States of 
Europe. 
The areas of competence of the European Community were again enlarged by the Treaty 
on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), most notably in the areas of Justice and 
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Home Affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. These two new pillars 
along with the central pillar of the European Community form the European Union. 
Community Institutions 
Following the Maastricht Treaty, the decision making structure of the Community is 
separated into five institutions - the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the 
Commission, the Court of Auditors and the Court of Justice. Each institution is 
assigned specific tasks by the Treaty, and this division of power reflects the complex 
political, legal and economic relationship which is at the core of the Communities 
obj ectives. 
The Council of Ministers 
The Council of MinisterS475 consists of Ministerial representatives from governments 
of each of the Member States. Depending upon the policy area under discussion, this 
will dictate which minister attends. 476 The Council is the principal legislative body 
within the EC, though the Commission has some legislative powers under the Treaty 
(see below). Due to criticisms of it being undemocratic and secretive, the Council has 
following the Edinburgh Inter- Governmental Conference (IGC) published automatically 
all votes taken by the Council on legislative proposals. Furthermore, the Council 
publishes detailed documents concerning legislative proposals and holds detailed press 
briefings following each meeting. 477 
Under the Maastricht Treaty majority voting (whether qualified majority or simple) in 
the Council is now the norm, though a few areas, taxation being one, are still subject to 
unanimity. It was the Single European Act 1986 which increased the use of Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) and the Maastricht Treaty which extended it further. The votes 
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of each Member State are weighted so that larger states have 10 votes and smaller ones 
fewer. A qualified majority consists of 62 votes out of a total of 87 when the Council 
acts on a Commission proposal. In other cases, the 62 votes must represent a favourable 
vote from at least 10 Member States. When the Council acts under the Social Protocol. a 
qualified majority consists of 52 votes out of 77.478 
One further point to be noted in connection with QMV is the so called "Ioannina 
Compromise". This came about following the enlargement of the Community in 1995 
and reflected primarily the concerns of the UK government. The compromise provides 
that if a total of 23 to 25 votes indicate their opposition to the adoption by the Council 
of a decision by qualified mqjority, the Council will do all within its power to reach 
within a reasonable time a solution that can be adopted by at least 65 votes. 
The Council is assisted in its work by a Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) which consists of the Member States' Ambassadors to the Community. 
The main task of COREPER is to prepare the work of the Council and carry out tasks 
assigned to it by the Council. COREPER also splits into smaller Working Groups that 
discuss some of the more technical aspects of the legislative proposals. 
479 Only if 
COREPER or the Working Group fail to reach agreement on a legislative proposal will 
the matter be discussed further within the full Council. Otherwise it is adopted without 
further debate. 
The Presidency of the Council of Minsters is held in accordance with the Treaties by 
each Member State for a period of six months. During this six month period, the 
Member State holding the Presidency has the pivotal role within the Community. It is 
this Member State that sets the agenda for Council meetings and strongly influences the 
pace of the Councils work. Perhaps most importantly, it is the Member State holding 
the Presidency that will seek compromise when there is disagreement oN-er legislative 
proposals. 
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At the end of each six month Presidency, there is a full meeting of the European 
Council. 480 This is when the Heads of Government meet to discuss the future direction 
of the EC. The meetings of the European Council are highly political affairs and are not 
concerned with the adoption of legislative proposals. They provide the policy direction 
which will be translated into legislation by the Council of Ministers. 
The Commission 
The Commission is the Civil Service of the Community and helps to develop the policy 
adopted by the Council. 481 Furthermore, the Commission also has some legislative 
powers and will introduce directives in mainly procedural areas. The Commission 
avoids political discussion, leaving this task to the Council. 
There are 20 Commissioners in total - two each from the UK France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain, and one from each of the remaining Member States. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty, the European Parliament must give approval to any Commissioner nominated 
for the Presidency of the Commission. Furthermore, the Parliament will also give its 
consent to the Commission once it has been nominated by the Member States and this 
Commission will be appointed for a five year term. 
Once appointed, the Commission operates collectively and must speak with one voice 
on all policy areas. 
482 As stated they are politically independent and carry out their 
duties independently of their national governments. Each Commissioner is given a 
particular policy responsibility during his or her tenure which they pursue in all Member 
States and not j ust their home country. 
The functions and duties of the Commission are inter alia: - 
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- to initiate Community action by proposing policies and putting legislative 
proposals to the Council. 
- to act as a "guardian" of the Treaties by using its wide powers of 
supervision and inspection to ensure that Member States apply the 
provisions of the Treaties and any subsequent legislation. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Commission has the power to initiate actions in the 
European Court of Justice when a Member State breaches the Treaty 
provisions. 
- to act as an external negotiator on behalf of the Communities in areas such 
as the environment and trade. 
- to implement Community policies in accordance with the Treaty and 
supervise Member States in their implementation of legislation. 
- in the case of legislation subject to the cooPeration or co-decision 
procedure, to re-examine the Council's common position on a proposal if 
any amendments are proposed by the European Parliament, and to submit a 
re-examined proposal to the Council. 
- to propose a first draft of and to implement the Budget of the EC. 
The European Court of Justice 
The Court of Justice48-3' is the final arbiter on all legal questions submitted to it under 
the EC Treaty. The primary dtity of the Court is to ensure that the Treaty is applied and 
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interpreted correctly by all Member States. It will hear disputes arising between 
Community institutions and between institutions and private firms. All decisions of the 
ECJ are binding on those concerned. 
In recent years, the workload of the Court has increased leading to a delay in the time 
taken for a case to be heard. This was the main motivation behind the establishment of 
the Court of First instance in the Single European Act. Since 1988, the Court of First 
Instance has dealt with cases which are complex or of less general interest. Initially, its 
competence extended only to areas such as competition and steel but since the 
Maastricht Treaty, its competence has been extended to cover all direct actions by 
citizens and firms against Community Institutions. However, it has no competence to 
hear actions brought by Member States or Community Institutions, or to give 
preliminary rulings on questions from national courts. 
The Court of Justice, consists of 16 Judges and 9 advocate-generals who are appointed 
for a five year period and they operate independently of all Member States. 
The European Parliament 
Since 1979 the Members of the European Parliament have484 been directly elected by 
the universal suffrage. Prior to this, the institution was referred to only as the "European 
Assembly" because its members were nominated by each Member State. Each Member 
of the European Parliament (MEP) is elected for a five year period with elections being 
held simultaneously in each Member State. 
At present there is no common electoral procedure within the Community with each 
Member State applying its own electoral process. 
485 However, since 1982 there ha,,., e 
been proposals for a uniform electoral procedure but this has proved to unsuccessful due 
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to lack of agreement in the Council. The proposals of the Parliament are based on 
proportional representation and thus would change the present electoral arrangements of 
the UK486 
The European Parliament comprises of 626 Members, 87 of whom represent 
constituencies in the United Kingdom. In the UK, Members of both Houses of 
Parliament may stand for election to the European Parliament, with those Members 
representing Northern Ireland constituencies being regularly elected to both. 
Any citizen of the European Union may stand for election to the European Parliament in 
any Member State and not just in his or her country of origin. Though the chances of 
being successfully elected are greatly diminished UK politicians have stood for election 
with varying degrees of success. David Steel MP unsuccessfully challenged to represent 
a constituency in Milan in 1989, but the British businessman Sir James Goldsmith 
represents a constituency in Paris for his anti-federalist party. 
Since 1986,, and the introduction of the cooperation procedure, there has been a major 
increase in the role of the European Parliament in the legislative process. The Maastricht 
Treaty has given the Parliament an even greater say through the co-decision procedure. 
The Parliament now has a direct influence on the content of legislation, by proposing 
1 487 amendments and can by unanimity reject the Common Position of the Council. 
The Treaties provide for other functions to be carried out by the Parliament. For 
example, it has the power to question both the Council and Commission on matters of 
policy. By a two-thirds niqjority, it can require the resignation of the Commission as an 
entire body (but not individually). In the international sphere, the assent of the 
Parliament is needed to conclude certain agreements, 
488 as is also the case prior to the 
489 
admission of new Member States 
Page - -343 
An area of operation that was widely extended by the Maastricht Treatý, came in the area 
of the European Parliaments investigative powers in cases of maladministration or 
infringement of Community law which are not subject to judicial proceedings In this 
context, Article 138e EC Treaty provides for the appointment, by the European 
Parliament of an Ombudsman to investigate maladministration. 
The reason for this increase in the activities of the European Parliament was to counter 
criticisms that the Community was undemocratic and isolated from the real needs of the 
peoples of Europe. The Parliament being the only directly elected institution of the EC, 
had to increase its influence and profile in order to establish its democratic credentials. 
The Court of Auditors 
The Court of Auditors490 is now considered as the fifth institution of the EC. It consists 
of 15 members who are appointed for a six year term by the Council following 
consultation with the European Parliament. The primary function of the Court of 
Auditors is to examine the accounts of the Community. Allied to this is the vital task of 
combating fraud in the Community491 by ensuring all expenditure is lawful or not 
wasteful. 
The Court of Auditors operates in a wholly autonomous way and has the power to 
investigate any Community institution or any funding decision. Each year, an annual 
report is presented with the findings of the Court of Auditors to all the Community 
institutions in preparation for agreeing the following years budget. 
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OTHER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMMITTEES 
The Economic and Social Committee 
The Economic and Social Committee492 consists of 222 members who are appointed 
for a four year term. The membership is drawn from a variety of European organisations 
such as Trade Unions, business leaders and a variety of professional occupations. The 
United Kingdom is represented by 24 members who take their place on the Committee. 
The primary function of the Economic and Social Committee is to act as a consultative 
body for both the Council and the Commission on any Community matter. Thus it is a 
major source (along with II and ideas for pressure groups) of information 
Community policy. 
The Committee of the Regions 
The Committee of the RegionS493 is a new development, only coming into being since 
the Maastricht Treaty. The Committee is constituted of representatives of regional and 
local authorities from all 15 Member States. It has 222 members who are appointed by 
the Council of Ministers for a four year tenure. The number of members are weighted 
according to the population of each Member State. 
Though independent in its operation, the role of the Committee is purely advisory. It is 
convened on the request of the Council of Ministers or the Commission, but can if 
required meet at its own initiative. The Committee may be consulted by the Council or 
Commission on any policý,, matter. However, both of these institutions are under an 
obligation to consult the Committee in the following policy areas: education. public 
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health; the report on economic and social cohesion; cultural "incentive measures"; basic 
rules governing all the Structural Funds and implementing rules for the Regional Fund. 
The Council and Commission may set a time limit in which these opinions are given. 
but a failure by the Committee to produce a report will not prevent further action. 
Similarly, though under an obligation to consult, the Council and Commission will not 
always take onboard the views of the Committee. In essence, the Committee of the 
Regions is just one part of a wider lobbying process. 
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APPENDIX 3 
THE WORKING METHODS OF THE SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 
The Committee meets every week when the House is sitting, usually at 4 pm on 
Wednesdays. Though the Committee has the power to meet during an adjournment this 
has not been exercised for many years. 
In preparation for the weekly meeting, a batch af advisory briefs is put on the Letter 
Board in the Vote Office at about 6 pm in Mondays. A second batch of advisory briefs 
together with a draft agenda is put on the Letter Board at about 6 pm on Tuesdays. 
However,, it is often the case that last minute briefs are put on the Board at lunch-time 
on Wednesdays. 
On arrival at the meeting each member of the Committee is given a folder which 
contains an updated copy of the agenda, a fresh copy of each advisory brief and a copy 
of the relevant Explanatory Memoranda. (This can also be obtained at an earlier stage 
from the Clerk). 
The Members receive no other documents, but can obtain a copy of the instrument for 
themselves from the Vote Office. The Committee's staff are there to assist the members 
with any matters relating to the instrument or any other issues concerning the work of 
the Select Committee. 
The Clerk of the Committee has the overall responsibility for the work of the 
Committee and the conduct of its meetings. It is the role of the Clerk to deal with the 
procedural advice for the Committee. In his role, the Clerk is assisted by the Assistant to 
the Clerk who deals witli the agenda for meetings and makes the arrangements for any In 
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visits. There is also a documents clerk whose function is to prepare the relevant 
documents for each meeting. 
Under the general direction of the Clerk, there are three Clerks/Advisers who are 
responsible for examining all the instruments coming before the Committee and 
offering advice to the Committee on how they should be dealt with. Each of the three 
Clerks/Advisers has responsibility for a particular area of legislation. They specialise as 
follows: - 
1. Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
2. Energy, Overseas Development, Employment, Health and Safety and 
Environment. 
3. Treasury, Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, Trade and Industry and 
Transport. 
The Committee also has the assistance of one of the Speaker's Counsel, whose task is to 
clarify the likely impact on United Kingdom law of the instrument coming before the 
committee and give any other legal advice which is required. This is an important role, 
as the impact of the legislation on UK domestic legislation is often the reason for the 
document to be recommended for further debate by the Committee. 
At deliberative meetings of the Committee the Clerk and all other relevant adviser are 
present. These deliberative sessions are always held in private. For oral evidence 
sessions which are usually held in Public, similar arrangements apply with the Clerk and 
adviser being present to assist. 
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After each meeting. the Committee's decisions are collated and presented to the House. 
together with explanatory paragraphs in a Report. It Is published as soon as possible 
after the meeting of the Committee and is available to all Members from the Vote 
Office. 
Each week, a list of European Community Documents which have been referred to one 
of the two European Standing Committees is published by the Public Bill Office. This 
also refers to the progress of the document and is circulated in Mondays Order Paper. 
The support staff are vital to the functioning of the Committee. They do all the 
necessary preparation which the Members with all their other obligations could never 
do. They also liaise with the other departments to keep informed of what European 
documents are likely to be before the Committee in the near future. Furthermore, unlike 
the Members, the permanent staff do not have a lengthy summer recess, and continue 
the work of the Committee at this time, but without the weekly meetings. 
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